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Preface 
This  report presents  the  results  of a study  on  the  costing  and  financing  of universal 
service obligations  in  a CO"l'etitive telecomn.Jnications  environrrent.  The  study was 
carried  out by  Wissenschaftliches  lnstitut fOr  Komn.Jnikationsdienste  (WIK},  with the 
assistance of DETECON Deutsche Telepost Consulting GmbH,  Bonn, for DG XIII of the 
European Commission. 
The study results were obtained through interviews with interested parties, the analysis 
of responses  to  questionnaires  and,  most  irll'ortantly,  original  research  on  relevant 
costing rrethodologies and financing approaches. 
Contributions were received from numerous representatives from regulatory authorities, 
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appreciation and thanks. 
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Background, general approach, issues not further covered in the 
report 
Background and general approach 
With the establishment of a competitive regime in the telecornrunications market in the 
European Union,  it has become necessary to put the objective of universal service on a 
new  basis as otherwise the provision and  financing  of telecoi1111.Jnications  services at 
affordable prices to everyone may  in the future no longer be assured. For this  purpose, 
the BJ has established a framew ark of special rules and safeguards that cofl1)rise the 
(proposed)  Voice  Telephony  Directive,  the  Interconnection  Directive  and  the  Full 
Cofl1)etition Directive. 
The Voice Telephony Directive provides a series of measures aimed at ensuring that all 
reasonable requests  for access to the fixed  public  telephone  netw ark and  provision of 
telephone  service  at  a fixed  location  are  met.  Specific  Universal  Service  Obligations 
(USOs)  ifl1)osed  on  organisations  designated  by  1\11ent>er  States  as  USO  providers 
concern the provision of a connection to the fixed public telephone netw ark, the provision 
of directories and directory enquiry services and the provision of public pay phones.1 
Under  the  Interconnection  Directive  and  Full  Cofl1)etition  Directive,  in  cases  w here 
specific USOs  result in  a justified net cost to  the  USO provider,  1\11ent>er  States  may 
allow  the  net  cost  to  be  shared  with  other  organisations  operating  public  tele-
cornrunications netw arks and/or publicly available telecorrm.mications services, under 
a Universal Service Fund  (USF).  This  framework for costing and  financing of USOs  is 
interpreted  in  detail  in  the  Communication  of the  Commission  on  USO  assessment 
criteria of 27 Novent>er 1996. 
Respecting  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  Directives  and  interpreted  in  the 
Cornrunication, the task of this report is to further clarify the principles and practices of 
costing and financing of USOs, in particular to develop 
•  criteria by which to identify the costs of efficient delivery of USO services; 
•  concrete procedures by which such costs can actually be measured; 
•  a methodology  to  assess the  revenues  to  be  set against the  cost of USO service 
delivery to obtain its direct net cost; 
Universal Service is defined in the Interconnection Directive as: "a defined minimum set of services of 
specific quality which is  available to all users independent of their geographic location and,  in  the 
light  of  specific  national  circumstances,  at  an  affordable  price".  The  term  "Universal  Service 
Obligations  (USOs)"  refers  in  this  report to  the obligations,  put on  a voice telephony  operator or 
service provider by a National Regulatory Authority (NRA), to provide Universal Service in  a specific 
geography. 2 
•  approaches to a rrethodology for assessing the value of indirect benefits; 
•  a rrethodology for deriving the net cost of the USO by avoiding double counting; 
•  whenever possible, benchmarks for the values of the various elerrents in the net cost 
calculations; and 
•  the  design  of  a  funding  rrechanism  that  rreets  the  requirerrents  of  non-
discrinination and proportionality. 
The criteria and procedures proposed should be practical and allow  the deternination of 
the relevant figures in a transparent and objective manner. 
Beyond  that the  report airrs  to  carry forward the debate about the  proper costing  of 
telecomrunications services in general. 
Of particular relevance in this context is the assulll"Jtion, maintained throughout rrost of 
the  study,  that  USO  services  will  in  the  beginning  be  delivered  exclusively  by  the 
incurment network operator. 
The net cost of providing universal services in  a given financial year,  in  rrost general 
terms, consists of: 
(  1)  Costs of service delivery avoidable if there were no universal service 
(2)  Revenues forgone from these services 
(3)  =  Direct net cost 
(4)  Value of any indirect benefits that flow from being a USO provider 
(5)  =  Overall net cost 
The difference generated by  lines  (  1)  and  (2)  is  the  direct  net cost because it  is  the 
directly rreasurable result from the USO activities  in  question.  Deducting from (3)  the 
indirect benefits of USO provision to the USO provider leads to the  overall net cost of 
universal service. 
The  summary  of  our  analysis  and  findings  regarding  the  various  costing, 
financing  and  methodological  issues  listed  above  is  given  in  the  following 
sections. Detailed methodological and practical issues including the concepts of 
avoidable costs,  revenues  forgone,  direct net costs and  overall  net costs, as 
well as the proper and appropriate financing of net costs are dealt with in  the 
Main  Report.  In  addition,  sample  calculations  for  the  various  stages  of the 
costing  and  financing  process  are  presented.  This  Executive  Summary -------------------~--s_tin~g_a_nd_F_in_a_nc_in~g~U_n_ive_r_sa_I_Se_N_ic_e_Ob~lig~a_tio_n_s  ________________ 3 
highlights the information required  by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to 
undertake the various costing and financing calculations. 
Special issues not further covered in main body of  report 
We start the surnTary with a resurre of aspects relevant in the context of the cost of the 
USO and its financing that are addressed in the introductory chapter of the report but are 
not covered any further in its main body. These issues are: 
- provision  of  universal  service  through  the  current  USO  provider  as  part  of  its 
corn:>etitive pas itioning, 
- corn:>etitive bidding, 
- requirerrent to  "play"2  for errergency  services,  operator  assistance  services,  and 
directory enquiry services, 
the funding of netw ark rrodifications required for the provision of specialised  services 
for disabled users and users with special needs, 
- specially targeted funding scherres (voucher and (virtual) voucher scherres), and 
- access deficit contributions (ADCs). 
We believe that relying on the current USO provider to continue offering USO services 
as  part  of  its  COI'l1Jetitive  positioning  and  designing  regulations  to  support  such  a 
corn:>etitive provision has a high chance of proving successful. This w auld rrean that in 
those  instances  where  this  approach  is  used,  setting  up  a  net-cost/corn:>ensation 
regirre may  prove unnecessary. A  regulatory  provision following this  approach seems 
so far successful  in  Germany. 3  As  a  corollary  to  this  follows  that,  as  long  as  the 
incurrt>ent  operator  dominates  the  market  and  corn:>etitors  have  only  small  market 
shares,  or,  as  long  as  corn:>etition  is  not  really  flourishing  and  other  operators  are 
actually not also involved in the business of providing USO services, there may  be little 
point in  establishing  a  USO  cost sharing  rrechanism.  Such  a  mechanism could,  as 
2  In the terminology used in the discussion on  universal service and the USO, the obligation to "play" 
means that the USO in question is placed on market entrants as well as on the incumbent, whereas 
the obligation to "pay" refers to the situation in which the incumbent operator is the only usa provide 
and entrants pay their share of the burden, say, by contributions into a Universal Service Fund. 
3  The  German  approach  essentially  postulates  that  the  requirements  of  universal  service w ill  be 
fulfilled  through  the  competitive  process.  The  incumbent  operator  is  seen  currently  to  provide  a 
satisfactory  level  of  universal  service.  If  it  wished to  discontinue  part of this  service  unless  it  is 
compensated for its  net cost,  it would have to  announce this  one year in  advance.  The  regulator 
would then check whether the provision of universal service could not be ascertained by competitors 
of  the  incumbent  without  any  compensation.  If  this  failed  competitive  tendering  would  be 
contemplated. Only if these approaches would not prove feasible or successful would compensation 
of the incumbent operator be taken into consideration. 4 
negative side effects, inhibit market entry of new, particularly smaller competitors and,  in 
addition, cause substantial admnistrative costs that one should not incur unnecessarily. 
When there is  to be  a USO net cost sharing mechanism,  using a competitive bidding 
approach  may  be  attractive  in  terms  of achieving  efficiency  goals  in  respect of both 
determning  the  USO  provider and  determning the  net cost of USO  services.  In  our 
opinion,  how ever,  for  reasons  listed  together  with  Recorrrrendation  2  below,  the 
conditions necessary for its  application do not yet exist in  rrost IVIerrber States, except 
perhaps in those with still incomplete roll-out of their netw arks. As long as the conditions 
for competitive bidding do not exist, one needs to rely on the approach of deternining the 
net cost of the USO that the provider incurs, seeing to it that these costs correspond to 
those of efficient delivery. 
The  Voice Telephony  Drective requires  that each provider of telephone services offer 
emergency services,  operator assistance  services,  and  directory enquiry services, 
which means that in respect of these services all CO"l>etitors are under the obligation to 
"play"4.  We  believe  that their  provision  will  in  fact be  assured  under the  corll>etitive 
process so that a priori there is  no need to provide for them in a USO net cost sharing 
mechanism. The NRA's irll>ortant task in respect of these services consists in providing 
for  interconnection arrangements to assure access to bottleneck resources required for 
these services by  new  corll>etitors. This applies  in particular if the new  corll>etitors are 
small  players  for which  setting  up  their  own facilities  (e.g.  emergency  call  centres) 
required for these services w auld be beyond their capabilities. 
We suggest that the netoork modifications required for offering specialised services for 
disabled users and users  !Mth  special needs  should  not sirll>IY  be  included within the 
scherne  handling  standardised usa services,  as  the  measures  needed  for them will 
require special initiatives both for setting them up and financing them. 
While  specially  targeted  funding  schemes,  in  particular  so-called  (virtual)  voucher 
schernes,  may  be  legitimate  policy  options  for  governments  to  bring  telecormuni-
cations services to disadvantaged groups of people, special care must be exercised that 
their financing is appropriately taken care of as part of the usa net cost calculation and 
net cost sharing rnechanism  Such schernes, which typically reduce the revenues that 
w auld  otherwise be  obtained  for the  sarne  arrount of services,  should  enter  into  the 
usa  net  cost deternination  through  their  effect on  revenues.  They  should  not  be 
considered to cause a usa cost to the extent of the noninal value of the scherne (for 
exarll>le in  the case of (virtual)  vouchers the full arrount of the value of the vouchers) 
because, as  reasoned  in  sorre detail in  Recommendation  5 below, this  w auld  alrrost 
certainly risk deternining a usa net cost in excess of what is required.  It w auld also not 
be  consistent with Conm  .. mity  Law . It is  worthwhile to point this  out at the outset as  it 
appears to have been suggested that one should proceed otherwise. 
4  For a discussion of the terms "play" and "pay" see footnote 2. ------------------~_st_in~g_an_d_R_na_nc_in~g_U_nw_e_rs_ai_S_er_vic_e_~~lig_at_ion_s  _______________ 5 
tt follows from the definition of the USO net cost that the access deficit is  not one of its 
corrponents. The USO net cost equals the net cost of serving customers that w auld not 
be  served  if  there  w ere  no  USO.  The  access  deficit,  in  contrast,  is  the  difference 
between the  totality  of costs  of subscriber lines  mnus  the totality  of rentals  received 
from the users of these lines.  The majority  of these users are customers that,  despite 
an  access deficit they  may  give  rise  to,  provide  a surplus  over all  the  services  they 
purchase. They are therefore not customers falling under the USO generating any deficit 
in need of corrpensation. The remedy for the possible problems due to an access deficit 
is  a restructuring of tariffs, as called for in the Full Competition  Directive.  If this  causes 
hardship  with  certain  customer  groups,  this  negative  irrpact  should  be  neutralised 
through targeted special tariff packages; any net cost of these would be picked up by the 
usa net cost calculation. 
Our position on theses issues, as summarised above and derived in detail in Section 1.3 
of the main text, leads to the follow ing recommendations: 
Recommendations 1 to 6 
1.  As regards the possibility of assuring the provision of universal service through the 
current USO provider as part of its corrpetitive positioning and without submtting a 
claim for compensation, there is value for the NRA to consider designing regulations 
that advance such a solution. This  w auld  circumvent the necessity of setting up a 
mechanism for the sharing of usa costs. 
The  NRA  is  urged to  consider in  this  context as  a general matter that setting  up 
such a mechanism is  called  for only  at such a time  when competition  is  already 
flourishing and competitors have already had an opportunity to enter themselves the 
business  of  providing  USO  services.  As  we  argue  farther  below  (see 
Recommendation  32),  the  incurrbent operator is  in  the  meantime  more  likely  to 
benefit from the status of usa provider than to actually  incur a net cost due to  it. 
Installing  a USO  cost sharing  mechanism under these circumstances  could well 
act as an entry barrier and cause unnecessary admnistrative costs. 
2.  Using  corrpetitive tendering  to  determne usa providers  has  attractive efficiency 
features. Unsolved problems regarding information asymmetries, potential strategic 
bidding  behaviour  due  to  small  number  of  bidders,  and  in  general  insufficient 
information  about the  scope of the  overall  net cost of the  USO  - especially  if  it 
confers substantial indirect benefits on  the current (incurrbent)  provider - mtigate 
against its  application  at the  present time  in  l\llerrber  States  with fully  developed 
netw arks. There w auld  be scope to  use the procedure in  l\llerrber States with still 
incomplete roll-out of their netw arks as the caveats apply there w ith less force. 
There  are,  however,  good  arguments  for  the  NRA  to  keep  abreast  of  the 
developments regarding the potential of using corrpetitive tendering for allowing the 
provision  of usa services  through  the  corrpetitive  process,  and  to  contemplate 
using the approach once the conditions for it are ready. 6 
3.  V\lhile the Voice Telephony  IJrective requires  that each telephone service provider 
provide for 
- emergency services, 
- operator assistance, and 
- directory enquiry services, 
there does not appear to be a need for including these services in  a USO net cost 
corrpensation  scheme.  The  reason  is  that  each  telephone  service  provider  will 
normally  include these services as  part of its  basic  offering thereby  automatically 
fulfilling the requirement. 
The  real  task of the  NRA  in  the  context of the  above  three  services  consists  of 
arranging  for interconnection  agreements  that would  enable  new  corrpetitors,  in 
particular if these are small  players, to access resources  under the control of the 
incurrbent operator that are needed to offer these services. 
Errergency  call  centres  belong  to  the  resources  that  facilitate  the  provision  of 
emergency  calls.  Since  maintaining  jointly  such  centres  is  in  the  interest  of  all 
network operators, one could  rely  on voluntary agreements to settle the sharing of 
their  costs.  If  the  intervention  of the  NRA  is  required  for bringing  about such  an 
agreement,  this  should  be  accorrplished  outside  the  USO  corrpensation 
mechanism. Again, the NRA should take care that small players also have access 
to the services of these centres at a coflTT'ensurate share of their costs. 
4.  Since  special  efforts  need  to  go  into  the  organisation  of  providing  and  funding 
network rrodifications needed for the offering of specialised services to users with 
disabilities  and  users  with  special  needs,  the  NRA  should  consider  installing  a 
special  USO  fund  to  cover  the  cost  of  such  efforts  (e.g.  in  form  of  projects 
supported by rrost corrpetitors). 
5.  The financing of specially targeted funding schemes  (for exarrple (virtual) voucher 
schemes) should strictly be accorrplished within the confines and  on the basis  of 
the standard USO net cost deternination. To  proceed otherwise would for one  be 
contrary to Cornrunity Law.  ~would  also risk to lead to an arrount of the cost of the 
USO  which  is  higher  than  required  as  not  all  beneficiaries  actually  cause  a  net 
deficit, for exarrple w hen their cost of service is  particularly low  and they generate 
enough (outgoing and inconing) call revenue to cover that cost. 
6.  The NRA is urged to allow  that the incurrbent operator restructure its tariffs in order 
to elininate any existing access deficit.  ~ would be inconsistent with the concept of 
the  USO to  make  an  access deficit a part of the  USO net cost. The  NRA  should 
convince itself that making the operator offer targeted special tariff packages  is  an 
effective and  efficient way of neutralising the  negative irrpact of a restructuring  of 
tariffs on certain user groups. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  7 
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II  The approach to cost in the net cost calculation 
The problem to be solved 
As stated above, the overall net cost of the USO to be corn:>ensated  under a USO net 
cost sharing rn3chanism consists of the cost of service production avoidable if there 
were no universal service minus revenues forgone from these services minus the value 
of indirect benefits that flow from being a USO provider. Of these three components the 
avoidable production cost component is  the roost essential one and its deternination is 
also the roost demanding. 
V\111en  carrying out the  production cost deternination we find  that a  separate costing 
exercise has to be accorn:>lished for the provision of the following services: 
•  access to the netw ark (subscriber lines), 
•  telephone services, and 
•  public pay phones. 
These  services  w auld  be  the  main  sources  of  USO  costs  under  a  standard 
compensation schern3. 
A  set of criteria by which to deternine the relevant costs of service provision has to be 
identified.  That this  is  not a straightforward matter  lies  in  the fact that roost  if  not all 
telecommunications  netw ark operators do not possess cost accounting systems that 
are in a position to provide the needed information. In  particular, the systems that are in 
place often generate cost data that do not properly reflect cost causation. 
The  first objective  is  therefore to  clarify  a  nurrber of conceptual  and  rn3thodological 
issues,  in  particular  regarding  the  cost standard to be  used.  Following  that,  practical 
issues regarding implern3ntation of the cost standard have to be discussed, in particular 
regarding a situation where the data base that can be supplied by the netw ark operator 
exhibits  the  rn3ntioned  deficiencies.  In  addition  questions  regarding  netw ark structure 
that have implications for the allow able level of costs are to be addressed in this context. 
Finally,  a rn3thodology  for cost deternination will be presented and a list of steps that 
should be followed by the NRA to obtain the necessary information to carry out the cost 
deternination. 
The  Long-Run  Incremental Cost standard and the  requirements  to be met by 
costing procedures 
Firms  facing vigorous competition in  their markets  must adhere for their pricing on the 
cost standard of Long-Run  lncrern3ntal  Cost (LRIC)  in  order to  survive and  prosper. 
This  is  the standard set by  an  efficient operator using  current technology,  and which 8 
assures that a firm cannot be out-perforrred by its corrpetitors in terms of its prices and 
quality. From the point of view  of the corrpetitive standard, irrplying the efficiency of the 
rrarket process, the proper standard for the costing of USO services is therefore that of 
LRIC. 
The  EU  regulations  require  that the  costing  of  USO  services  must  corrply  with the 
principles  of  non-discrinination,  transparency  and  objectivity.  Further  achieving 
econonic efficiency is  a rrajor objective of any regulatory provision.  It is  for this  reason 
that  the  Interconnection  Directive  requires  the  application  of forward-looking  costs,  a 
requirerrent  which  the  LRIC  standard  fulfills.  At the  sarre  tirre,  another  irrportant 
objective is, how ever, the practicability of the approach to cost deternination. 
The objectives underlying the above requirerrents are as follows: 
Efficiency and non-discrimination: Requiring  determnation of the cost of USOs  on  the 
basis of a cost standard reflecting efficient operation assures that this cost corresponds 
to the cost under a corrpetitive standard. If COI'll'ensation payrrents for the cost of USO 
provision are calculated using a standard that does not fulfill the efficiency requirerrent, 
the  contributors  to  the  COI'll'ensation  will  effectively  subsidise  the  USO  provider. 
Therefore, to avoid discrinination between rrarket participants in the financing of USOs, 
contributions into a USF (by "paying only"5  contributors)  must be  required  to  be  based 
on  costs  of USOs  that  correspond  to  efficient provision.  As pointed  out already,  this 
illl'lies the application of the proposed forward-looking LRIC cost standard. 
Practicability:  For  determning  the  cost of  USO  services,  the  NRA  must  have  at  its 
disposal the  proper instrurrents of evaluation,  and  proper inforrration and  data bases. 
The  proper  cost accounting  approach  for the  purpose  is  current cost Activity-Based 
Costing  (ABC)  but so far European  telecomrunications  netw ark operators  have only 
illl'lerrented  such  systems  very  occasionally.  This  should,  however,  provide  no 
justification  to  rely  on  data  from existing  Fully  Distributed  Cost (FDC)  accounting  for 
reasons of practicability. Instead of using FDC data, it is more consistent with regulatory 
objectives  - and  at the  same  time  more  practical - for the  NRA  to  require  data  from 
special studies and in particular use analytical cost modelling of its own. 
Transparency and objectivity:  In  the  process of deternining proper cost measures  for 
the  costing  of  USOs  the  aims  of  transparency  and  objectivity  should  be  ensured. 
Transparency  means  that  the  procedures  followed  should  not  be  too  colll'lex. 
Objectivity  in  determning  USO  costs  means  that the  best available approach is  used 
when  approxirrations  to  unobservable  realities  have  to  be  rrade.  Since  such 
approxirrations  always  involve  judgements  which  rray  not  be  COI'll'letely  free  of 
subjective  bias,  it  should  be  the  aim  to  rrake  the  process  of costing  as  visible  and 
transparent as possible in order to discover and elininate such bias. 
5  For a discussion of the terms "play" and "pay" see footnote 2. -----------------~  __  st_in~g_an_d_Fi_na_nc_in~g_U_niv_e_rs_ai_S_er_vic_e_O_bl~ig_ati_on_s _______________ 9 
Despite the general acceptance of the goals of the liberalisation process and despite the 
fact that  the  above  requirerrents  have  always  played  a  substantial  role  in  all  policy 
issues  regarding  telecornn.Jnications,  it  would  be  safe for the  NRA  to  prepare  itself 
regarding  upconing  questions  in  the  present  context  on  the  basis  of  the  following 
recor11119ndations.  The  detailed  discussion  and  the  argurrents  supporting  these 
recor11119ndations are found in Section 2.2 of the main text. 
Recommendations 7 to 10 
7.  There is  a need for the  NRA to faniliarise itself thoroughly with the  irrplications of 
the  requirerrents  of  efficiency,  non-discrinination,  transparency,  objectivity  and 
practicability on the costing of USO services.  In this  context, the applicability of the 
cost standard of Long  Run  lncrerrental Cost (LRIC)  proposed in  this  study should 
generally  be established  as  the correct one.  The  NRA  should uphold  in  particular 
the  forward-looking  character  of  the  LRIC  concept  (in  agreerrent  w ith  the 
Interconnection Directive). 
8.  Non-discrinination requires that contributors into the  USF for the financing of USO 
services  are  not  paying  rrore  for  these  services  than  w auld  be  payable  if  the 
services  were  provided  under  corrpetitive  conditions.  The  NRA's  goal  should 
therefore be to  apply  a standard for the costing of USOs  that rreets this  demand. 
The cost standard best suited for the purpose is that of LRIC. 
9.  One prerequisite for ensuring the legitimacy of necessary corrpensation payrrents 
is  a corrplete transparency of the process of USO cost deternination.  It should be 
one of the airrs of the NRA to install a procedure that assures this condition. 
10.  The NRA w auld need to have the expertise at its disposal to set itself in the position 
to judge- objectively, by  itself and  using only  criteria that correspond to the  NRA's 
nission - the justification of presurred cases of unecononic services and the size 
of the deficits subnitted by the USO provider with the claim for corrpensation. 
Cost accounting issues 
Cost  accounting  procedures  with  regard  to  the  costing  of  USO  services  should 
conmand prirre regulatory  attention.  Cost accounting  involves the  handling  of issues 
which have substantial impact on the level of costs eventually rreasured. The following 
are  the  main  issues  on  which  the  NRA  must  itself  form  an  opinion  and  establish 
appropriate rulings: 
Cost  accounting  practices:  The  traditionally  used  Fully-Distributed  Costing  (FOC) 
approach is increasingly criticised for its inadequacy for managerial as well as regulatory 
purposes  as  FOC  data  generally  are  not  based  on  the  underlying  cost  causation 
processes.  Rigorously  applied  Activity-Based  Costing  (ABC)  is  the  right approach for I 
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applying the standard of Long-Run  Incremental Cost (LRIC)  as  it not only  reflects cost 
causation  but also  picks  up  only  those costs that correspond  to  efficient provision.  A 
large majority of incurment usa providers are, how ever, as of the present, still far away 
from having installed such an ABC system Even in those cases where operators report 
being  in  the  process  of establishing  ABC costing,  it  is  doubtful  that their  efforts  will 
already  have gone  all  the  way toward setting  up  what above  is  called  rigorous  ABC 
costing.  In  such cases,  it  may  be  necessary to  reject cost figures  even  if they  come 
from ABC systerrs, for exafll)le if they still reflect inefficiencies. Also in such cases,  in 
lieu- or as an extension- of the existing ABC systerrs, analytical cost rrodels can offer 
valuable assistance. Such cost rrodels determne the costs of service provision bottom-
up,  including  only  those  cost  cofll)onents  that  are  necessary  under  conditions  of 
efficient service provision. 
Current vs.  historical input prices:  Traditionally,  network operators  have  based  their 
costing systerrs on the historical prices of the inputs used in the production process. In 
the  past years with emerging  cofll)etition and  new  operators using rrodern equipment 
with  rruch  lower costs,  the  inadequacy  of  historical  cost accounting  with  regard  to 
pricing decisions has become obvious. At the same time there has been an  increasing 
regulatory requirement to apply the cofll)etitive efficiency standard to prices and costs, 
which means  that according to  a forward-looking concept,  pricing decisions should  be 
based on the current replacement costs of assets. From this follows a need for network 
operators to rrove from Historical Cost Accounting to Current Cost Accounting (CCA). 
NetiAOrk  costs due to depreciation:  In  a capital-intensive sector like telecorrrrunications 
the  method  to  determne an  appropriate  arrount of depreciation  is  one  of the  central 
strategic parameters  in  the  area  of cost accounting.  From a regulatory  and  efficiency 
point  of  view  and  especially  with  regard  to  the  determnation  of  usa  costs,  a 
depreciation rrethod is preferable which is as closely as possible in line with the rrethod 
of economc depreciation. This  method takes  into account changes in the prices of the 
equipment  invested  as  well  as  expected  changes  in  the  demand  for  the  output 
generated by the equiprrent. 
The  cost of capital:  The  cost of capital  (CC)  - or  rather  the  rate  of return  on  capital 
efll)loyed - that the network operator will be allowed to earn on account of the services it 
supplies under the usa has also a great ifll)act on the level of overall costs. The CC is 
to  be derived as  a weighted average of the  rate of return that shareholders  require  on 
their shares in the cofll)any and the rate of interest that the cofll)any pays on its debt. 
An ifll)ortant cofll)onent in  the  forrrer is  the risk prerrium to  be  included according to 
the network operator's overall risk.  This  risk premum and  the weights that the two CC 
cofll)onents  have  in  the  overall  rreasure  require  regulatory  determnation.  Given  that 
costing is to be carried out on a CCA  basis, the CC should be on a real rate basis,  i.e. 
w ith the inflationary cofll)onent taken off from the nomnal rate. -----------------~  __  st_in~g_an_d_Fi_na_nc_in~g_U_nw_e_rs_ai_Se_N_~_e_O_bl~iga_ti_on_s  _______________  11 
Operating,  maintenance and administrative costs: There does  not exist much  detailed 
factual  inforrration  accessible  to  external  observers  on  the  costs  of  operating, 
maintaining and adrrinistering a telecolllll.Jnications system. Therefore, the NRA  must 
order the regulated firm to provide it with inforrration that is as detailed as possible. If not 
available  from an  ABC system,  studies  should  be  carried  out  with the  objective  to 
provide such information according to the standards of ABC costing. The data submtted 
should decurrent that the costs correspond to an efficient operation,  rraintenance and 
adrrinistration  of the  network in  question.  Further,  it should  be  required,  following the 
principles of ABC costing, that as little as possible of the total costs is left in the category 
of residual unattributable common costs. 
Treatment  of  sunk  costs:  An  important  aspect  of  capital  investrrent  in 
telecolllll.Jnications is the issue of sunk costs. There are sunk costs if there are  capital 
iterrs which have no alternative use and which have not yet been arrortised. In particular 
when there has been investrrent in capacity which has becorre redundant, the network 
operator rray argue that it should be allowed to include the extra burden in its prices and 
usa deficit figures.  Such a deviation from the proper costing of USa services should, 
however, not be  allowed.  The  usa provider should  have had  the opportunity  to  apply 
special depreciation charges on such sunk investrrent in the preparatory phases to the 
establishrrent of full competition.  As regards  uneconomic custorrers in  an  economic 
area that the  usa provider would  not have  been  able  to  identify  beforehand,  the  net 
costs of serving them under the usa do not include the sunk costs of the local network 
since  this  cost  is  not  avoidable.  Pensions  due  to  employees  for  which  no  proper 
reserves were built up in the past, as another category of sunk costs, are also not part of 
the costs of current service provision and in particular not of the cost of the provision of 
usa  services. 
Treatment of  common cost: The proportion of total costs that on the basis of a thorough 
analysis shows no causal link to a service is  the true common cost as it does not vary 
with the level of activity of the firm Accordingly, the true common cost does not change 
if a network operator discontinues to  serve specific areas or custorrers. Thus  it is  not 
part of the LRIC of USa services. 
The detailed discussion underlying the above sunmary is  found in Section 2.3.1  of the 
rrain text, with digressions on depreciation policies in Appendix A and on the sunk costs 
due to pensions in Appendix B. This discussion leads to the following recomrrendations: 
Recommendations 11 to 16 
11.  There is a need for the NRA to be aware of the impact of cost accounting issues on 
the level of the costs of usa  services. In particular, the NRA should be aware of the 
status of the cost accounting system of the usa provider. It should not be prepared 
to accept cost figures for usa services on  the basis  of a traditional  FOC costing 12 
system  Instead  it  should  insist  on  the  establishment  of  an  analytical  cost 
accounting system based on rigorously applied ABC principles.  6 
12.  Since  analytical  cost  rrodels  (in  lieu  or  as  an  extension  of  an  analytical  cost 
accounting  system)  are quite  powerful, even if no  specific data from the  network 
operator are available, the NRA should decide to use such an instrument for its own 
independent assessment of the costs of USO provision. 
13.  The choice of the depreciation regime has great influence on the costs shown for a 
capital intensive industry like telecomn.mications.  For this  reason, there is  a need 
for  the  NRA  to  faniliarise  itself  thoroughly  with  the  implications  of  different 
depreciation practices.  In  this  context, the NRA should in particular faniliarise itself 
with the issues concerning Current Cost Accounting vs. Historical Cost Accounting. 
The former is the one used in rigorously applied analytical costing for the costing of 
capital items. 
The NRA should accordingly discuss with the USO provider the appropriateness of 
the depreciation policies that affect the costs of USO services. 
14.  There is  a need for the  NRA to faniliarise itself thoroughly with the implications  of 
sunk costs. Sunk costs that are due to inefficient and redundant investments in the 
past are  not costs  of the  USO  and  should  therefore  not be  covered  by  a  USO 
compensation  scheme.  The  NRA  should  impress  on  the  network operator that it 
has  itself  the  responsibility  to  take  care  of  such  sunk  costs  through  special 
depreciation charges or through other arrangements, which, how ever, w auld not be 
allowed to affect the costing of USO services. 
Furtherrrore,  sunk  costs  due  to  investment  for  services,  that  at  the  time  of 
investment could not be identified as unecononic, for example service to particular 
customer groups in econonic areas found later to be unecononic, do not qualify to 
be included with the costs of USO services, as these investments w auld also have 
been rrade under competitive conditions. 
Finally,  sunk costs due to inappropriate past pension plan  policies are not costs of 
current service provision, in particular not of the provision of USO services. 
15.  External observers know  very little about the variable costs of a local network, since 
they are rrainly costs of personnel for operations, rraintenance and adninistration. 
The NRA should insist that these costs are provided to it according to the standards 
of ABC costing.  If  an  ABC costing  system has  not yet been  installed,  the  USO 
provider should  be  requested to carry out specialised studies designed to  provide 
the data on a representative sample basis. 
6  The  NRA  should  not accept the  possible  argument that the  cost of establishing  such a  costing 
system should  be  made  part of the  cost of the  USO.  In  their future competitive  environments,  all 
network  operators  will  need  such  powerful  cost  accounting  systems  for  their  own  purposes, 
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16.  The  residual corrmon cost is  that share of total costs that remains  after all  costs 
caused in the long run by identifiable services are properly assigned on the basis of 
ABC costing.  By  definition,  none  of that cost would decrease or increase if usa 
services were discontinued or added  on.  The  NRA  m.Jst not allow  that any  part of 
this residual corrmon cost be included in the costs of USO provision. 
Issues relating to (local) netVI.()rk structure 
One  of the  aspects  of a forward-looking  approach  to  regulation  of doninant network 
operators'  prices  and  also,  in  particular,  to  deternination of a usa deficit is  that the 
underlying assessrrent of the costs is  based on a state-of-the-art network structure.  In 
the following we will sumnarise our insights on the questions of which network structure 
should be the basis for the assessrrent, how  cost savings through non-USO services 
should  be  taken  into  account and  how  the  appropriate size of a USO area should  be 
deterrrined: 
Most recent available vs.  most recent employed technology:  Regarding  the choice of 
the  best technology,  a telecorrm.Jnication  operator  m.Jst  often  find  the  right  balance 
between the  one  that  is  proven  and  reliable  and  represents  rrore or less  the  current 
state of the  art,  and  the  one  that is  new,  perhaps  revolutionary,  pronising great cost 
savings  but  has  not  yet  derronstrated  conclusively  its  strengths.  As  costs  of 
telecorrm.Jnications  services  and  in  particular costs  of USO  services depend  on  the 
type of equiprrent used, the NRA should decide that the cost of efficient usa provision 
is  calculated on the basis of the least-cost technology.  In a decision problem of the kind 
rrentioned  the  NRA  should  specify  as  least-cost technology  a  technology  that  is  in 
actual use and not one that exists already but is not yet in use. 
Optimal vs.  existing structure of local netoork: Corresponding to the question of least-
cost technology the question arises on the basis of which network structure USO costs 
should be calculated. Conceptually, there is no doubt that again the least-cost solution of 
an optimal network structure should be applied. Cost differentials that are at stake may 
run from5% to 10o/o.  In many cases, however, an informational problem will arise as the 
network  operator  w ill  be  m.Jch  better  inforrred  about  the  implications  of  netw ork 
optirrisation  than  the  NRA.  In  those  cases  the  NRA  should  consider  to  insist  on  a 
costing of USO services on the basis of a least-cost network design only if the expected 
cost differential at stake is of a significant magnitude. 
Cost savings through non-USO se!Vices:  A  local  network is  typically  not designed to 
provide exclusively those services covered by the definition of universal service. Others 
can  be  leased  line  services,  data  transrrission,  or broadband  delivery  services.  Cost 
savings occur, when the sarre facilities  are used for either services. Thew  ay  and the 
degree in which the underlying equiprrent costs are shared between the services needs 
a careful exanination. The  USO provider should be required to supply data from which I 
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the extent of cost sharing between USO and  non-USO services can be ascertained.  If 
this  cannot  be  derronstrated  on  the  basis  of  an  analytical  cost accounting  system, 
factual inforrration should be provided that would allow  to deternine the cost savings by 
way of analytical cost rrodelling. 
The  appropriate size of a USO  area:  It  is  inherent in  a network operator•s  planning  of 
local networks that at the tirre of planning  no consideration  is  given to  the question of 
whether individual subscribers would be econonic or not. The decision unit is  always a 
larger segrrent of the network in question. So any  network segrrent to be classified by 
the NRA w hether being econonic or not w ould have to require sorre ninimum netw ork 
configuration about which the operator can be expected to rrake a separate investrrent 
decision.  The  size of the  area  should  on  the  other  hand  also  be  linited  from above. 
Otherwise  calculations  of  the  USO  net  cost  could  risk  to  be  very  unreliable  when 
potential  corrpetitors  find  it  attractive,  for exarrple,  to  pick  up  a subset of profitable 
subscribers within a larger unecononic area. Applying these principles, the appropriate 
area  potentially  to  be  classified  as  unecononic appears  to  be  a local  exchange area 
w hich  is  directly  served  either  by  a  parent  local  sw itching  centre  or  by  a  rerrote 
concentrating/switching  unit.  In  the  relevant  cases  it  delineates  areas  from  a  few 
hundred to  a few  thousand subscribers.  Defining  geographies  as  USO net cost areas 
that sorrehow  corrt:>ine  (parts  of) different exchange areas  or even (parts  of) different 
local  networks  should  not  be  acceptable  for the  reason  that they  would  give  rise  to 
arbitrary cost allocations  and  probably  lead to cost figures  in excess of what would be 
legitimate. 
The  detailed  discussion  reflected  in  above surrmary  is  found  in  Section  2.3.2  of the 
main text. It leads to the follow ing recomrendations: 
Recommendations 17 to 20 
17.  The  NRA  should insist that the costs of USO services is  always calculated on  the 
basis of the least-cost technology. The NRA should specify as least-cost technology 
a technology that is in actual use and not one that exists already but is not in use. 
18.  As regards  network design,  the  NRA  should  require that the local  network cost of 
serving unecononic areas be on the basis of the optirral design of local networks, 
as this would be the proper approach based on LRIC. The NRA should, however, be 
nindful that it rray not be in a strong position to argue conclusively with the network 
operator  on  technical questions  as  to what the  optirral design  of a local  network 
should be.  In such cases the NRA should insist on the cost of an  optimal structure 
depending on the likely magnitude of the difference in costs. 
19.  The  NRA should request the  USO provider to supply data from which the extent of 
cost  saving  due  to  cost  sharing  between  USO  and  non-USO  services  can  be 
ascertained.  The  data  should  either  corre  from  the  operator's  analytical  cost -----------------~  __  st_in~g_an_d_Fi_na_nc_in~g_U_nw_e_rs_ai_S_eN_ic_e_~_l~ig_ati_on_s  _______________ 15 
accounting system or,  if not available in this form,  as factual information that can be 
used in analytical cost modelling. 
20.  The  NRA  should  define  an  exchange  area  served  by  a  parent  switch  or  by  a 
concentrating/switching unit as  the  proper extent of a usa net cost area.  It  is  the 
mnirrum area tow  arrant separate investment decisions.  It is  also not too large so 
that some stability  in  the composition of customers  in  the area is  assured despite 
the  activities  of  competitors.  The  NRA  should  not  accept  other  geographical 
boundaries for a usa net cost area as these risk to lead to arbitrary cost allocations 
and to cost levels of the usa that are unwarranted. 
Methodologies for cost determination and steps to be undertaken by  the NRA 
As  already  pointed  out,  most  netw ark  operators  have  currently  not  yet  installed  a 
rigorous analytical cost accounting system of the ABC type.  In these cases the NRA has 
to  look  for  an  alternative  approach  to  cost  determnation.  The  NRA  can  either  use 
analytical cost modelling  carried out under its  auspices  or ask the netw ark operator to 
provide figures obtained  on the  basis of analytical studies and statistical data collected 
for  the  purpose.  In  the  following,  we  summarise  the  main  principles  of  the  two 
approaches.  In  addition  we report  on  some  benchmark  calculations  with  a  specific 
analytical cost model: 
Cost studies perfonned by the netoork operator:  VVhen  the netw ark operator delivering 
usa services  has  no  analytical cost accounting  system installed  but is  requested  to 
establish  the  avoidable  costs  for these  services,  it  should  be  required  to  carry  out 
special studies and use an adequate methodology to assure cost data that correspond 
to  efficient  service  provision.  The  data  should  essentially  cover  the  costs  for 
uneconomc areas,  uneconorric customers  and  uneconorric pay phones  according to 
the different cost drivers and types of costs. 
Volume data requirements: The direct net cost of universal service (to be dealt with in 
Section rv of this  Executive Summary) will be the difference between relevant costs and 
revenues  from  uneconorric  customers  (Section  Ill).  To  be  able  to  determine  the 
necessary total cost figures  (which are generally derived as  products of volume times 
unit cost),  the  NRA  should  require the usa provider to  subrrit the  necessary volume 
figures, i.e.: 
- the  null"Der  of  subscriber  lines  of  uneconomc  customers  in  economc  areas 
classified according to the actual cost per subscriber that could be avoided, 
- volumes of business and residential local,  national and  international calls  at different 
times of the day, 
- volumes of interconnect calls, outgoing and incorring, at different times of the day. I 
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The  volurre data  requirerrents  correspond  to  those  for analysing  revenues  foregone 
(which like costs are also generally derived as  products of volurre tirres unit price, see 
Section Ill below). The volurre data should be collected jointly for both purposes. 
Data verification requirements:  The  data supplied  by  the  USO provider will have to  be 
verified  whether  they  reflect  rigorously  applied  ABC  principles  for  proper  cost 
assessrrent, in particular: 
- a strict application of the forward-looking LRIC standard; 
- use of OJrrent Cost Accounting; 
- use of the proper depreciation policy; 
- use of the proper cost of capital; 
- inclusion of no more capacity reserves as required for accorrrrodating realistic future 
demand; 
- inclusion of services not falling  under the USO to catch the effects of shared use of 
facilities on increrrental costs; 
- incorporation of access, switch and  transnission technology  that either is  the cost 
nininising  one  for  the  exchange  area  in  question  or,  if  this  is  the  regulatory 
perspective taken, of the technology currently used by the operator. 
Besides being verified on the basis of these principles, they should be checked against 
the results obtained from the analytical cost rrodels. Any significant discrepancy should 
be taken up w ith the operator and reconciled in a way that to the satisfaction of the NRA 
the proper cost figures are deternined.  In  particular, cost deductions would rrost likely 
have to be imposed if the cost data corre from an  FDC system adjusted to reflect cost 
causation but still also reflecting all the implied  inefficiencies inherent in that approach. 
These deductions may have to run up to 30 °/o. 
Local netlfi.Ork  analytical  cost modelling:  The  application  of  an  analytical  cost  rrodel 
provides  the  NRA  with independent  information  about the  cost that  an  efficient  USO 
provider would  have to  incur.  These  cost estimates  can  be  contrasted  with the  data 
presented  by  the  current provider.  An analytical cost rrodel  should  be  in  a position  to 
model various network elements  in  a transparent and understandable manner.  It should 
be  possible  to  clearly  identify  line  dependent and  usage  dependent cost elerrents.  It 
should  offer the  NRA  a high  degree of freedom regarding  the  adjustrrent of input data 
according  to  its  specific  needs.  This  also  enables  the  NRA  to  carry  out  a  detailed 
sensitivity  analysis  to  assess  the  impact  of the  various  cost drivers  on  average  and 
increrrental  cost.  The  model  should  offer  the  opportunity  to  perform  calculations 
exclusively with data taken from the public domain for cases in which requested data are 
slow to be provided by the network operator, or for the purpose of contrasting cost figures 
from the operator with independently derived results.  The  rrodel should further be  in  a 
position  to  capture  the  diversity  of actual  exchange  areas,  e.g.  regarding  the  actual 
distribution of subscribers in  the areas and  the  corresponding concrete topology  of the 
network, in  order to avoid calculations based on the simplifying assumptions of uniform 
population density or equal loop length. Working models and tools are already available to ------------------~  __  st_in~g_an_d_F_ina_n_ci~ng~U_n_w_er_sa_I_Se_N_~_e_O_b~lig_at_io_ns  ________________  17 
meet these requirements,  though  they  rrust be  adjusted  to  deal  with specific national 
circumstances. 
Benchmark  calculations  Vtith  a specific  local netoork  analytical cost model:  Sample 
calculations  have been carried out as  part of this  study with a concrete analytical cost 
model demonstrating that such models can be used to estimate the relevant LRIC.  The 
calculations cover access over a subscriber line and local network traffic. The required 
data for running the rrodel (in  particular prices of inputs) come from the public domain. 
As  far  as  country  specific  inputs  are  concerned  (e.g.  labour  and  excavation),  we 
differentiate  between  high  wage and  low  wage countries.  The  following  results  were 
obtained:  In  case of a country with high  labour costs,  average monthly  subscriber line 
costs fall  in  a range  between 15.5  ECU for very low  and  7.5  ECU for high  subscriber 
density netw arks, and  in the case of a country with low  labour costs, correspondingly in 
the range between 9. 7 and 5.1  ECU.  As regards the costs of local network use (largely 
local calls), in the case of high labour costs, the cost per rrinute falls in a range between 
1.26  cents  and  0.2  cents  of  an  ECU,  and  in  the  case  of  low  labour  costs, 
correspondingly  between 0.8  cents  and  0.1  cents,  depending  on  the  size of the  local 
network and the density of subscribers. Vv'hen considering these cost levels, it should be 
kept in rrind that some of the cost estimates rrust be considered conservative, as they 
are based  on  data for current operating  expenses derived from the records  of former 
monopolist  incurment  operators  and  therefore  still  reflect  the  corresponding 
inefficiencies,  and  as  they  assume  no  cost  sharing  between  USO  and  non-USO 
services.7 
The above rrethodological discussion is  presented in detail in  Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 
of the main text, and in Appendix C which is a digression on local network analytical cost 
modelling. This discussion leads to the following recommendations: 
Recommendations 21 to 23 
21.  The  NRA  should  place  data  requirements  on  the  USO  provider  enabling  it  to 
deterrrine the  cost of efficient  USO  service  provision.  These  data  requirements 
should comprise appropriate unit costs as well as  USO service volumes to be able 
to  generate  relevant total  cost figures.  Cost  data  should  be  based  on  the  LRIC 
standard. Since a rigorously applied analytical cost accounting system will probably 
not be  available,  cost information  should  be  based  on  special studies  using  high 
7  We  emphasise  again  that the  above  figures  are  estimates  based  on  model  calculations.  They 
provide what we consider realistic estimates for ranges  of costs for the two service categories  in 
question, given different labour cost levels and densities of networks. In  concrete cases, estimates 
would have to be derived on the basis of a model adjusted to the particular country using input data 
that reflect the real cost situation as closely as possible. The cost estimates are for retail services a 
the focus of this study is on the cost of services brought to the final customer. They include customer 
spectfic costs and  are for combinations  of network cofll)onents dtfferent from those required, for 
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quality  sarll'le  data.  The  NRA  should  verify  the  cost  data  subrrissions  as  to 
whether they reflect rigorously applied ABC principles for proper cost assessrrent. 
22.  The NRA should carry out benchmark calculations with an analytical cost rrodel of 
its own. The rrodel used should incorporate the accounting standards necessary to 
get an estimate of an efficient provision of service. Even if the nurrber of areas to be 
covered  is  large,  the effort to  calculate the  cost of subscriber lines  and  calls  for 
each of the  prospective uneconorric areas  w auld  be  rroderate.  Most of the data 
required for this costing exercise are normally in the public domain. 
23.  There  is  a  need  to  exercise great care  in  the  deterrrination  of the  cost of USO 
service provision and  for this  purpose in  carrying out the tasks  listed  above.  The 
NRA will need to have sufficient expertise for this  at its disposal and,  if necessary, 
should seek to obtain assistance from outside. 
Ill  The approach to revenue in the net cost calculation 
The problem to be solved 
If  custorrers  deerred  to  be  uneconorric  were  disconnected  or  public  pay  phones 
withdrawn, revenues w auld  be foregone.  V\then  analysing whether areas, categories  of 
custorrers or public pay phones create a universal service cost (i.e.,  a direct net cost), 
revenues foregone must be set against long-run avoidable costs. 
Our discussion  of these issues,  summarised  above  and  presented  in  rrore detail  in 
Section 3. 1 of the main text, leads to the follow ing recomrendations: 
Recommendations 24 to 25 
24.  As unit of analysis for revenues foregone, the NRA should define exchange areas, 
custorrer categories (by tariff options or special scherres, beneficiaries of voucher 
scherres where applicable, bill segrrents, etc.) and public pay phone categories (by 
revenue segrrents and/or types of area). 
25.  Data  on  revenues  foregone  should  be  provided  for each  potentially  uneconorric 
area,  each potentially  uneconorric category  of custorrers and  public  pay  phones. 
Information on areas, categories of custorrers and public pay phones that the USO 
provider  considers  to  be  econorric  from the  outset  could  be  provided  in  rrore 
aggregate form. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  19 
Revenues foregone of  areas, customer classes, and public pay  phones 
Revenues  foregone  for  each  (potentially  unecononic)  area  include  revenues  from 
access and outgoing calls billed to customers in that area, revenues from inconing calls 
billed  to  customers  in  other  areas,  revenues  from  called-party-pays  calls  billed  to 
customers  in  other  areas,  and  interconnect  revenues  billed  to  other  operators  for 
transporting  calls  to  and  from that area.  However,  the  full  armunt of those  revenues 
w ould  not be foregone  if the  area  were disconnected  from the  network.  Some  of the 
calls from and  to disconnected lines  in that area would be replaced by calls from or to 
lines (or public pay phones) in other areas. Revenues from such replacement calls have 
to  be  deducted  from the  revenues  above  since  they  reduce  the  armunt of revenue 
foregone. 
The corresponding calculation would be as follows: 
Access and outgoing call revenues 
+  lnconing call revenues 
+  Called-party-pays revenues 
+  Interconnect revenues 
Revenues from replacement calls 
=  Revenues foregone if an area were disconnected 
For details regarding the above derivation, see Table 3.5-1  in the main text. In this table it 
can  in  particular be  seen  how  the  not directly  observable revenues  for inconing calls 
and replacement calls are estimated. 
Sinilarly,  revenues  foregone for each  category  of (potentially)  unecononic customers 
include  access  and  outgoing  call  revenues  billed  to  these  customers,  inconing  call 
revenues  billed  to  other  customers,  interconnect  revenues  and  called-party-pays 
revenues. Again,  revenues from replacement calls  have to be deducted to arrive at the 
armunt  of  revenues  foregone  if  a  custorrer  of  the  particular  category  were 
disconnected. 
Finally,  when looking  at  the  universal  service  costs  of  public  pay  phones,  revenues 
foregone have to be set against avoidable costs.  Revenues  foregone include outgoing 
call revenues collected and called-party-pays revenues. 
The  discussion  of  the  approach,  as  sunrnarised  above  and  presented  in  detail  in 
Sections 3.2 to 3.4 of the main text, leads to the follow ing recorTlTendation: _______________________________________________________ 20 
Recommendation 26 
26.  The NRA should request the USO provider to subrrit data on access and outgoing 
call revenues, incorring call revenues, interconnect revenues and called-party-pays 
revenues for each (potentially)  uneconorric area, each custorrer class and,  to the 
extent required, for each category of public pay phones.  If data are not available on 
an area-by-area basis, by custorrer class and by pay phone category from the USO 
provider's  records,  estimates  should  be  prepared  on  the  basis  of information  as 
discussed in detail in the main text and according to the example developed in Table 
3.5-1. 
IV  Net costs of USOs 
The problem to be solved 
After  the  deternination  of  the  avoidable  costs  of  USO  service  provision  and  of 
corresponding revenues foregone, it remains to derive the resulting net costs. For this, 
two steps are required, first deriving the direct net cost by deducting from costs of USO 
services the relevant revenue figures, while taking care that no double counting occurs, 
and second, to deduct from the resulting figure the value of the indirect benefits that are 
flowing to the USO provider due to this status, to obtain the overall net cost. 
Determining the direct net cost of uneconomic areas,  uneconomic customers,  and of 
uneconomic public pay phones 
Uneconomic areas: For the calculation of the direct net cost of an unecononic area, two 
steps  are  needed.  In  the  first  step  potentially  uneconorric  areas  are  identified  by 
deterrrining the simple difference between costs and revenues, i.e. before elinination of 
double counted in coning call revenue. This is done as follows: 
Average cost of access per subscriber line times number of subscribers 
+  Average ninutes of outgoing calls per subscriber line times cost per rrinute of 
calls (each for local, long-distance, and international calls and differentiated 
according to relevant time zones) times number of subscribers, net of the cost of 
replacement calls 
+  Average ninutes of incorring calls per subscriber line times cost per ninute of 
calls (differentiated as for outgoing calls above) times number of subscribers, net 
of the cost of replacement calls 
+  Average ninutes of interconnect calls per subscriber line times cost per minute 
of calls (differentiated according to relevant time zones) times number of 
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+  Average ninutes of called-party-pays calls per subscriber line times cost per 
ninute of calls (differentiated according to relevant tirre zones) times nurrber of 
subscribers, net of the cost of replacerrent calls 
Revenues forgone if the area were disconnected 
=  Net cost avoided if the area were disconnected 
For details regarding the above derivation see Table 4.2.4-1  in the main text.  In this table 
it can in particular be seen how  the not directly observable costs of inconing calls  and 
replacerrent calls are estimated. 
In  the second step double counted inconing call revenue has to be elininated.  Double 
counting occurs because revenues from inconing calls that are themselves coning out 
of  unecononic  areas  are  counted  there  already  as  outgoing  calls  and  included  in 
outgoing  call  revenue.  Since the  double  counted  corrponent can  only  be  know n w ith 
sufficient precision after the  unecononic areas  are clearly  identified  and  since for this 
identification the double counted corrponent should itself be known already, an  iterative 
procedure is called for. The aim of this  iterative procedure is to identify those areas w ith 
initial surpluses  - potentially unecononic  areas - which turn  into  actual unecononic 
areas upon adjustrrent due to double counted incorre. 
Uneconomic customers:  The  first step  of deternining the  sirrple  difference between 
costs and revenues of the various unecononic custorrer categories in econonic areas 
is  identical with the first step in  respect of unecononic areas.  In the second step again 
an  iterative  procedure  identical  to  the  one  described  before  is  perforrred  in  order to 
elininate double counted  call  revenues  between unecononic customer categories.  In 
this procedure care has to be taken to take those potentially unecononic custorrers out 
of consideration  that  live  in  unecononic areas  as  their  net costs  have  already  been 
included in the net costs of these areas. 
Uneconomic pay phones: Fbtentially unecononic public pay phones should be identified 
and grouped according to relevant distinguishing demand or cost characteristics which 
may  be  that  they  are  prone  to  vandalism or  are  located  at  places  where they  can 
generate only  low  average revenues. The avoidable direct net cost of the types of pay 
phones identified will then be calculated as follows: 
Average cost of the relevant type (or subtype) of public pay phone times nurrber 
of pay phones 
+  Average ninutes of outgoing calls per pay phone tirres cost per ninute of calls 
(each for local, long-distance, and international calls and differentiated according 
to relevant tirre zones) times nurrber of pay phones 
Revenues forgone if service over these pay phones were discontinued 
=  Net cost avoided if pay phones were elininated from the network 22  ----------------------------------------------------------
The  direct net costs  of uneconomc areas,  uneconomc custorrers  and  unecononic 
public pay phones determned in the way described above sum up to the total direct net 
cost of the USO provider. 
Taking  note  of  the  corrplications  in  the  process  of  determning  the  net  costs  of 
uneconomc areas,  custorrers,  and  public  pay  phones,  discussed in  detail  in  Section 
4.2 of the main text, we subnit the following recormendations: 
Recommendations 27 to 29 
27.  While  the  calculation  of  direct  net  cost of  uneconomc  units  (areas,  custorrer 
categories  in  economc  areas,  public  pay  phones)  may  essentially  appear  as  a 
routine  matter  after  the  determnation  of  their  costs  and  revenues,  care  rrust 
nevertheless be exercised regarding a nurmer of aspects.  In  particular, it rrust be 
assured that costs  and  revenues  match  in  terms  of underlying  rreasures  (sarre 
nurrber of subscribers, volurres  of calls,  etc.),  that double counting of costs and 
revenues  is  avoided,  and  that  there  is  no  redundancy  of  work  due  to  an 
inappropriate order in w hich the operations are carried out. 
28.  Specifically, the NRA should make sure that: 
- uneconomc areas are determned first, as their total nurmer may heavily be 
influenced by the adjustrrent to be made for double counted incomng call 
revenue, and as all the uneconomc areas should be know n w hen the 
calculations for uneconomc custorrer categories w ithin economc areas are 
carried out; 
- when uneconomc custorrer categories within economc areas are deternined, 
those living in uneconorric areas, and thus having already been accounted for, 
should be excluded from the count early in the process of carrying out thew ork. 
29.  Tables 4.2.1.2-1, 4.2.2.2-1, and 4.2.4-1  in the main text have been prepared to serve 
as exarrples for the detailed steps to be carried out. The discussion that goes along 
with these tables  should  serve as  guideline  regarding  the  handling  of the different 
aspects discussed above. 
The indirect benefits of  the USO 
In order to determne the overall net cost of usa services, it rrust be taken into account 
that a usa provider benefits from several indirect effects brought about by  this  status. 
The following effects need consideration: 
Life cycle effects: The life cycle effect refers to the effect of basing a decision on the net 
present value (NPV)  of the business  proposition  in  question,  instead of on  the current 
difference between costs and revenues. In the present context, the business proposition 
would be to serve particular areas or custorrer groups or to maintain pay phones, taking -----------------~  __  st_in~g_an_d_Fi_na_nc_in~g_U_nw_e_rs_ai_Se_r_vic_e_O_bl~iga_ti_on_s  _______________ 23 
into account the  NPV of the expected business over the relevant future period.  If areas, 
custorrer categories and pay phones, that appear uneconorric according to the current 
difference between costs and revenues, can be expected (following a suggestion by the 
British  regulator  Oftel)  to  turn  econorric within five years,  they  should  be  considered 
econorric from the  beginning.  For  this  purpose,  projections  over this  future  period  of 
both costs and revenues have to be made and the decision be taken on the basis of the 
difference  between  the  sums  of these  cost and  revenue  streams  discounted  to  the 
present  tirre.  One  should  essentially  use  standard  investrrent  project  evaluation 
techniques for the purpose.  In particular one would need projections of demand over the 
relevant  future.  The  possibility  of  properly  applying  life  cycle  effects  to  the  various 
categories  of uneconorric custorrers  and  public  pay  phones  depends  heavily  on  the 
capability  of the  network operator to  provide data that allows the identification of those 
categories of custorrers/pay phones that may  possibly be econorric in  the long  run.  It 
w ill further depend on the evaluation of whether the category for which this  is  true is  a 
large enough fraction so that it would be worthwhile to continue serving the whole group. 
From the NRA's point of view, in the absence of the information necessary for carrying 
out this evaluation, the whole group of each of uneconorric custorrers and  pay phones 
according to the direct net cost rreasure should be classified as  econonic. As regards 
areas,  each  of them found  uneconorric  according  to  the  direct net  cost calculation 
should be exarrined according to whether they would remain so taking the developrrent 
of cost of service delivery and revenues  over the next five years into consideration and 
carry out the  calculation  on  a NPV  basis.  It  should  be  expected that a large share of 
areas found unecononic on  account of current net cost will be classified as  econorric 
when exanined on  an  NPV  basis.  The  sorting  of unecononic areas  and  custorrers, 
taking into account double counted inconing call revenue (see above), should be carried 
out after the  life cycle tests  has  filtered  out the  areas  and  custorrers that on  an  NVP 
basis are not unecononic. 
Enhancement of corporate reputation:  Being the USO provider is  generally well reputed 
so that for this  reason one should expect the  USO provider to gain an enhancerrent of 
its corporate reputation. This would not be a marginal effect. If there is no other indicator, 
one  should  use  as  a  rreasure  of the  benefit  a  percentage  of  the  USO  provider's 
advertising and marketing budget, like the 20 °/o share of BT's corresponding expenditure 
used by  Oftel,  or a share of the turnover of the  USO provider, which, to correspond to 
the 20 °/o  of the advertising and marketing budget, would in the BT case have been 0.65 
o/o.  The  NRA  should  initiate  consurrer research  in  order to  rreasure directly  to  what 
degree custorrers extend a greater loyalty to  the usa provider' and w hat comrrercial 
benefit the latter derives from this  greater loyalty.  It should be expected that the results 
would yield a substantially larger benefit in terms of enhanced corporate reputation than 
is expressed by a 20% share of the advertising and marketing budget or a 0.65 °/o  share 
of the usa provider's turnover. 
Ubiquity:  A  provider being  ubiquitously  present in  a given country enjoys  a substantial 
marketing  benefit.  It  is  a  benefit that  only  the  incumbent  operator  currently  enjoys.  It 24  ----------------------------------------------------------
corres into play  in  particular when custorrers are rroving and they know  that they can 
order telephone services from the incurrbent operator nation-wide. They  may  then  not 
go to the trouble of finding  out whether there are corrpeting  providers of local network 
services and rrore or less automatically take services again from their old provider. This 
benefit is predorrinantly related to the incurrbent being a large, well-established, market 
dorrinant,  national  operator.  The  fact that  the  incurrbent  operator  is  also  the  USO 
provider adds only  very little to  it.  If the incurrbent ceased to serve unecononic areas, 
only in respect of the very small fraction of people rroving out of uneconorric areas into 
econonic areas - but only  if the  unecononic areas  are now  being  served by  different 
USO providers - would there be an effect on these people's choices due to the change 
in the incumbent's ubiquity, as these people now  know  about alternatives. For everybody 
else there would be no change in their perception of the incurrbent w orthw hile taking into 
account.  Thus,  the  incurrbent would  keep  its  reputation  as  ubiquitous  provider  very 
largely intact. The benefit resulting from it should not be set against the direct net cost 
when calculating the overall net cost of the USO. 
Access to  full range  of telephone  usage  data:  The  incurrbent network operator  has 
because of its  doninant market position  a superior know ledge about how  custorrers 
use  the  telephone.  This  is  a  significant  marketing  benefit.  As  is  true  in  respect  of 
ubiquity,  this  effect is  primarily  related  to  the  incurrbent operator being  a large,  well-
established, market dorrinant, national operator. The fact that the incumbent operator is 
also  the  USO  provider adds  very  little  to  it.  If  the  incurrbent withdrew  services  from 
unecononic areas,  custorrers and  pay  phones,  it would loose only  information that it 
does not value highly since, after all,  it voluntarily gives up the relevant business. There 
should therefore be no deduction on account of this effect from the direct net cost when 
calculating the overall net cost of the USO. 
Advertising effect through public pay phones:  This  effect should  be  considered  as  a 
non-marginal indirect benefit.  Indicators for the corresponding value can relatively easily 
be  ascertained through reference to the price for corrparable advertising space in  the 
relevant areas. 
The  argurrents summarised  above are developed  in  detail  in  Section 4.3 of the main 
text. They lead to the following recomrrendations: 
Recommendations 30 to 33 
30.  There  is  a need  for the  NRA  to  verify very  carefully  w hether  unecononic areas, 
custorrer categories within areas, and public pay phones, are unecononic over the 
relevant  tirre  period  and  not  only  on  the  evidence  of deficits  shown  in  current 
accounts. The NRA should make sure that the proper perspective is brought to bear 
on this evaluation. In particular: 
- if areas, custorrer categories and pay phones can be expected to turn 
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beginning; 
- in respect of uneconorric customer categories in econorric areas, if the USO 
provider is not in a position to identify those customers it w auld not serve, all 
the potentially uneconorric customers should be considered econorric. 
31.  The  NRA  should organise the w ark for the deterrrination of the USO net cost in  a 
way to  avoid  redundancy  of w ark,  particularly  as  regards  the  test for  life-cycle-
effects and the elirrination of double counted incorring call revenue. 
32.  Since the indirect benefit from USO provider status in terms of corporate reputation 
should be expected to  be quite substantial and  rray in  effect be  of a rragnitude to 
outweigh any direct net cost, there is value for the NRA to pay particular attention to 
this effect. 
The  proper value  of the  benefit that the  USO  provider draws from this  status  in 
terms  of  enhanced  reputation  can  be  ascertained  on  the  basis  of  consumer 
research.  Given  the  likely  rragnitude  of this  indirect effect,  the  NRA  is  urged  to 
commission such research. 
As long as the value of this indirect effect derived from properly designed consumer 
research is  not available it is  recommended to use as indicator a percentage of the 
USO provider's  advertising and  rrarketing  budget or an  appropriate percentage of 
the turnover of the  USO provider, where we consider the latter measure to  be the 
rmre  appropriate  one.  For  this,  however,  the  NRA  should  rely  on  advice  from 
advertising and marketing experts. 
33.  The  effects of ubiquity  and  access to  the  full  range  of telephone  usage data  are 
predorrinantly  related  to  the  incurrbent operator  being  a  large,  well-established, 
rrarket doninant national operator, so that the effect due to being the USO provider 
is marginal. The NRA should not give this indirect effect much weight in the net cost 
evaluation.  In  contrast  the  advertising  effect of  uneconorric  public  pay  phones 
should be considered as  a non-marginal indirect benefit the corresponding value of 
which can relatively easily be ascertained. 
V  Financing the net costs of USOs 
Requirements for funding schemes 
If  an  overall  net  universal  service  cost exists,  l\llerrber  States  can  finance  it  out  of 
general taxes or implement a specific universal service funding scheme to share the net 
cost armng rrarket players. In the report, we do not address general taxes as a means 
of financing USOs.  It should,  however, be noted that in terms  of efficiency and  market-
neutrality,  general  taxes  to  which  all  tax  paying  entities  contribute  are  preferable  to 
specific  universal  service  financing  schemes  to  which  only  the  telecomrunications 
industry or parts of it contribute. 26 
Our analysis  dem:mstrates  that specific  universal service funding  schemes  rrust be 
designed  with care.  Unless  appropriately  specified,  specific  universal  service funding 
schemes may 
•  have a damaging effect on econonic efficiency; 
•  seriously  distort  econonic  incentives  in  the  industry  by  favouring  one  use  of 
telecorrrrunications  over  others,  integrated  networks  over interconnection,  or one 
type of transnission technology over another; 
•  discrininate against the universal service provider or, alternatively, against COf'll>eting 
operators w ith no USOs; 
•  discrininate against particular groups of market players such as  new  entrants that 
rely on interconnection; 
•  not satisfy practicability requirements and, hence, be difficult to apply; 
•  not satisfy the need for proportionality. 
Above requirements are discussed in detail in Section 5.2 of the main text. They lead to 
the follow ing reconmendations: 
Recommendations 34 to 38 
34.  When  devising  specific  universal  service  financing  schemes,  l\llerrber  States 
should  respect the  goals  of  efficiency,  market  neutrality  and  non-discrinination, 
continuity  of  funding,  objectivity  and  transparency,  practicability,  and  above  all, 
proportionality. 
35.  To nininise efficiency losses and ensure the continuity of funding, schemes should 
allocate  the  overall  net  cost  of  USOs  across  the  broadest  possible  base  of 
organisations allowed by  Corrrrunity Law, that is,  all organisations operating public 
telecorrrrunications networks and/or publicly available voice telephony services. 
36.  To avoid discrinination of market players and satisfy the need for market neutrality, 
schemes should 
- assess contributions  in  proportion to  econonic activity,  that is,  gross revenues 
before tax net of certain deductible expenditures; 
- be neutral w ith regard to provision of USOs; 
- not  allow  particular  groups  of  market  players  to  be  exef'll>ted  or  to  make 
discounted contributions unless justified by strong practicability reasons; 
- be structurally neutral, i.e., avoid double contributions on interconnect calls; 
- be neutral with regard to the services provided; and 
- be independent of the type of transnission technology used. ------------------~-s_tin~g~a_nd_R_In_an_c_in~g_Un_w_er_sa_I_Se_N_ic_e_~_l~ig_at_ion_s  _______________ 27 
37.  To ensure practicability of the scheme, the contribution to be paid by each operator 
should  be  higher  than  the  adninistrative  cost  of  assessing  and  collecting  the 
contribution. 
38.  To  meet  the  need  for proportionality,  financing  schemes  should  not give  rise  to 
corrpetitive  distortions  unless  this  is  unavoidable  for  ensuring  universal  service 
objectives. On a rrore general level,  it should be noted that the costs of a financing 
scheme  in  terms  of efficiency  losses,  corrpetitive distorsions  and  adrrinistrative 
costs can be  substantial. Given those costs,  NRAs  should not irll>lement specific 
universal  service  financing  schemes  as  long  as  it  can  be  expected  that  the 
(incurment) operator currently providing USO services will continue to do so as part 
of its  corrpetitive  positioning without any  need  of corrpensation (see on  this  also 
Recommendation 1). 
The case for a net revenues-based Universal Service Fund 
Contributing organisations: The  EU framework allows  fv1errber  States to share the net 
USO  costs  arrongst all  organisations  operating  public  telecorTmJnications  netw arks 
and/or  publicly  available  voice  telephony  services.  Hence,  organisations  liable  to 
contribute to a Universal Service Fund (USF) can encorrpass organisations that operate 
fixed public telephone netw arks and/or fixed public telephone services as well as  public 
rrobile telephone netw arks and/or public rrobile telephone services. Organisations that 
according to the  EU framew ark cannot be made liable to contribute to the fund include 
private network operators offering corporate networking, service providers offering data 
communications,  value-added services or enhanced voice telephony services such as 
video-conferencing, voice mail  services, and voice enquiry/reply services.  Exerrptions 
from the maximum scope of operators that can be made liable to pay contributions as 
defined in that framew ark must be carefully evaluated. They could unnecessarily narrow 
the  basis  of  the  fund  and  could  violate  the  principles  of  non-discrirrination  and 
proportionality. 
Basis for assessing contributions:  The  EU framew ark allows Merrber States  to  share 
the  net cost of universal service arrongst market  players  proportionate to  a suitable 
measure of econorric activity.  Merrber States  that irrplement a USF should  carefully 
evaluate the corrpatibility  of the  measure chosen with the general requirements  for a 
funding  scheme  described  above.  Gross  revenues,  call  rrinutes,  and  nurrber  of 
subscribers do not meet the need for market neutrality and are discrininatory in  a way 
that make them incompatible w ith Treaty rules.  Call minutes are not neutral w ith regard 
to the type of calls provided; for exarrple, a ninute of a long-distance call w auld bear the 
same  USO  levy  as  a  ninute  of  a  local  call  even  though  its  value  were  higher. 
Furtherrrore,  call minutes  are  not  neutral  with  regard  to  the  nurrber  of  operators 
involved  in  carrying  out a call;  any  allocation  of call  ninutes  between interconnecting 
operators is  likely to be arbitrary.  Number of subscribers would seriously  disadvantage 
operators  that  predoninantly  serve  low-volume  users,  such  as  households. 28  -----------------------------------------------------------
Contributions based on  gross revenues  would discrirrinate against new  entrants  that 
strongly rely on interconnection with the incurment operator since any interconnect call 
would be charged twice. 
Rather, the contribution base of each operator should be defined as follows: 
Gross revenues of  operator, before taxes, from 
·  fixed voice telephony services 
·  rrobile voice telephony 
·  wholes  ale services 
·  interconnection services 
·  leased line services 
+  Internal  revenues  from  providing  netl/l,{)rk  services  !Mthin  the  company  to 
business  areas  that  provide  value-added  services,  data  communication 
services, corporate netiMJrk ing,  etc. 
Expenditures, exclusive of  taxes,  for 
·  wholes  ale services 
·  interconnection services 
·  leased-lines services 
Net revenues from  uneconomic areas/customers/public call boxes,  exclusive of 
taxes (deduction for universal service provider if regulatory constraints prevent it 
from  passing  on  contributions  to  uneconomic  areas/customers/ public  call 
boxes) 
Allowance of  X 
=  Base on Vthich to assess an operator's contribution to the USF 
Gross  revenues  in  above  calculation  should  include  revenues  from  outgoing 
international  calls  (fixed  and  rrobile).  In  turn,  gross  revenues  should  not  include 
revenues  from  terrrinating  incorring  cross-border  calls  (interconnection  revenues 
received from foreign operators, or payrrents received under the international settlerrent 
system). Also,  expenditures for terrrination of calls  in  other countries  (interconnection 
expenditures  made  to  foreign  operators,  or  payrrents  made  under  the  international 
settlerrent system)  should  not be  made  deductible.  The  reason is  that operators and 
custorrers  in  one  country  should  not  subsidise  the  provision  of  USOs  in  another 
country. Operators and  custorrers should only  contribute to the USF in  the country in 
which they are resident.  Other options, where operators and custorrers in one country 
(indirectly)  contribute  to  a  USF  in  another  country  are  likely  to  raise  problems  on  a 
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Netw ark operators  should  also  be  charged  a contribution  on  internal  revenues  from 
providing  wholes ale  services  and  leased  lines  to  business  units  within  the  firm that 
provide  corporate  networking,  data  comrunications  and  other  value  added  services. 
This  should  be  done  in  order  to  safeguard  corrpetitive  neutrality  since  the  network 
operators are assessed a contribution w hen they sell w holes ale services or leased-lines 
to other providers of relevant telecomrunications services. 
f\.Jetw ark operators' expenditures for IMJolesale,  interconnection and leased line seNices 
should be deducted. These include already a contribution assessed at the source on the 
netw ark operator that delivers them so that leaving them included w auld result in double 
counting. 
Net  revenues  from  uneconomic  customers  should  not  be  included  if  regulatory 
constraints prevent the USO provider from passing on contributions to those customers. 
If such regulatory constraints exist, the universal service provider will have to spread the 
total aiTK)unt of contributions to be paid over its econonic customer base. With intense 
corrpetition, this  night not be fully feasible and problems for the financial viability of the 
USO provider could emerge.  Hence, the universal service provider should be allowed to 
deduct net revenues attributable to unecononic customers. 
An  allovvance  should  be  deducted  to  assure that  srrall  providers  with an  insignificant 
contribution base are not assessed to contribute to the  USF.  The allowance should  be 
set at a level that no contributions are collected for which the adninistrative costs w auld 
be higher than what they are worth. 
Net  revenues  from  corporate  networking  and  closed  user  group  services,  data 
coiTill.Jnications, value-added services, and enhanced voice telephony services are not 
included  in  the  above  calculation  of  the  contribution  base.  To  do  so  w auld  not  be 
corrpetitively neutral since the EU framework excludes  pure providers of such services 
from contributions to the fund. 
To  ensure  transparency,  all  operators  liable  to  contribute  to  the  fund  should  provide 
separated accounting inforrration. 
The  case for a net-revenues  based  USF surrmarised  above  is  developed  in  detail  in 
Section 5.3 of the rrain text. The discussion leads to the following reconmendations: 
Recommendations 39 to 41 
39.  In  principle,  a// organisations  operating  public  telecoiTill.Jnications  netw arks  and/or 
publicly available voice telephony  services  should  contribute to the fund.  How ever, 
srraller  operators  whose net  revenues  are  below  a threshold  level  X should  be 
exerrpted from contributions.  Restricting the scope of contributing organisations to 
those above this threshold would strengthen the practicability of the rrechanism and 30 
keep adninistrative costs down. The disadvantages of an exerrption w auld be small 
and justified by the adninistrative costs avoided. 
40.  Exerrptions  on  other grounds add  nothing to the practicability of the system while 
creating  inefficiency  and  market  distortions.  Exerrption  of  rrobile  telephony 
operators,  in  particular,  w auld  not  be  corrpetitively  neutral,  distort  investrrent 
incentives and discrininate against operators of fixed telephone networks, given that 
rrobile and fixed telephony markets are converging. 
41.  Gross revenues, call ninutes, and nurrber of subscribers should not be used as a 
basis for assessing contributions since those rreasures violate virtually all neutrality 
requirerrents  and  are  discrininatory  in  a way that  make  them incorrpatible with 
Treaty rules. 
Contributions  into a USF,  in  principle,  should  be  based on  gross revenues (before 
tax)  net of expenditures  for interconnection,  wholes  ale  services  and  leased  lines 
(usually  terrred  net  revenues).  Net  revenues  from  unecononic  custorrers, 
however, should be excluded from the USO provider's contribution base if regulatory 
constraints  prevent  the  USO  provider  from  passing  on  contributions  to  those 
custorrers. Otherwise prices for the USO provider's non-USO services w auld  have 
to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of the USO. 
Net revenues is the only rreasure that rreets the need for market neutrality and non-
discrinination on the one hand and for practicability on the other hand. 
Disadvantages of  supplementary charges added to interconnection payments 
As  an  alternative  funding  scherre,  the  EU  frarrew ork  envisages  a  system  of 
supplerrentary  charges  in  addition  to  interconnection  payrrents.  With  such  an 
approach,  the  USO  provider  shares  its  net  USO  cost  with  other  operators 
interconnecting  w ith  its  network.  V\lhereas  interconnecting  operators  pay  an  explicit 
supplerrentary  charge  in  addition  to  their  interconnection  payrrents,  the  universal 
service provider irrplicitly charges a share of the  net USO cost to itself. The traditional 
understanding  is  that  supplerrentary  charges  are  based  on  the  nurrber  of  access 
ninutes  provided  by  the  universal  service  provider  to  interconnecting  operators.  The 
universal  service  provider  ifll)licitly  contributes  on  the  basis  of  the  number  of  call 
ninutes of its customers. 
In  general,  a system of supplementary  charges added to  interconnection payments  is 
inferior to  a  USF.  It  creates  inefficient incentives  to  avoid  interconnection and  violates 
market neutrality requirements with regard to market players, services, technology, and 
vertical structure, in particular, if supplementary charges are based on call ninutes. Call 
ninutes are not a proper rreasure of market activity and are discrininatory in away that 
make  them incompatible with Conm.Jnity  Law.  Furthermore,  if  competitors  bypassed 
the  USO provider's  network,  the  continuity  of funding  w auld  be  endangered.  Finally,  a 
system  of  supplementary  charges  ties  provision  of  USOs  to  the  market  doninant ------------------~-s_tin~g~a_nd_F_in_an_c_in~g_Un_iv_er_sa_I_Se_N_ic_e_~_l~ig_atJ_·on_s  _______________ 31 
operator and does not maintain the option of putting usas out to COrllJetitive tendering 
in the future. 
As an alternative to  call  ninutes, supplementary charges to  interconnection payments 
could be based on net revenues as defined. A net revenues based allocation of the cost 
of  usas  arrong  the  USa  provider  and  interconnecting  operator  w auld  be  less 
distortionary and meet the neutrality requirements to a greater extent than call ninutes. 
The above discussion, developed in rrore detail in Section 5.4 of the main text,  leads to 
the following recorrrrendations: 
Recommendations 42 to 43 
42.  Given  the  problems  involved  in  a  system  of  supplementary  charges  to  inter-
connection  payments,  such  a  scheme  can  only  terllJorarily  be  justified  in  the 
irrrrediate aftermath of fullliberalisation, i.e.,  in  a situation normally marked by  the 
following characteristics: 
- There is one doninant operator in the market. 
- All  organisations  providing  public  telecorTITIJnications  netw arks  and/or publicly 
available voice telephony services are interconnecting w ith the market doninant 
operator (with the exception of non-facilities-based resellers which, by definition, 
do not interconnect but buy w holes ale services). 
43.  If  a  l\llember  State  terllJorarily  applies  a  system of supplementary  charges,  the 
following requirements should be met: 
- usas should be solely irllJosed on the market doninant operator. 
- All operators interconnecting with the universal service provider should contribute 
to the funding of universal service. There should be no exer11Jtions  for particular 
groups of interconnecting operators such as rrobile telephony operators. 
- The overall net universal service cost should  be  allocated  arrong the universal 
service provider  and  interconnecting  operators  on  the  basis  of net revenue.  In 
contrast,  because of their distortionary  and  discrininatory  nature,  call  ninutes 
should  not  be  used  as  a  bases  for allocating  usa costs  between  the  usa 
provider and interconnecting operators. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations 
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1  Overview 
1.1  Background 
Before  the  liberalisation  of  the  telecomnunications  market  in  the  8.Jropean  Union, 
telecorrmmication  services  were  w idely  provided  as  rronopoly  services  by  public 
telecomnunications  operators. As a consequence the operators' business  policy was 
largely deternined by political decisions. In particular, the provision of universal services 
as well as prices and quality of the services were part of the operators' performance as 
public  enterprises.  Insofar  as  these  services  caused  losses  they  were financed  by 
internal  subsidies  within the  firm  Hence,  there was no  need  to  calculate  the  burden 
associated with universal service explicitly - a COrllJensation by another public institution 
w auld have been considered only to lead to additional transaction costs. 
In  a cor11Jetitive  market,  how ever,  cross subsidies will no  longer be  possible because 
the new  cor11Jetitors  will enter profitable markets  such as  long-distance telecomnuni-
cations  and  business  users.  With  the  agreerrent at the  8.Jropean  level  to  cofll>letely 
open up the telecomnunications market for cor11Jetition within rrost of the Comrrunity 
by  1  January  1998  a  widespread  discussion  started  on  how  to  guarantee  the 
maintenance  of universal service in  a fully  liberalised  market.  With  the  abolition  of all 
exclusive and special rights a need was seen for the establishrrent of rules  concerning 
the provision and  financing of universal telecormunication services at affordable rates 
to  everyone.  Besides  a necessary  definition  of the  scope of  universal service thus  a 
reconsideration  is  necessary  to  guarantee  equal  opportunities  for  any  telecomnuni-
cations  operator  and  to  ensure  fair  cor11Jetition  in  the  telecomnunications  market. 
According  to  Comnunity  Law,  Universal  Service  Obligations  (USOs)  rrust  not  be 
allowed to have negative effects on the cornron market, in particular the free rroverrent 
of services,  and  no  distortion  of cor11Jetition  in  the  internal  market.  This  ifll>lies  that 
liberalisation should be  ifll>lerrented by  rreans of a regulatory frarrew ork that includes 
the  necessary safeguards  in  form of a cornron set of principles  on  the  provision and 
financing of universal service. 
The  EU  regulatory  frarrew ork  for  universal  service  is  being  established  by  three 
directives that have either already been adopted or are currently in the process of being 
adopted: 
- Directive 95/62/EC of the  8.Jropean  Parliarrent and  of the Council of 13  December 
1995 on  the  application  of open  network provision  (ONP)  to voice telephony,  to  be 
arrended by  the  A'oposal for a 8.Jropean  Parliarrent and  Council  Directive on  the 
application of ONP to voice telephony  and  on  universal service for telecomnunica-
tions  in  a COrllJetitive  environrrent;  the  proposed  "Voice Telephony  Directive"  of 4 
November 1996 (replacing Directive 95/62/EC); 2  Study for the European Corrmission 
- Corrmission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Commission  Directive 
90/388/EC regarding  the  implementation  of full  competition  in  teleconm.mications 
markets; the "Full Competition Directive"; 
- 8.1ropean  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  97/33/EC  of  30  June  1997  on  inter-
connection  in  telecommunications  with  regard  to  ensuring  universal  service  and 
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network A"ovision (ONP), 
the "Interconnection Directive". 
The  Voice  Telephony  Directive,  which  is  taken  as  the  rrost  authoritative  reference, 
defines both the scope of universal service and  the scope of the  USO as  it applies  to 
different  organisations.  A"ovisions  listed  in  Chapter II  of  the  Directive,  applying  to 
organisations  designated  by  fv'lember  States  as  having  specific  USOs,  have  to  be 
distinguished  from  "General  A"ovisions"  defined  in  Chapter  Ill  that  apply  to  all 
organisations  providing  fixed  public  telephone  networks  and/or  publicly  available 
telephone services. 
The USOs defined in Chapter II of the Voice Telephony Directive cover 
(  1)  network connections and access to telephone services, 
(2)  directory services, 
(3)  public pay telephones, and 
(4)  specific measures for disabled users and users with special needs. 
The provisions in the chapter also specify that these services must be affordable which 
means that the fv'lember States must ensure that they are offered at an affordable price. 
With regard to (1) and (3) the provisions in Chapter II specify that if a user concerned or 
a certain  public  pay  telephone  can  only  be  served at a loss  or under cost conditions 
falling  outside commercial standards, the net cost of service provision may  be shared 
with other organisations under a USO cost sharing mechanism, for example a Universal 
Service Fund (USF). With regard to (2) the same holds where a fv'lember State finds that 
no  organisation  is  willing to  make telephone directories publicly  available,  or to  provide 
directory enquiry services to all telephone users. There is  no provision that calls for the 
sharing of costs resulting from (4). 
Article 9 of Chapter  Ill  specifies that fv'lember  States  must ensure that all  users with a 
connection to the fixed telephone netw ark can access 
(5)  operator assistance services, 
(6)  directory enquiry services, and 
(7)  emergency services at no charge. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  3 
VVhile  the  above  services  are  generally  counted  am:mg  the  universal  services  - in 
particular they  are  treated  as  such  in  the  Conmission  Corrm.mication  of 13  March 
19961 -there are concerning them in the Voice Telephony Directive no provisions calling 
for the sharing of net costs between organisations,  as  they  belong to the services that 
each organisation  is  under the obligation  to provide.  It  should  be  noted,  how ever,  that 
directory enquiry services under (6) are actually a subset of (2) above and rrey therefore 
fall  under the  services  for which a sharing  of net cost rrey  be  relevant.  But this  can 
happen only if no organisation is willing to provide these services to all telephone users. 
A'ovisions  in  the  Full  Colll>etition  Directive address  possible implications  of universal 
service for the COill>etitive process. Its  provisions require that a national scherre airred 
at sharing the net cost of USOs should 
- apply only to undertakings providing public telecornrunications netw arks, and 
- allocate the  respective burden to  each undertaking  according to  objective and  non-
discrininatory criteria in accordance w ith the principle of proportionality. 
It further calls for notification of the Cormission of such national scherres giving it the 
possibility to verify that these will not interfere with corrpetitive rrerket forces due to the 
erection of entry  barriers,  distortion  of investrrent incentives,  excessive adninistrative 
costs, possible discrininatory procedures and other efficiency irrpairing practices. 
Rnally,  the  Interconnection  Directive  sets  out  the  frarrew ark  within  which  rvlerrber 
States  can  irrplerrent their  national  scherres  to  guarantee the  fulfilling  of USOs  and 
assure  their  funding.  This  frarrew ark  finds  a  detailed  interpretation  in  the 
CommJnication of the Col1111ssion on  USO assessrrent criteria of 27 Noverrber 19962 
(henceforth referred to  as  Conmission Corrmunication).  Since this  decurrent will be 
the  rrein  backdrop for the analysis  in  the  present report, we list below  its  rrein  points 
and irrplications: 
- The  cost  of  universal  service  covers  the  unavoidable  net  losses  incurred  by  an 
efficient operator in providing universal service to so-called "non-viable" custorrers or 
groups  of custorrers.  These  are custorrers  to  whom an  operator,  following  solely 
cornrercial principles, w auld not offer services at an affordable price if there were no 
USO requirerrent to do so . 
- Furtherrmre, as costs of universal service could qualify the costs of the provision of 
public  pay  phones,  of  errergency  call  centres  supporting  errergency  telephone 
nurrbers  and  of  netw ark  rmdifications  for services  to  users  w ith  disabilities  and 
users with special  needs.  From this  follows that in  respect of errergency services 
only  the  net  cost of  call  centres  could  be  recoverable  via  a  national  scherre for 
1  See European Commission (1996a). 
2  See European Commission (1996b). 4  Study for the European Cornnission 
universal service. The obligation to provide free errergency calls,  w hich  is  generally 
placed on all operators, would not be recoverable so that each operator has to bear 
its  own cost.  Further,  the  above does  not clarify whether the  net cost of providing 
directories or directory enquiry services is  covered by  the cost of universal service, 
as is provided for in the proposed Voice Telephony Drective for the case. 
- The  net cost of universal  service has  to  be  calculated  on  the  basis  of objective, 
transparent,  non-discrininatory  and  proportionate  procedures  and  criteria.  The 
calculation  should  identify  the  increrrental  costs  and  revenues  -and  associated 
benefits - of providing USOs. 
- The net cost (total increrrental cost ninus total increrrental revenues) of public pay 
phones, errergency services and the network rrodification for services to users with 
disabilities and users with special needs should be identified separately and added to 
the total USO cost. 
- Benchmark estimates should be established for the following categories of benefits: 
enhanced brand  recognition,  universal coverage in  the  area of ubiquitous  operation, 
life cycle value of particular custorrers, and rrarketing benefit of accessing full range 
of telephone usage data. 
- The rrechanisms for financing USOs  rrust also be based on objective, transparent, 
non-discrininatory  and  proportionate  criteria  and  procedures.  Such  rrechanisms 
may  take  the form of either  a  USF  established  at a national  level  or a system of 
supplerrentary charges. 
- In  the  case of a  USF,  the  body  adninistering  the  fund  should  rreet the  following 
criteria: 
(a)  The body shall be independent of the contributing and recipient undertaking(  s). 
(b)  The body shall be responsible for the collection and transfer of payrrents or rray 
oversee payrrents directly between the organisations concerned. 
(c)  The responsibility for verifying the USO net cost should rerrain with the relevant 
National Regulatory Authority (NRA). 
- A  system of supplerrentary  charges  rrust be  subject to  review  by  the  NRA  and 
should  particularly ensure that there is  no conflict of interest between an  operator's 
corrmercial activities and its  role in collecting in-payrrents from its competitors. The 
contributions should be calculated annually on the basis of USO net costs. They rray 
be collected as an annually one-off payrrent or at any other frequency deternined by 
the  NRA  and  rrust,  in  any  case,  be  unbundled  from  traffic  charges  for 
interconnection. 
- Only organisations providing public telecomrrunications networks and/or public voice 
telephony  services  rray  be  required  to  contribute  to  a  USF  or  to  any  system of 
supplerrentary charges.  In  accordance with the principles of non-discrinination and Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  5 
proportionality,  contributions  rray  only  be  irll>osed  on  voice telephony  providers  in 
proportion to their usage of public  telecomrunications networks.  Nevertheless,  the 
scope of the contribution base for universal service rray evolve over tirre in  line with 
changes in technology and rrarket structure. 
- National USO financing rrechanisms should apportion contributions arrongst eligible 
rrarket players according to their activity in the relevant rrarket. In order to ensure an 
objective,  transparent,  non-discrininatory  and  proportionate  calculation,  the 
rrechanisms should COrll>IY with the following principles: 
(a)  The  apportionrrent  of  contributions  should  not  unduly  distort  investrrents 
incentives and econonic efficiency. 
(b)  The  criteria chosen to  deternine rrarket share of eligible  organisations  should 
not have a disproportionate or discrininatory effect on particular players. 
(c)  The collection rrechanism should prevent that specific organisations have to pay 
"double contributions" to the USO cost. 
The  Corrrnission  Communication  rrakes  it  clear that the  task of delivering  services 
under the  USO should  be  open  to  all  providers  in  the rrarket.  Nevertheless,  it  is  also 
clear  that  in  the  irrrrediate  future  it  is  going  to  be  the  incumbent  operator  that will 
continue to be the USO provider.  In  a number of l\llember States it is  expected that the 
incumbent operator is  going to subnit claims to be COrll>ensated for the cost that goes 
along with this obligation.  From this follows that it is an urgent task to formulate a set of 
procedures that can be used when such claims corre forward. They should at the sarre 
tirre allow  the  NRA  to  prescribe to  the  USO provider how  to  substantiate its  claim for 
compensation and to verify the claims once they are subrritted. 
l\llore  concretely,  while respecting  the  principles  laid  down in  the Comrunication, the 
task is to develop 
•  criteria by which to identify the costs of efficient delivery of USO services; 
•  concrete procedures by which such costs can actually be rreasured; 
•  a  rrethodology  to  assess  the  revenues  to  set against  the  cost of  USO  service 
delivery to obtain its net cost; 
•  approaches to a rrethodology for assessing the value of indirect benefits; 
•  a rrethodology for deriving the net cost of the USO by avoiding double counting; 
•  whenever possible, benchrrarks for the values of the various elerrents in the net cost 
calculations; and 
•  the design of a compensation rrechanism that fulfils the requirerrent that it does not 
distort  incentives  in  the  industry  and  distributes  contributions  arrong  liable 
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The  criteria  and  procedures  should  be  practical  and  allow  the  deternination  of  the 
relevant figures in a transparent and objective rranner. 
Beyond  that the  report aims  to  carry  forward the debate  about the  proper costing  of 
teleconTllJnications services in general. 
The following section will give an overview  over the general approach taken to this  task 
and  outline  how  the discussion is  organised.  The  section concluding  this  introductory 
chapter will then briefly discuss various issues of the USO that have been addressed by 
EU legislation or raised in discussions in the EU and that need to be mentioned. Since, 
how ever,  these  issues  are  not  central  to  the  subject of this  report  they  will  not  be 
covered in it any further. 
1.2  The general approach to cost determination and funding of USOs 
proposed in this report 
1.2.1  Preliminaries 
In  rrost general terms,  the  net cost of providing universal services in  a given financial 
year consists of: 
(1)  Costs of service delivery avoidable if there were no universal service 
(2)  Revenues forgone from these services 
(3)  =  Direct net cost 
(4)  Value of any indirect benefits that flow from being a USO provider 
(5)  =  Overall net cost 
The  difference generated by  lines  (1)  and  (2)  is  the  direct  net cost because  it  is  the 
directly measurable result from the  USO activities  in  question.  Deducting from (3)  the 
indirect benefits of USO provision flowing to the USO provider leads  to the  overall net 
cost of universal service. The definition is  in general agreement with definitions found in 
rrost other  analyses.  The  discussion  in  the  report is  organised  such that Chapter 2 
deals  with line  (1),  Olapter 3 with line  (2)  and  Olapter 4 with lines  (3)  to  (5).  Rnally, 
Chapter 5 discusses setting  up  the  financing  scheme by  which corrpensation  of the 
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1.2.2  The cost of service delivery 
Chapter 2 presents the analytical approach to USO cost deternination which culninates 
in Section 2.3.4 with a sullYTBry staterrent of the steps to be undertaken by the NRA.  It 
starts  with a conceptual  discussion  regarding  the  proper  cost standard,  in  particular 
what the requirerrents are that this standard has to fulfill. The appropriate cost standard 
is shown to be the one of forward-looking Long Run lncrerrental Cost (LRIC).  It is shown 
that it is  this costing standard which fulfills best the requirerrents of efficiency and  non-
discrinination. 
After having established the cost standard to be applied, cost accounting procedures are 
discussed that assure that the cost calculations are done in a transparent and objective 
way, are practicable,  and  in  particular provide the proper data  in  accordance with the 
required standard.  From our discussion of this  issue follows that the traditional costing 
system of Fully-Ostributed Costing is inadequate for the purpose, that an analytical cost 
accounting system like Activity Based Costing should be used,  and that in the absence 
of an analytical costing system the NRA should resort to analytical cost rrodelling of its 
own, which w auld  provide  ~ with a safeguard that not overstated  costs  are rrade the 
basis of the USO net cost calculations. 
Another  larger  section  of the  chapter deals  w ~h particular  issues  of cost accounting 
which are  very  significant  in  respect of what the  level  of costs  shown will finally  be. 
These  issues  are  about  how  to  deternine the  costs  of fixed  investrrent (current vs. 
historical cost accounting,  rrethod of depreciation,  cost of capital),  and  how  it is  to  be 
assured  that  other  categories  of  costs  (operating,  rraintenance  and  adninistrative 
costs, corrm:>n costs) accord with efficient operation. These are questions that the NRA 
cannot leave to  the  netw ark operator to  decide and  on  w hich  ~ nust develop its  ow n 
opinion and rulings. 
Another section relates  to the underlying netw ark structure as  the costs,  particularly of 
services in the local netw ark, will depend on the type of technology used and  on which 
netw ark structure- optirral vs. existing one- the calculation ought to be based. Also the 
question of what the appropriate size of a USO area should be is discussed. 
Building  on  the  preceding  discussion,  the  section  on  rrethodology  lists,  for one,  the 
requirerrents  to  be  placed  on  the  network operator  for  providing  cost  data  for  the 
services of access to the national netw ark,  telephone services and  public  pay  phones, 
for the  other,  describes  how  the  criteria  developed  can  be  built  into  analytical  cost 
rrodels to be used by the NRA.  Particular errphasis is placed on the need of developing 
such an  analytical cost rrodel for local  netw ark services.  Benchrrark calculations  are 
presented for both  local netw ark access services and  for local and  long-distance calls 
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The chapter concludes, as already pointed out, with a section surrmarising the steps to 
be undertaken by the NRA for the purpose of obtaining reliable estirretes of the costs of 
usa services. 
1.2.3  Forgone revenues 
tf  unecononic areas, custorrer classes or public  pay  phones  are disconnected or not 
served to begin with, revenues will be foregone. Those revenues have to be set against 
the  avoidable  costs  since they  reduce  the  cost of the  usa.  Chapter  3  presents  the 
approach  to  revenues  in  the  net  cost calculation.  k discusses  the  various  revenues 
corll'onents, which include  revenues  from access  and  outgoing  calls,  revenues  from 
inconing  calls,  revenues  from interconnect  calls  and  called-party-pays  calls.  k also 
provides  recomrrendations  on  how  to  obtain  estirretes for data that are not available 
from the usa provider's records. 
1.2.4  Direct net cost deterrrination, indirect benefits, and overall net costs 
Chapter 4 brings the strands of analysis in Olapters 2 and 3 together for the calculation 
of net costs. The data requirerrents that ought to  be available following the procedures 
laid  down in  these two chapters  are listed  and  the corll'utational steps for calculating 
direct net costs are developed. 
V\lhen  the data on  costs and  revenues foregone are brought together to  deternine the 
direct usa net costs double  counting  should  be  avoided.  Double  counting  can  occur 
either  because  a  part  of  the  unecononic  custorrers  live  in  unecononic  areas,  or 
because revenues from inconing calls that are themselves coning out of unecononic 
areas  or from unecononic custorrers are counted there already as  outgoing calls.  An 
iterative  procedure  is  developed  to  solve  the  latter  problem  (it  must  be  an  iterative 
procedure  since  the  double  counted  COrll>Onent  can  only  be  known  after  the 
unecononic  areas  and  custorrers  are  identified  and  since  for this  identification  the 
double counted COrll>Onent itself rrust be known already). Also a sarll'le calculation for 
the deternination of the direct net cost of an area is presented. 
Part of the deternination of the  overall net cost of the usa is  the valuation of indirect 
benefits of being the usa provider, consisting of enhancerrent of corporate reputation, 
increased  ubiquity,  access  to  better  inforrretion,  and  rrerketing  effects  of public  pay 
phones.  Approaches to  deternining the value of these benefits  are presented and  the 
assessment that,  in  particular,  the  enhancerrent of corporate  reputation  due to  usa 
provider status can be of considerable value to the operator. 
Finally,  by  adding  together  the  direct  net  costs  of  unecononic  areas,  unecononic 
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value  of  indirect  benefits,  the  overall  net  costs  of  USO  service  provision  can  be 
deternined. 
1.2.5  Financing 
V\lhen  devising  specific  universal  service financing  scherres,  l\lleni::>er  States  should 
respect the  goals  of efficiency,  market  neutrality  and  non-discrinination,  continuity  of 
funding,  objectivity  and  transparency,  practicability,  and  above  all,  proportionality. 
Chapter 5 exanines the various options for financing scherres and shows how they fare 
against these requirerrents. 
The chapter, in particular, argues in favour of a USF. Organisations contributing into the 
fund  should  include  a//  organisations  operating  public  teleconmJnications  networks 
and/or publicly  available voice telephony  services.  Narrowing down the scope of liable 
organisations  could  increase  allocative  efficiency  losses  and  distort  investrrent 
incentives  in  the  industry.  !\termer  States  should,  therefore,  not  provide  for  further 
exerrptions. Smaller operators, how ever, should be exerrpted from contributions which 
would strengthen the practicability of a US F. 
The  chapter also discusses alternative bases for assessing contributions.  It  is  argued 
that a net revenues-based rreasure is the only one that satisfies the requirerrents listed 
above.  With  net revenues,  payrrents  made  to  other  organisations  contributing  to  the 
fund  for wholes  ale,  interconnection  or leased  lines  services  are  to  be  deducted  from 
gross revenues. The contribution base reflects the telecorrrrunications value added by 
an operator. Its essential advantage is  its neutrality with regard to vertical structure, type 
of service,  or technology  used.  Other contribution  bases  such as  nurmer of ninutes, 
nurmer of subscribers, retail revenues or gross revenues should not be used given the 
associated distortions or lack of practicability. 
A  USF  is  to  be  preferred  against  a system of supplerrentary  charges  in  addition  to 
interconnection  payrrents.  The  latter  creates  inefficient  incentives  to  avoid  inter-
connection  and  violates  market neutrality  requirerrents,  in  particular,  if supplerrentary 
charges  are  based  on  call  ninutes.  Given  the  problems  involved  in  a  system  of 
supplerrentary  charges,  such  a  scherre  can  only  terrporarily  be  justified  in  the 
imrrediate aftermath of fullliberalisation,  i.e.,  in  a situation normally  marked  by  all  new 
entrants interconnecting with a single doninant operator. 
1.3  Special issues not further addressed in remainder of the study 
The  net cost/corrpensation approach will consist of a set of procedures showing how 
the net cost of the USO - fulfilled by an operator which by default in rrost cases will be 
the incumbent operator- is to be deternined and how  such a net cost should be shared 
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present report,  this  is  not to  irrply  that it should  be  the  predoninant approach for the 
foreseeable future; it is the one that currently conmands rrost attention because it is the 
one rrost urgently needed. As stated in the Corrmission Cornrrunication, there should 
be  no  automatic  assurrption  that the  current usa provider rrust continue to  provide 
universal  service  or  be  the  only  provider. 3  Nor  do  we  think  that  the  usa should 
automatically  be  associated  with the  need  to  corrpensate a net cost arising  from its 
provision.  In  the first two subsections  of this  section we briefly  take  up these aspects 
and  consider two alternatives,  i.e.  setting  up  a scherre by  which it  is  made  likely  that 
usas are accorrplished through the corrpetitive process,  and  corrpetitive bidding  for 
USas. 
The  remainder  of the  section  addresses  four special issues  that in  various  ways are 
connected  with  the  approach  of  a  usa net  cost  sharing  rrechanism  which  need 
clarifying before starting the developrrent of such a scherre. These issues concern 
- the  USOs  required under the "General R-evisions" of the Voice Telephony  Directive, 
i.e. errergency, operator assistance, and directory enquiry services, and the question 
whether  there  is  the  need  of  establishing  for  them  a  rrechanism  for  the 
compensation of net costs; 
- the  funding  of network rrodifications  for the  offer of  special  services  for disabled 
users and users with special needs; 
- the proper handling of so-called voucher and virtual voucher scherres w ithin a usa 
netcostapproach;and 
- the  questions  of whether so-called  access  deficits  are  part of the  net  cost of the 
USa. 
1.3.1  Reliance on the provision of universal service by the current USO provider 
as part of its cofll)etitive positioning 
tt  is  possible to  establish  regulatory  provisions  by  which delivery  of universal  service 
through  the  competitive  process  is  assured  without that  it  is  considered  a  forgone 
conclusion  that  there  will  be  a net cost and  hence  the  need  for compensation.  The 
approach starts with the recognition that the incurment operator is currently providing a 
satisfactory level of universal service. The incurment and later on also other providers of 
services  falling  under  the  usa,  may  never  be  induced  to  subnit  a  claim  for 
compensation  of such costs  provided  the  procedure that rrust be  followed to  receive 
compensation is designed in an appropriate way. The procedure w auld have to force the 
usa provider to exanine its case so carefully that it realises the possible disadvantages 
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associated with such a claim that it may sirrply choose to abstain from subnitting any. 
In  other  words,  the  procedure  w auld  have  to  be  designed  in  a  so-called  incentive 
corrpatible  way leading  the  w auld-be  claimant  to  evaluate  the  matter  so that all  the 
concerns of the regulator are also taken into consideration. 
A  case  in  point  are  the  provisions  regarding  universal  service  in  the  German 
Telecorrm.mications  Act  of  1996  (which  are  based  on  the  recognition  that  the 
incurment operator currently  provides  a satisfactory level of universal service). These 
provisions  w auld  allow  for the  corrpensation  of the  costs  of fulfilling  USOs  only  on 
condition that a nurmer of steps have previously been undertaken that aim at securing 
delivery of USO services in  an efficient and cost-effective (from society's point of view) 
manner. The various steps in these provisions entail the following: 
- The  incurment operator rrust announce one year in  advance if it  intends  to  scale 
down its delivery of USO services, say, because of deficits in its delivery. 
- The regulator exanines whether any  other supplier w auld  be willing to take over the 
task without asking for a COrTf>ensatory payrrent. 
- If  this  fails  the  regulator can  obligate the  incurment operator,  or any  other provider 
that has a doninant position on  the relevant market,  or the incurment operator and 
these providers together, to fulfill the usa provision. 
- If a provider to  be so obligated shows that the delivery of USO services necessarily 
involves  deficits  and  w auld  justify  COrTf>ensation  the  regulator  exanines  whether 
there should  be  a COrTf>etitive  bidding  process  in  Which the  USQ provider itself as 
well as the minirrum arrount of necessary corrpensation is to be deternined. 
- Only  if such a bidding  process does not seem feasible w auld  it be conceded to the 
dorrinant operator that deficits due to universal service may be corrpensated. 
These provisions  have been  interpreted to  have the effect of preventing the  doninant 
operator to consider submitting a claim for usa corrpensation. Prospective competitors 
in Germany have in effect gone on record that in those cases where Deutsche Telekom 
were to  cease  the  universal  service  provision  they  w auld  be  prepared  to  provide  it 
instead.  This,  so  the  general  perception,  leads  Telekom  to  exanine  its  case  very 
carefully before it w auld go to the regulator with a claim to be COrTf>ensated. 
The  above observation  is  consistent with what we will discuss in  Olapter 4.3 that the 
overall indirect benefits of being the USO provider are quite substantial and may in many 
instances be large enough to outweigh the direct net costs arising from USO services. 
At this  point a general observation  may  already  be  in  place:  A  USO  net cost sharing 
rrechanism may  actually  be  called  for only  at a tirre when there are in  fact already a 
nurmer of providers in a market and these providers are also in the business of offering 
usa services. It would be at that tirre only that the costs and benefits of providing usa 12  Study for the European CorTI'Tission 
services may be so unevenly distributed that it becomes a necessity that net costs and 
benefits are evened out.  As long  as  this  is  not the case, the current usa provider,  as 
follows  from the  above,  is  likely  to  assure universal service and  not incur a net cost 
thereby. Installing under these circumstances a usa net cost sharing mechanism may 
run  the risk of establishing  a market entry  barrier,  in  particular for smaller entrants.  I 
w auld  also  mean  that the  adninistrative  cost of such  a  scheme  w auld  have  to  be 
incurred without that the need for it has yet been established. 
From above analysis we conclude: 
1.  There is value for NRAs to conterrplate designing regulations aimed at assuring the 
provision of universal service by the current usa provider as part of its corrpetitive 
positioning. 
2.  As  derronstrated  by  the  exarrple  of  legislation  in  Germany,  this  can  be 
accorrplished by a procedure that leads the current usa provider to the realisation 
that subnitting a claim may in the final analysis be to its disadvantage. 
3.  As long as corrpetition is not really flourishing, as long as it can be expected that the 
current  usa  provider  continues  offering  usa  services  w ithout  needing 
corrpensation, and  as  long  as  other operators are actually not also involved in  the 
business of providing USO services, there may  be little point in establishing a USO 
cost sharing  mechanism  I  could  inhibit market entry  of new, particularly  smaller 
corrpetitors and,  in addition, cause substantial adninistrative costs that one should 
not incur unnecessarily. 
1.3.2  Competitive bidding for uneconomc areas 
As an  alternative to irrposing  USOs  on  a network operator and  measuring the cost of 
USOs by a costing approach, USOs could be put out to corrpetitive tendering. The usa 
provider and the price of usa provision w auld  be deternined by  a corrpetitive bidding 
procedure.  This  w auld  have the advantage that the provision of universal service,  and 
any corrpensation that need to be paid for it, is subnitted to corrpetitive pressure. 
The Oftel Consultative Document on universal telecommunications services4 contains a 
description of the basic elements of such a procedure. I also addresses in passing the 
question of corrpetitive bidding in the case where the usa provider status w auld convey 
benefits in econonic areas so that the bidder should be prepared to pay for the privilege 
of being the USO provider (instead of claining a subsidy).  In  the discussion below  we 
follow  the  arguments  advanced  by  Oftel  placing  in  some  cases  greater  weight  on 
caveats regarding the procedure. 
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The  regulator  would  first have to  deternine those  unecononic  areas  that are  to  be 
tendered. Potential candidates would generally be rerrote areas where the geographical 
characteristics and the low  population density make the area expensive to serve. Oftel 
concludes that the best candidates for tendering would be  areas where there is  either 
corrpeting infrastructure already in place or a good opportunity to deliver services using 
alternative technology at lower cost (e.g. fixed radio access). 
An operator would be  chosen as  USO  provider when it  subnits a bid  requesting  the 
low est subsidy to take on the obligation. The contract between the NRA and the winning 
operator should cover the following issues: the detailed level of service to be supplied, 
the duration of the contract, the quality of service standards, contingency arrangements, 
rronitoring and  penalty arrangements. The contracted operator w ould  have to corrpete 
with any other operator in the area but would be the supplier of last resort, i.e. would be 
obliged to supply basic telephony to any customer on reasonable request. Furtherrrore, 
it would be subject to an explicit control on prices. The required subsidy would be paid to 
the winner of the tender using the available corrpensation scheme. 
As it  is  likely  that there would be  only  a few  bidders  in  any particular area,  the auction 
process would have to be designed in  a way that the chances of strategic or collusive 
bidding  are mnimsed.  Hence it would be  useful to set a reserve price,  based on  the 
estimated universal service cost of the area to the current USO provider. Furtherrrore, a 
single round auction of sealed bids would seem to be preferable to a rrulti-round auction 
for the same reason. In order to avoid the "winner's curse", i.e. the high risk that a bidder 
other than the incurment wins the tender at a subsidy that would be insufficient to cover 
the  net cost incurred,  measures  would  have to  be  taken  to  reduce the  informational 
disadvantages of the corrpetitors.  If this  could  not be done successfully, and  potential 
bidders are aware of their disadvantage, there may  then be no bidding at all except by 
the incumbent. 
We should note the two precautions mentioned in the preceding paragraph: statement of 
a reservation price and reduction of information disadvantages that corrpetitors have vis 
a vis  the  incumbent operator.  Establishing  a  reservation  price would,  at least at the 
beginning, require a prior cost estimation procedure that one actually would like to avoid 
with corrpetitive bidding. As regards corrpensating for the informational disadvantage of 
corrpetitors, we believe that accorrplishing this would be very difficult. In  particular, the 
incumbent  operator  would  not  only  have  the  advantage  of  privileged  access  to 
operational information about serving the area but would also have a clear perception of 
the indirect benefit of being  the  USO provider,  in  this  area and generally (see Chapter 
4.3).  Not  wanting  to  jeopardise  its  enhanced  reputation  arising  from this  position  by 
allow ing  corrpetitors to gain if only  part of it,  the incurment would be likely  to require a 
lower corrpensation than otherw ise. This of course would make it even rrore difficult for 
corrpetitors  to  subnit a  winning  bid.  Their  cost advantage  would  have  to  be  quite 
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We do not believe that in  the short run  corrpetitive bidding  should be  used in  l\llermer 
States that have fully developed networks and w here at the present tirre the incurment 
operator controls the overw helning part of that network. I could in our estimation lead to 
the result that the incurment is thew  inning bidder in  alrrost all areas at sorre positive 
corrpensation when in  fact,  on  an  overall  evaluation,  there would be  no  need  to  pay 
corrpensation at all  because the  benefits that the  incurrbent operator draws from its 
usa provider status outweigh any direct net costs (see again Chapter 4.3).5 
V\lhen  there  is  on  balance  a benefit from being  the usa provider in  an  area,  it  is  of 
course also true that the corrpetitive bidding  process w auld  bring out the true value of 
that benefit - if carried  out under conditions  of information  syrrrretry and  w ithout any 
strategic interferences,  and  without any  interdependence  of the  benefit  reaped  from 
usa status  in  this  area with corresponding benefits  reaped  in  other areas,  or for that 
matter in  rrost of the country.  We would argue that the  latter effect w auld  also in  this 
case nitigate against using corrpetitive bidding at the present tirre, as new corrpetitors 
would hardly be in a position to outbid the incurment. 
In general, the approach of corrpetitive bidding should be taken into closer consideration 
once rrore is  known about the  overall  net cost of usa provision,  its  distribution over 
drfferent areas and  categories  of custorrers, and  in  particular on  how  to  deal w ith  the 
fact that the  incurrbent operator is  currently  practically  the  only  usa provider nation-
wide and the recognition it gains from this  gives  it,  so to speak,  "overlapping" benefits. 
We w auld  agree of course w ith Oftel that the idea of applying the bidding procedure to 
the usa should be developed further in order to overcorre these difficulties. 
In  agreement with the Commission  Communications  we believe  that  tendering  would 
hold  pronises for l\llerrber States  where the  roll-out of the  network has  not yet been 
corrpleted  and  where there  remain  whole areas  essentially  still  to  be  connected.  In 
these regions,  where the  incurrbent operator  may  not be  in  a position  to  provide for 
network build-up in  a short enough period, using the bidding procedure to pick the best 
alternative  operator w auld  appear feasible.  Under  these  circumstances,  sorre of the 
caveats that we listed above would apply with less force than in l\llerrber States with fully 
developed netw arks. 
Thus we conclude: 
1.  Using corrpetitive bidding to deternine usa providers w auld have the advantage of 
subnitting the provision of universal service to corrpetitive pressure. 
5  Note that Oftel concludes that BT has no justified claim to be compensated for a net cost of USO 
provision, mostly due to indirect benefits BT draws from the USO (see Oftel (1997), p 33). 
6  See European Commission (1996b), p. 28. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  15 
2.  For corrpetitive bidding to be successful, the design of the bidding procedure rrust 
preclude the  possibilities  of collusion,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  danger of either 
winner's curse results or no bidding at all, on the other. 
3.  We w ould not reconrnend to use corrpetitive bidding in  rv1ermer States w here the 
netw ork  is  fully  developed  and  currently  controlled  by  the  incurment  network 
operator  before  rmre  is  known  about the  overall  net cost of  USO  provision,  its 
distribution over different areas,  and  its  irrpact in  terrrs  of indirect benefits to  the 
incurment operator and current USO provider. 
4.  Corrpetitive bidding  holds  pronises for Merroer States  in which network roll-out is 
not corrplete. Other operators in addition to the incurment could be selected by this 
procedure to speed up network build-up throughout the country. 
1.3.3  Requirerrent to "play" for services falling under the "General A-ovisions" of 
the proposed Voice Telephony Directive 
The provisions in Chapter Ill of the proposed Voice Telephony Directive are clear in that 
sorre  of  the  typical  USO  services  rrust  be  offered  by  all  network operators  and 
providers of telephone services. Since this obligation is placed on all operators it follows 
that each bears its own cost and therefore there is  no need to include the services in a 
regirre established for the sharing of USO net costs. According to these provisions this 
applies w ithout qualifications to 
•  errergency services and 
•  operator assistance services. 
As regards 
•  directory enquiry services, 
there  may  be  an  exception  if  a  rv1erroer  State  finds  that no  organisation  is  willing  to 
provide directory enquiry services to all telephone users. In this case the rvleni:>er State 
may provide that the net cost of the service may be shared armng all operators. 
In  the  terninology  that  has  established  itself  in  the  USO  context,  there  is  for these 
services an  obligation for all operators to "play" and  there w ill  be  no obligation to "pay" 
into a fund for the sharing of USO costs for any of these services,1 with the one possible 
exception noted. The question may nevertheless arise whether operators may not reject 
7  According to this terminology, the obligation to "play" means that the USO in question is  placed on 
market entrants as well as on the incurment, whereas the obligation to "pay" refers to the situation 
in which the incumbent operator is the only USO provider and entrants pay their share of the burden, 
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this  general obligation and subnit claims to be cof11)ensated for the costs of providing 
the services, on the grounds that the obligation places a burden on them that prevents 
them to cof11)ete on equal terms and are therefore discrininatory. 
The  argument  should  be  dealt  with  as  follows.  No  netw ark  operator  connecting 
customers  to  the  general public  telephone  netw ark or running  public  pay  phones  can 
afford not to offer these services. They are sif11)ly  necessary as part of a basic offering 
of  telephone  services.  Not  offering  any  of  the  above  services  would  have  adverse 
reputational  effects  of  a  magnitude  that  w auld  put  a  big  question  mark  behind  the 
operator's  whole  cof11)etitive  position.  Since  all  operators  know  this  none  will 
contef11)1ate the idea not to offer the services, whether they are part of the USO or not. 
A"oof to this are provisions in existing interconnection agreements everywhere assuring 
that the new cof11)etitors have access to so-called ancillary services - to be provided by 
the  incumbent  operator- putting  them  in  a  position  to  offer  above  services  to  its 
customers.  In  these  agreements  great  ef11)hasis  is  generally  placed  on  precisely 
defined levels of quality of these support services,s which should  be  interpreted  as  an 
indication  of the  if11)ortance  that the  cof11)etitors  place  on  the  ability  to  satisfy  their 
customers in this respect. 
From the above follows that the regulatory concern to make sure that these services are 
universally offered seems to be rrore a matter in the realm of interconnection than of the 
USO.  In order that cof11)etitors  can offer the services like the incumbent operator, they 
must be able to use resources, e.g.  the information base needed for directory services 
and  the  infrastructure to  convey  emergency  calls  to  their  proper destination,  that are 
mainly  under the  control  of the  incumbent  operator.  The  incumbent  has  unrestricted 
access to  these resources  enabling  it  to  derronstrate to  users that it will continue to 
reliably offer these services as it always has. For the new  cof11)etitors to do the same, it 
must have access to these resources on terms  and conditions that do not place it in  a 
disadvantageous position. 
The regulator's task in this  context appears therefore to lie in assuring that new netw ark 
operators  obtain  access to  the  necessary resources  at rates  and  conditions  that are 
called for under the Interconnection Directive. They should not be discrininatory and the 
fees  to  be  paid  for using  these resources  should  be  based  on  costs.  We  argue that 
fulfilling  this  condition  will  preclude  the  possibility  that  any  operator  comes  forward 
advancing  claims  to  be  cof11)ensated  for net costs  arising  from the  provision  of the 
above services. 
The prices for these services fall of course under the affordability constraint - one thinks 
here  primarily  of  directory  enquiry  services  that  are  generally  thought  to  generate 
deficits. If this  is  in fact the case, and if it is the incumbent operator that foots the bill for 
8  For an  exaf11Jie  see Vogelsang (1994),  p.  39, where the interconnection agreement between BT 
and Nynex Cable Comrns, a TV cable company entering the telephone business, is analysed. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  17 
the  required  expensive  resource,  the  interconnection  prices  to  be  paid  by  the  other 
corrpetitors for the use of this resource should reflect the circumstance. This w auld not 
affect the judgerrent according to w hich this  is  a matter of interconnection required for 
the  purpose  of enabling  services  that  each  of the  corrpetitors  w auld  have  to  offer, 
independent of any universal service obligation. 
Finally,  the incuni:>ent operator may  be expected to corre forw ard w ith a claim that for 
the price of, say, directory enquiry services allowed under the affordable price regirre, it 
w auld  remain  with a net cost that  ought  to  be  corrpensated.  Since,  how ever,  every 
network operator faces the sarre price constraint on these services - if only through the 
working of the normal corrpetitive process - and since every operator bears the cost of 
its  service either by  assuning the  cost of required  resources directly or by  paying  for 
them  in  form of  interconnection  payrrents,  there  is  no  balance  of net  costs  or  net 
benefits that needs to be evened out,  and there is  still no case for including the service 
among the ones that cause net costs requiring corrpensation. 
The  argurrent  actually  applies  with  equal  force  to  errergency  call  centres  that  are 
explicitly  referred to  in  the Corrnission Conmunication as  a USO requirementS  The 
service of an errergency call centre should be looked upon as an ancillary service that 
all competitors  can use to handle errergency calls.  In  principle,  each competitor could 
establish such a centre; this, how ever, should be considered a waste of resources as it 
w auld  be difficult to  draw  a COrll>etitive  advantage from having  one's  own emergency 
call  centre.  If  there  exist already  such centres  established  by  the  incuni:>ent  operator 
new  COrll>etitors  should be allowed to use them and  in turn assume part of the cost of 
maintaining them. 
If none exist yet, the operators should normally have an interest to install emergency call 
centres  jointly  because  of the  econonies  of scale that  can  be  realised  this  w ay.  Of 
course, the parties w auld have to agree on the modus of sharing the costs and that may 
be  difficult.  (In  this  case one  w auld,  by  the  way,  not  be  able  to  invoke  principles  of 
interconnection in the classical sense, as this would normally presuppose control over a 
bottleneck resource by  one of the operators, which is  not the case under the assurred 
circumstances.)  In  this  context then  there  may  be  a case for regulatory  intervention 
calling  for  the  establishrrent  of  emergency  call  centres.  This  w auld  still  not  be  a 
sufficient case  to  finance  them  through  the  rrechanism  of the  USO  compensation 
scheme.  If  the  COrll>etitors  cannot corre to  an  agreerrent by  themselves  on  how  to 
share these costs, the NRA should use its influence and power of deternination to bring 
such an agreement about. This w auld have to be an agreerrent on the division of costs 
of jointly  used  resources.  This  is  a different matter than  sharing  the  net cost of USO 
services  delivered  by  one  (or  a  few)  and  financed  by  all  through  a  corll>ensation 
rrechanism very specifically designed for this purpose. 
9  See European Commission (1996 b), p. 12. 18  Study for the European CoiTITission 
Thus we conclude: 
1.  The corrpetitive process will assure that the USO services of 
- emergency calls, 
- operator assistance, and 
- directory enquiry services 
are offered by all network operators as part of their basic offerings. 
2.  Since all operators are required to "play" in  respect of these services, and as there 
will be  no  tendency  for irrbalances  in  possible  net costs  to  arise,  a need  for the 
corrpensation of any net cost will not arise. 
3.  In  order to  assure that new  corrpetitors are able to offer above services, it will be 
necessary to  arrange for effective interconnection  arrangements  that enable  new 
corrpetitors to use needed bottleneck facilities (e.g. data bases) that are under the 
control of the incurrbent operator. 
4.  One should expect that the establishment of jointly financed emergency call centres 
lies  in the interest of all corrpetitors.  If they  have to be brought about by  regulatory 
intervention,  how ever,  this  would  not mean  that  their  costs  need  to  be  financed 
through the USO corrpensation mechanism. The NRA should, if necessary, use its 
influence  or  power of  deternination  to  bring  about  an  agreement  regarding  the 
sharing of costs of these resources that depends on the use of these resources by 
each of the corrpetitors. 
1.3.4  Netw ark rrodifications for the provision of services to users with disabilities 
and users with special needs 
tt will need special initiatives  in the future to get the network rrodified in a way (e.g.  get 
text relay systems installed) to help those that in one way or another are irrpaired to use 
the normal telephone services. We imagine that for this  the  NRA will have to organise 
support from the corrpetitors, public organisations dedicated to the irrprovement of the 
living  conditions  of  the  so  handicapped,  as  well  as  from  national  government  and 
possibly  the  EU.  In  particular,  industry  will  be  made  to  realise  that  investing  in  the 
provision  of such services  may  be  a good  business  proposition.  Such  initiatives  will 
therefore  involve  many  sides  and  in  particular  may  also  have  to  unlock sources  of 
finance beyond the telecommunications sector. 
From the above follows that the provision of such equipment and its funding could not so 
easily be fitted within the confines of a standardised net-cost/corrpensation scheme for 
normal  USO  services.  To  mention  a  possible  circumstance  which makes  the  point 
perhaps  rrore obvious.  Suppose that the direct net cost of standard  USO services  is 
rrore than outweighed by the indirect benefits to the USO provider so that on account of Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  19 
these services there would not only be no need for a corrpensation rrechanism but also 
the  usa  provider  would  have  sorre  surplus  benefit  left to  it.  This  would,  how ever, 
presurrably not preclude the necessity that projects be set up for the developrrent and 
instalrrent  of  such  special  equiprrent  and  that  agreerrents  be  concluded  between 
competitors  (and  others)  in  respect  of  its  funding,  possibly  within  the  confines  of  a 
special usa fund. 
The rrain focus of this  report is the developrrent of criteria and procedures for the cost 
deternination and  funding of standard usa services.  ~would be  beyond the scope of 
the  study  to  assess  the  rrany  ways  in  which  the  provision  of  such  specialised 
equipment could be fit into this scheme. 
From this we conclude: 
1.  Due to the special efforts that rrust go into the organisation of providing and funding 
specialised equiprrent of services to users with disabilities  and  users with special 
needs,  their  usa  cost  cannot  simply  be  included  within  a  standard  usa 
compensation scherre. 
2.  ~ rray  be  appropriate to  install a special usa fund  for this  equiprrent (in  form of 
projects supported by rrost competitors, for exarrple) to organise the provision and 
funding of such equiprrent. 
1.3.5  Specially targeted funding schemes 
Scherres by which custorrer groups with specifically low  derrand or with special social 
needs are given preferential access to the telephone service belong to the approaches 
that are being  used or conterrplated  by  sorre EU governrrents.  Usually  they  take the 
form of light user scherres with special  low  tariffs,  or so-called voucher scherres  by 
w hich  eligible users  are given  vouchers the value  of which can  be  deducted  from the 
bills  for  services  priced  at  standard  levels.  VVhen  the  vouchers  are  replaced  by 
entitlerrents  that  can  be  clairred  by  custorrers  solely  by  virtue  of  belonging  to  a 
particular  socio-econonic group,  the  latter  scherres  are  also  referred  to  as  "virtual" 
voucher  scherres.  Through  these  scherres  the  users  in  question  can  get  the 
preferential terms and conditions envisaged by the governrrent policy. The scherres are 
legitirrate policy options for governrrents endeavouring to bring universal service also to 
people who rray not have the rreans to subscribe to services priced at standard levels. 
This  would  particularly  apply  in  those  countries  w here  the  providers  of  telephone 
services have not introduced such pricing policies  on their own initiative. The scherres 
rray  indeed  engender efficiency gains  if they  are  properly  targeted  and  - w hich  is  an 
important proviso- they are not too expensive to adninister. 20  Study for the European CoiTITission 
In  the  deternination of the  USO net cost,  there is  no  need  to  consider these kinds  of 
special offers to low  users and/or users with special needs separately and in addition to 
the normal USO net cost deternination. To see this  it is  only  necessary to refer to the 
form.Jia  for calculating  the  USO net cost which we stated  at the  beginning  of Section 
1.2.1.  Follow ing  lines  (  1)  and  (2)  of the  form.Jia,  one  starts  w ith  the  cost of service 
provision  caused  by  the  services  under  the  USO  and  deducts  from  this  cost  the 
revenues received from the services' users- low  as  they  may be- to obtain the  USO's 
direct  net  cost.  Now,  if  these  users  are  beneficiaries  of  scherres  like  the  ones 
rrentioned  above,  the  revenues  will reflect this  fact.  If  the  users  benefit from low  user 
scherres  the  revenues  correspond  to  the  special  tariffs  accorded  them;  if the  users 
benefit from (virtual)  vouchers  distributed  to  or  clairred  by  them,  the  cash  revenues 
obtained from them are reduced by the arrounts due to the vouchers. Thus, the effect of 
the scherres on the USO net cost is  picked up through the reductions  in the revenues 
that they bring about. 
~ may also conceivably be the case that the governrrent finances the scherres out of its 
general budget by  refunding  to  the  USO provider the  arrounts  by  which the scherres 
reduce revenues.  In  this  case there w auld  be  no extra effect through them on  the  net 
cost position of the USO provider whatever. The relevant case w auld  rrost probably be 
the one,  however, where the cost of the scherres has to be financed through the USO 
net cost sharing rrechanism. 
There may then be the tendency to consider as the relevant USO cost of such scherres 
the  difference between  the  standard  price,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  price  received 
under the special scherre, on the other, m.Jitiplied by the number of units demanded by 
the scherre's beneficiaries.  In  particular (virtual) voucher scherres may  be susceptible 
to be regarded this way. 
The approach w auld  be problematic for the follow ing  reasons.  First,  it is  doubtful that it 
w auld  be  consistent with  Comm.Jnity  Law  as  it  w auld  not correspond  to  a net cost 
deternination of the cost of the USO. That this  is so follows directly from the discussion 
in  the  paragraph  preceding  the  last one.  ~ is  not the  value  of the  vouchers  nor  the 
difference between standard and special tariff under low  user scherres that deternines 
a deficit but rather the difference between costs and  revenues - w hich of course m.Jst 
be net of the value of vouchers and/or evaluated at the low  special tariffs. 
Second, there is  the risk that a "burden" of the USO is  established that is  in  excess of 
the  actual  net cost.  There  may  actually  be  two cases:  In  the  one  case,  the  users  in 
question would not cover the cost of the service they are getting even if they were paying 
standard prices; benefiting from the voucher system or from low  user special tariffs they 
will  now  even  pay  less.  The  direct  net  cost  of the  USO  deternined  in  the  costing 
calculation will then  necessarily include the total  amount of the  social scherre.  In  the 
other  case,  it  may  be  true  that  even  under  the  special  scherres  there  are  sorre 
custorrers that do not cause a deficit. This  could  be true if there are very low  costs for 
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would be  incurred  in  any  case whether the custorrers in  question are being  served or 
not.  Even if in this case the value of the scherre by itself is considered as the direct net 
cost of the  USO this  would overstate that direct net cost as  not all of the beneficiaries 
would actually cause a deficit.  In  both cases, how ever,  it holds  that if the values of the 
scherres were added to the arrount deterrrined by a net cost calculation there w ould be 
the risk of double counting up to the total arrount of the scherres as the deficit caused 
by them would normally also be picked up by the net cost calculation. 
From the above discussion we conclude: 
1.  V\lhile  specially  targeted  funding  scherres  (low  user  scherres,  (virtual)  voucher 
scherres) may be efficient elerrents of an approach to implerrent universal service 
policies,  the  arrounts  corresponding to  the value of such scherres should not be 
considered  as  a separate  item  besides  the  deterrrination  of the  net cost of the 
USO.  The  reason  is  that the arrount of the  USO net cost deterrrined through the 
net  cost  calculation  would  necessarily  include  these  arrounts;  any  additional 
consideration would thus arrount to double counting. 
2.  Using  the  value  of  such  a scherre  in  lieu  of a net  cost deterrrination  would  be 
contrary to Cormunity Law. In any case using the value of such a scherre in lieu of 
a proper net cost deterrrination would risk to overestimate the direct net cost of the 
USO. 
1.3.6  Access deficit contributions 
The term "access deficit contribution" was frarred in the context of the interconnection 
negotiations in the UK at the beginning of the 1990s. It referred to a perceived irmalance 
between the cost of a subscriber line and the rronthly  rental that BT received from its 
custorrers implying that BT had to cover the "deficit" from its call revenue. Given that BT 
still ow ned  alrrost all of the local access networks and  competitors were therefore not 
faced with such a deficit, the regulator decided that the latter should contribute to BTs 
deficit through  the  inclusion  of an  access deficit contribution  (ADC)  in  interconnection 
charges. The British regulator has, however, made very linited use of this instrurrent. 
The  concept has  also entered the discussion concerning  interconnection  in  other  EU 
l\llember  States.  As  discussed  in  the  Commission  Communication1 o,  national  ADC 
scherres will be allowed under Cormunity Law  on a temporary basis until,  as  required 
by  the  Full  Competition  Directive,  the  necessary  tariff  rebalancing  by  incumbent 
operators elirrinating the access deficits has been accomplished. Such scherres must 
also rreet the  requirerrent that they  are structurally  separate from any  USO  net cost 
sharing mechanism. 
10  See European Commission (1996 b), p. 6. 22  Study for the European CoiTlllssion 
Underlying this  position is  the argurrent that the access deficit is  not part of the cost of 
the USO.  The position is  consistent with the approach developed in the present report, 
as  already  expressed  in  the  form.Jia  for  calculating  the  USO  net  cost stated  at  the 
beginning of Section 1.2. 1.  In accordance w ith this form.Jia, the USO net cost equals the 
net cost of serving  custorrers  that  would  not  be  served  if  there were no  USO.  The 
access deficit,  in  contrast,  is  the  difference between the totality  of costs of subscriber 
lines  mnus  the  totality  of  rentals  received  from the  users  of  these  lines.  For  the 
overw helmng majority of these users, how ever, it will be true that revenues received for 
calls  and  other  services  outweigh  the  access  deficit.  Each  of these  custorrers  will 
therefore  generate  a  surplus  and  be  served  by  the  network  operator  for  purely 
corll'rercial reasons. These custorrers obviously do not generate net costs. 
The point taken is  not that an irrbalance between the cost of subscriber lines and rental 
revenues, to the extent that it exists,  is  of no consequence. There is  no question that it 
could  have  an  influence  on  the  corrpetitive  position  of  the  operator  w he  owns  the 
subscriber lines - virtually always the incurment operator - if in fact prices for calls would 
have to be substantially higher than otherwise necessary. The answer to this problem is, 
how ever, for the operator to  restructure its  tariffs according to the  requirerrents  of the 
corrpetitive market, and not to declare the arrount of the irrbalance a cost of the USO.  If 
due  to  this  restructuring  of  tariffs  there  are  custorrer  classes  that  are  hurt  in  an 
inacceptable way, special tariff packages  like light-user scherres should be introduced 
to neutralise this irrpact. 
It may then be the case that the special tariff packages (which in effect may include as 
an  elerrent  a  low  rental  charge  and  therefore  generate  an  "access  deficit"  for  the 
custorrers using them) lead to revenue/cost relations through which particular custorrer 
classes  or even whole areas  becorre uneconomc.  In  these cases the  USO net cost 
corrpensation  scherre  would  pick  up  the  corresponding  deficits  and  address  the 
problem in the correct way. 
We conclude: 
1.  So-called access deficits are not part of the USO net cost. To the extent that they 
exist and  cause financial irrbalances for the incuni::>ent operator, a restructuring of 
tariffs is called for. 
2.  Unfavourable irrpacts of this  tariff restructuring on certain custorrer groups should 
be neutralised through the introduction of special tariff packages. If taking advantage 
of such  tariff packages  makes  these custorrers  uneconomc,  the  corresponding 
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2  The approach to cost in the net cost calculations 
2.1  The problem to be solved 
The  rrost essential corrponent of the net cost of the USO is  the cost of production of 
the  services  falling  under  it.  The  first  step  in  carrying  out  the  corresponding  cost 
deternination consists in identifying the individual services or service elerrents for which 
this is relevant and state what the task irrplies. 
According to the Commission Corrm.mication11, the services and service elerrents for 
which there may be corrpensation under a national USO scherre are the following: 
•  access of custorrers to the national network from a fixed location (mainly subscriber 
lines), 
•  switched telephone services, 
•  public pay phones, 
•  directory services, 
•  network rrodifications for services to be offered to users with disabilities  and  users 
with special needs, and 
•  errergency call centres. 
The Comnission Conmunication does not include the further services rrentioned in the 
"General A"ovisions" clause of the Voice Telephony Directive, i.e. 
•  errergency calls and 
•  operator assistance services 
because  these  services  have  to  be  offered  by  each  provider  on  its  ow n so that  no 
uneven  distribution  of  a  USO  burden  and  therefore  no  need  for  a  cost  sharing 
rrechanism arises. 
Of  the services that the Comnission Corrrrunication explicitly  includes  as  eligible for 
cost sharing under a USO scherre, access to the netiAOrk,  sVtitched telephone services 
and  public pay phones  are the  rrost irrportant ones.  They  will be  the subject of this 
chapter, and for that matter, the rest of this  report.  Of the remaining services, directory 
services in form of w hite page services are part of the package of providing access to 
the network and  are therefore automatically included, w hile  directory enquiry services, 
netiAOrk  modifications  required  for  specialised  services  for  the  handicapped  and 
11  See European Commission (1996 b). 24  Study for the European CorTTTission 
emergency  call  centres  should  not  be  included  under  a  standard  USO  net  cost 
corrpensation scheme,  as  we discussed  in  Sections  1.3.3 and  1.3.4.  From now  on, 
these latter services will not occupy us any further. 
Access to  the netw:Jrk  and  telephone  seNices are  services  that  concern  identifiable 
customers. The process of cost deterrrination concentrates here on particular groups of 
customers  and  customers  living  in  particular  areas  for  which  demand  and  cost 
conditions  are such that revenues  do not cover costs. Sirrilarly, while the service over 
public pay  phones is always delivered to anonyrrous customers, the cost deterrrination 
process w ill  have to  focus  on  the  pay  phones  w here the  revenues  generated  are  not 
sufficient for cost covering. Thus part of the task in regard of these services consists in 
identifying  the  groups  or  types  of  customers,  areas  and  pay  phones  that  may  be 
uneconomic. 
The  main  objective  of  this  chapter  lies  in  generating  a  set  of  criteria  by  w hich  to 
deterrrine  the  relevant  costs  of  service  provision.  That  this  is  not  a straightforward 
matter lies  in the fact that rrost telecommunications  network operators do not possess 
cost accounting  systems  that are  in  a position  to  provide  the  needed  information.  In 
particular,  the systems  that are  in  place often generate cost data that do  not properly 
reflect cost causation.  In the following, the first objective is therefore to clarify a number 
of conceptual and methodological issues, in particular regarding the cost standard to be 
used. 
The chapter will further address practical problems which have to be solved in advance 
of a concrete USO cost deterrrination. They  concern cost accounting issues such as 
the method of capital cost deterrrination, procedures to assure that costs of operating, 
maintenance  and  adrrinistration  are  used  that  correspond  to  efficient  network 
operations,  and  the treatment of comrron  costs.  In  addition,  questions  are addressed 
concerning  the  technology  and  network structure on  which the  calculation  should  be 
based  and  how  the  appropriate  size  of  a  USO  area  should  be  deterrrined.  This 
discussion will lead  to  the  development of a methodology  of deterrrining the  costs  of 
USO service provision.  The discussion will be concluded with benchmark calculations 
for  the  costs  of  local  and  national  network  services  obtained  from  analytical  cost 
models. 
In  the closing section the concrete actions will be listed that the  NRA  should follow  for 
the  purpose  of deterrrining  the  costs  of the  three  services  identified  above  as  falling 
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2.2  Conceptual and methodological issues 
2.2.1  The Long Run Incremental Cost standard 
The cost standard that we propose to use in the deternination of USO costs is the Long 
Run  Incremental Cost (LRIC)  caused by  the  USOs.  The  incremental cost is  the cost 
that  is  caused  by  the  activity  in  question,  here the  provision  of the  USOs,  when it  is 
carried  out with a long-run  perspective.  Equivalently,  looking  at the  question from the 
perspective of a TQ12 currently providing USOs, the incremental cost caused by them is 
equal to the costs that could be avoided in the long run if USOs were rerroved from the 
incumbent TO and it would discontinue to provide the service. As a corollary, we could 
therefore also say that the price should be set at the Long Run Avoidable Cost (LRAC) if 
usa provision is discontinued. 
The two concepts are equivalent whenever the costs not incurred due to the decision to 
discontinue a service from now  on are in  the long run  (after all necessary adjustments 
have been carried out) the same as  the costs incurred due to the decision to start now 
the service. We consider this to be the case in rrost applications. 
The  LRIC  concept  is  rrotivated  by  its  relevance  under  co111Jetitive  conditions.  A"ice 
setting  in  a market with strong competition  requires  that costs  be  based on  the  LRIC 
standard.  This  implies  that they  are  calculated  from a forward-looking  perspective,  in 
particular 
- from the standpoint of building production and service capability today, 
- at  current  input  prices,  including  a  return-on-capital  consistent  with  colllJetitive 
capital markets, and 
- in  a way that  is  rrost cost effective  in  light  of today's  available  technology,  input 
prices, and expectations about demand. 
In  a  co111Jetitive  market,  only  prices  derived  from  costs  based  on  these  principles 
guarantee success and survival of the enterprise. We will argue below  that this general 
principle  which  reflects  the  competitive  standard  rrust necessarily  also  apply  to  the 
calculation of the costs from which compensation to be paid for USOs are to be derived. 
The  principles  essentially  have  implications  for the  fixed  investment since  a  method 
rrust be applied that deternine their costs consisting of depreciation and cost of capital 
that are in accordance w ith these principles' prescriptions. 
12  The expression "TO"  is  used alternatively for "incumbent network operator" and  stands for "Tele-
communications  Organisation"  which  in  Community  documents  has  been  defined  to  mean  a 
"public or private bod(y), tow hich a l\t1ember State grants special or exclusive rights for the provision 
of  a  public  telecommunications  network  and,  where  applicable,  public  telecommunications 
services". 26  Study for the European Corrmission 
One of the defining features of the LRIC standard is that it is a forward-looking concept. 
The  Interconnection  Directive  requires  in  Annex  Ill  that  the  USO  cost leading  to  any 
compensation  under  a cost sharing  mechanism rrust be  deternined  according  to  a 
forward-looking standard. The LRIC standard clearly fulfills this requirement. 
The  LRIC concept has  in  recent discussions  undergone  a refinement that should  be 
noted. This refinement differentiates between "Total Service" and "Total Bement" LRIC. 
The latter (TSLRIC) measures the increment in cost occurring in the long run of offering 
a  coJ11)1ete  service  in  addition  to  other  services  in  the  programme  of  the  firm.  In 
contrast, TELRIC refers to the increment in cost that is caused by  identifiable elements 
that are needed  in  the production of a service,  like switching or transnission between 
switching centres or a certain advanced function  implemented  in the switch. The  latter 
will be  rrore  relevant,  for example,  for the  pricing  of interconnection  services;  for the 
pricing of USOs the former, i.e. TSLRIC,  is the appropriate concept. 
V\lhile the LRIC concept is  a concept from econonics, this does not mean that it does 
not have its  counterpart in  the business  adninistration literature.  In  particular,  TSLRIC 
has  its  immediate counterpart in  the concept of "long-term product costs" as  they  are 
generated  by  the  approach  of  Activity  Based  Costing  (see  rrore  on  this  in  Section 
2.3.1.2). 
We conclude: 
1.  If  USO  services  were provided  as  the  result  of  a fully  competitive  process,  their 
prices would have to be based on costs derived following the Long Run Incremental 
Cost (LRIC)  standard.  This  makes  the standard a natural candidate to  be  used  in 
the usa cost determination process. 
2.  LRIC is the cost caused by a service under a long-run perspective.  It is deternined 
from the standpoint of building capacity today, at current input prices and at a return-
on-capital consistent with competitive  capital  markets,  and  in  a way that is  rrost 
cost effective in  light of today's available technology, input prices, and expectations 
about demand. 
2.2.2  Requirerrents to be rret by costing procedures 
According to both the  Full Competition and the Interconnection Directive, the costing of 
USOs  rrust comply  with the  principles  of objectivity,  transparency,  non-discrinination 
and  it rrust be carried out in  a proportionate way. The latter we interpret in the present 
context to mean that the scheme rrust be practicable and  not lead to costs of its  own 
which  are  in  a disproportionate  relation  to  its  objective.  In  addition,  the  Comnission 
Comrrunication also specifies that the costs in question can only cover those costs that 
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In the following we will take up these requirerrents and briefly discuss their irrplications 
starting with the questions of efficiency and non-discrinination. 
2.2.2.1  Efficiency and non-discrinination 
One associates with strong corrpetition the achieverrent of efficiency. From this follows 
that the  cost standard  used  successfully  in  the  corrpetitive  process  is  also  the  cost 
standard that corresponds to an efficient operation. 
The  Commission's  requirerrent  in  its  Cornrunication  that  a  cost standard  be  used 
reflecting  the  cost  of  an  efficient  operator  irrplies  therefore  that  the  USO  cost 
deternination process be based on a standard that would prevail under competition.  A 
standard  not  fulfilling  the  efficiency  requirerrent  would  irll'IY  that  operators  that  are 
fulfilling their USO with contributions to the USO fund would pay with these contributions 
rrore  than  w ould  be  necessary  if  this  "price"  were  deternined  in  the  corll'etitive 
process. Application of such a standard would allow  the  USO provider to  earn a profit 
w ithout having to  cope w ith  corrpetition and  in  fact irll'IY that the  other competitors  in 
part  subsidise  the  USO  provider.  This  would  clearly  be  discrininatory  in  that  it 
advantaged the one and disadvantaged the others. 
The  costing  procedure  that  must  be  used  instead  of  relying  on  a  not  available 
COrll>etitive  process  must  attempt  to  replicate  the  latter's  result.  We  have  already 
pointed  out and  will argue throughout the  report that the standard recomrrending  itself 
for this purpose is the standard of Long  Run  lncrerrental Cost (LRIC).  It is  the standard 
that rrost closely  reflects  the  costs  of efficient provision  which is  the  standard  when 
there is  vigorous  corrpetition.  Using this  standard would provide the safeguard that all 
market participants  obligated  to contribute to the funding  of USOs  pay  in  fact no  rrore 
than would be demanded from them if the service in  question were provided  in  a truly 
corll'etitive environrrent. There would also,  as  far as  cost deternination is  concerned, 
be no discrinination.13 
13  While  we place  strong  emphasis  on  the  necessity of applying  a rigorous  competitive  efficiency 
standard, one may  ask whether it night not be incongruous to apply such a rigorous standard in 
respect of universal service provision given  that  in  the  normal  business  of bringing  services to 
customers  one  observes  that still  something  quite  less  than  this  standard  prevails.  It  may  be 
observed, for example,  that the  incumbent  is  asking  prices  in  some  areas  that are higher than 
sufficient to  cover costs and  in  some  cases  interconnection charges  may  also  in  this  sense be 
high. The regulator might have acquiesced in this practice because the incumbent has still some 
sunk costs  left un-arrortised from its  administrative-rronopolistic  past that the  regulator feels  it 
needs to cover from revenues obtained this way. Why not also allow  the incumbent some leeway in 
respect of the costing of USOs for the same reason? 
This  objection,  how ever,  cannot  be  accepted.  Suppose  in  an  economic  market  segment  the 
incumbent charges prices that are high relative to the costs of efficient provision. Then competitors 
have an incentive to enter that market, try to gain a share of the business and thereby put downward 
pressure on prices. Suppose, further, a competitor is  required to pay interconnection charges that 28  Study for the European Conmission 
From this we conclude: 
1.  Requiring  deternination  of  the  cost of  USOs  on  the  basis  of  a  cost standard 
reflecting efficient operation assures that this cost corresponds to the cost under a 
competitive standard. 
2.  Deternining the cost of USO  provision for the  purpose of compensation  using  a 
standard that does not fulfill the efficiency requirerrent implies  that the contributors 
to the compensation w auld effectively subsidise the USO provider. 
3.  To  avoid  discrinination  in  the  financing  of USOs,  contributions  into  the  USF  by 
"paying only" market participants must be based on costs of USOs that correspond 
to efficient provision. We propose that this is the standard of LRIC. 
2.2.2.2  A'acticability 
In  deternining the  net cost of the  USO,  the  NRA  will have to follow  a procedure that 
insures reasonably well that it will lead to the desired results. The procedure must give 
the NRA confidence in the results and at the sarre tirre be manageable.  In applying the 
procedure the NRA must have at its disposal instrurrents of evaluation and informational 
and data bases that assure these requirerrents. 
In practice, it w ill probably invariably be the case that for the purpose of deternining the 
cost of universal service, the USO provider will propose to subnit cost rreasurerrents 
that it derived from its existing cost accounting system which usually implements some 
Fully  Dstributed Costing (FDC)  approach and which reflects historic input prices. Even 
if the operator recognised that the costing should be done on an incremental cost basis, 
it w auld argue that these measures be derived from its existing cost records and then be 
properly adjusted. It is our position and has been shown in previous exercises that this is 
very difficult and w auld be extrerrely time consuning. 
One  particular  aspect in  this  context is  the  control  of information  on  which the  cost 
measures are to be established. It night appear simpler to start from the cost records of 
the operator and work back from them in trying to derive the proper net cost figure of the 
USO.  In  addition to the difficulty mentioned  above to achieve this,  there is  the problem 
are high  relative to costs. The  incurment would here as  well invite competitive attack from rivals 
attempting to build their ow n access to customers. 
Such competitive responses from competitors if the incurment's provision of universal service were 
accompanied by  excessive compensation payments would be difficult. This would be  because in 
most instances it is for the foreseeable future unlikely that (new) competitors- mainly for reasons of 
economies  of scale and scope not yet realised and for information asymmetries - will be  in  the 
market for USO services. So it could be that a regime is established in which the USO provider is for 
a long time paid more by way of compensation - and this by its competitors - than would be justified 
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that the exercise w auld start from a cost data base which w auld be extremely obscure 
to  the  NRA.  It  w auld  know  nothing  about the  necessary adjustments  to  the  raw  data 
coning  out of this  cost data  base which w auld  be  dictated  to  a  large  extent by  the 
structure of the cost accounting system in  place. Control over the actual cost standard 
applied w auld lie alrrost exclusively with the operator. 
We  will argue  in  the  following  that Activity  Based  Costing  (ABC)  is  the  proper  cost 
accounting  approach  for  a  telecorrrrunications  operator.  This  applies  in  regard  of 
general  cost  accounting  purposes  and  in  particular  regarding  the  purpose  of  USO 
costing.  As  Arthur  Andersen14  in  their  report  to  the  European  Commission  on  the 
subject,  how ever,  suggest,  it  is  unlikely  that many  telecom operators  in  EU  Member 
States will at the present time have implemented this  costing approach.15 Since this is 
the case we will argue that the next best thing to fully implemented ABC should be used, 
i.e.  cost studies  and  in  particular analytical cost rrodelling  that as  closely  as  possible 
takes into account all the necessary cost drivers. 
The  important aspect of analytical cost rrodels  is  that they  can  be  constructed using 
generally  available  information  and  know ledge  about  telecomrunications  netw ark 
structures and the productive process of bringing services to customers. Such models 
can therefore be  made  available to  the  NRA  with relatively  little  expense of time  and 
money.  The  immediate  and  important benefit is  that the NRA  is  in  control of the cost 
information used. In any case, applying an analytical cost rrodel is  less demanding than 
trying  to  derive  proper  cost measures  (LRIC)  from the  existing  cost records  of the 
operator if these are not based on ABC. 
We conclude: 
1.  The likely  non-availability of the proper cost accounting approach of Activity Based 
Costing (ABC) provides no justification to rely on data from existing Fully  Distributed 
Cost (FDC) accounting for reasons of practicability. 
2.  Instead of using FDC data, it is more consistent with regulatory objectives -and it is 
also more practical - for the NRA to use cost studies and in particular analytical cost 
modelling for the purpose of USO cost deternination if the USO provider has  not 
implemented the ABC approach. 
2.2.2.3  Transparency and objectivity 
Above we developed that the proper cost measure for the costing of USOs  is  Long Run 
Incremental Cost. We also argued that- absent an ABC methodology- the proper cost 
14  See Arthur Andersen (1994). 
15  It has been reported that some telecom operators have converted their costing to ABC. See Kylem 
and Olve (1993) with respect to Telia, and Mercury (1993). 30  Study for the European Corrmission 
rreasure is  best derived  using  an  analytical cost rrodel that is  made  as  corrplete as 
possible following the  principles  of ABC.  Within  the  analytical cost rrodel,  it would be 
possible  to  trace  all  individual  cost  calculations  on  the  basis  of  the  functional 
relationships that are used to reflect the cost causalities involved. Thus the very process 
of carrying out these calculations assures transparency. 
V\/hile it is true that analytical cost rrodels can be built that are so corrplex that only the 
experts that constructed them are able to interpret any particular cost calculation, there 
is actually no need to rely on rrodels w ith this degree of corrplexity. Above we indicated 
that  the  rrodels  should  be  constructed  in  a  way  that  they  closely  reflect  the  cost 
deternining process that is followed in ABC.  If this is done, the issue of over-corrplexity 
does not arise, or does not arise rrore than in ABC.16 
The  objectivity  of the  process depends  of course on  the quality  of effort going  into the 
costing exercise. It is  independent of the rrethodology used. V\/hoever is  involved in the 
process  rrust  constantly  keep  the  requirerrent  of  objectivity  in  nind  when  cost 
rreasures  are  selected  that  are  supposed  to  reflect the  costs  incurred  due  to  USO 
provision.  In  any  of the available approaches, such cost rreasures rrust inevitably rely 
on  averaging  of cost figures  over  representative  units,  also  to  sorre extent on  proxy 
rreasures because the real costs cannot directly be observed. Objectivity then  rreans 
that the best available approach to carrying out the operations of averaging is used, that 
the  rrost judicious  choice of proxies  is  being  made,  and  so on.  Such operations  and 
choices  always  involve  judgerrents  which  may  -even  with  the  rrost  professional 
approach- not be corrpletely free of subjective bias. Transparency as described above 
will, how ever, allow  that such biases, if they creep in, can be discovered and elininated. 
Of course, transparency and objectivity should be ensured not only on the cost side but 
also on the side of the revenues. According to the net cost approach, one has to deduct 
from the costs of USO provision the revenues that would be foregone if there were no 
such provision. V\/hile data on direct foregone revenues should in principle be obtainable 
from the  records  of the  operator  in  a transparent  and  objective  manner  without any 
problem,  it  will necessarily  be  rrore difficult to  derive data with this  claim for indirect 
revenue effects that also exist.  V\/hen  for this  purpose one looks  at suitable indicators, 
16  Sometimes it is  argued that the requirement of transparency is  fulfilled if it is  possible to  trace in 
detail how from an existing cost accounting system the "relevant" cost data are taken and combined 
to derive cost figures for a particular purpose in question. Usually one has  in  mind  an  accounting 
system  based  on  FDC.  As  is  generally  well  known  and  as  will  become  apparent  from the 
discussion in Section 2.3.1.2, FDC cost measures are not well suited to reflect cost causality. The 
transparency provided when using these cost figures w auld  stop very close at the surface of the 
problem. One w auld have to consider as acceptable whatever is recorded as the relevant cost data 
and  not question tow  hat extent it truly reflects cost causation. Often the cost data are not broken 
down far enough to obtain any  measure that reflects the cost of the unit in question. So one w auld 
need to resort to extrapolation. While we are far from claiming that with the approach proposed here 
USO  costs  could  in  any  sense exactly  be  determined,  we do  claim,  how ever, that it gets  much 
closer to a realistic measure of cost causation than  is  offered by the conventional FDC approach. 
And we believe that this is the real meaning of transparency, allowing to transparere (show  through) 
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again  one  has  to apply  good  professional standards  to  obtain objective measures  in  a 
way that can easily be reproduced by an external observer. 
We conclude: 
The rrost professional standards  in the application of the costing methodologies should 
be adhered to in order to safeguard objectivity.  Even then,  subjective valuations  cannot 
be  avoided  COrll>letely.  For  this  reason,  it should  be  the  aim to  make  the  process  of 
costing as visible and transparent as possible. 
2.3  Practical issues 
2.3.1  Cost accounting issues 
2.3.1.1  'Nhy a discussion of cost accounting issues? 
When it is said that price setting should be cost-based, the meaning of this is that prices 
should  reflect the  value  of  the  resources  used  up  in  the  production  of  the  product in 
question.  Between this  requirement and the assurance that the requirement is  adhered 
to lies  cost accounting.  In  competitive industries where there  is  no need for regulation, 
cost accounting  is  strictly an  internal affair that in  general underlies  no direction  by  the 
state, and companies use it for operations control, derivation of results, and price setting 
as  they  see  fit.  This  is  different w hen  a company  is  regulated  - because  it  has  a 
doninant market position and  competition  is too weak to  keep  it in check;  or,  as  in the 
present  context,  cost figures  are  used  to  deternine deficits  in  the  provision  of  USO 
services; or both situations apply.  In these circumstances accounting practices become 
very rruch a regulatory concern as the validity of the cost figures needed in a regulatory 
deternination largely depends on the way cost accounting is carried out. 
In  business  practice,  cost  accounting  has  been  in  constant  evolution.17  With 
competition beconing ever rrore pervasive, knowing what one's  costs are becomes  in 
many  industries  a precondition  for survival.  A reflection  of this  is  the  current rrove  in 
many business organisations to adjust their cost accounting systems from conventional 
Fully  Distributed  Costing,  until  recently  the  approach  alrrost  universally  used,  to  the 
rruch  rrore  analytically  oriented  approach  of  Activity  Based  Costing  (see  Section 
2.3.1.2). One needs only browse through the acadenic literature on the subject to obtain 
an irll>ression of this development. 
The telecommunications  sector has  in  rrost countries of the world,  in particular also in 
rrost 1\tlember States  of the  EU,  until quite recently  not been operating  in  a competitive 
17  See Johnson and Kaplan (1987). 32  Study for the European Corrrrission 
environrrent.  Typically,  telecorrrrunications  services were provided  by  a state-ow ned 
public  enterprise  protected  by  rronopoly  rights  or  by  factual  rronopoly  status.  An 
analytical  cost  accounting  for  the  purpose  of  helping  the  corrpany  to  cope  in  the 
corrpetitive process was alrrost by  definition  not necessary.  Cost accounting  has  in 
these circumstances alrrost exclusively been used for the purpose of distributing past 
and  current outlays  over units  of services  to  ascertain that  - in  total- all  "costs"  are 
covered by the tariffs charged to subscribers. Such tariffs stood often only in a faint- if at 
all- relation  to  the  underlying  costs.  In  fairness  this  was also  due  in  many  cases  to 
public policy concerns, but even if an effort had been made to base prices on costs the 
cost system would not have allowed to calculate prices  that are truly  reflective of the 
corresponding resource use, due to the lack of the proper analytical instrurrents.18 
With the advent of corrpetition this is rrost probably going to change. The change will be 
the quicker the faster competition is  actually challenging the incurment operators  in  all 
fields.  At the  present tirre,  there are still  conservative forces  at work tending  to  slow 
down the process, especially for services where rronopoly positions are expected to be 
maintained for sorre tirre to corre.  In these areas a cost accounting approach wedded 
to the old practices would still allow  to carry as costs items of outlays past and present 
that have no or only a very tenuous causal relationship with the process of bringing the 
service to market.  Since this  has had the starrp of approval for so long, the practice is 
often defended with argurrents like "V'vhat was right in the past cannot all of a sudden be 
w rong  now" and  "One cannot change over night w hat has  been  accepted practice for 
decades". As regards the regulatory authority, it may suspect as underlying incentive for 
this  unresponsiveness  that  a  rrore  analytical  approach  to  cost  accounting  would 
uncover costs  of inefficiencies  that one  would  not  be  able  to  recover  in  corrpetitive 
markets  but  which  one  is  still  able  to  include  in  one's  prices  in  areas  where  the 
competitive threat is slow to materialise. Such a conduct must be considered as rational 
for a company that has this kind of rronopoly control over its markets. 
For reasons that we have spelled out earlier,  if there is  to be corrpensation for deficits 
due to the provision of USOs,  the basis for the calculation of such compensation must 
be  the  cost  of  efficient  provision.  In  this  section  we have  seen  that  there  may  be 
obstacles to obtaining proper rreasures for such costs. The obstacles primarily lie in the 
absence of the necessary analytical instrurrents, a circumstance which in some cases 
may  also be used as  a screen to  prevent access of the  regulator to the relevant cost 
information (in  general regulated firms  are not known to volunteer the provision of cost 
information to outsiders, of which the regulator is certainly considered to be one). 
Not only for purposes of the costing of USO provision, but generally for all its  regulatory 
functions, the NRA  rrust be famliar with the cost accounting systems of the regulated 
firms.  The  NRA  may  in  fact require that these systems  be  adjusted  to  satisfy certain 
conditions that are necessary for regulatory control. Before this general background and 
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the one laid  out above, the discussion in the following sections will provide an overview 
over the properties of the various cost accounting approaches and instruments and the 
ill  consequences  of following  practices  that are  not geared  to  the  requirements  of a 
COrllJetitive environment. At the same time we will discuss what the reaction of the NRA 
should be and what remedies could be used in the face of these difficulties. 
We conclude: 
Cost accounting issues should co11111and  prime regulatory attention as  it is  one of the 
essential prerequisites for being able to judge properly the costs of USO provision. 
2.3.1.2  Cost accounting practices 
From the  beginning  of regulatory  intervention  in  the  telecormunications  sector,  one 
question  has  been  in  the  centre  of the  discussion.  It  is  the  question  which  costing 
standard  provides  an  appropriate  basis  for practical  problems  such  as  regulation  of 
rn:mopoly  prices  in  particular  regulation  of  prices  for  interconnection  services, 
deternination of the local access loss of a regulated operator, and deternination of the 
cost of USOs. 
Over the years regulators have answered the question for the right costing standard in 
different ways. We can observe two general approaches: 
•  In  the first period regulators  generally based their decisions on  the Fully  Distributed 
Cost (FDC) standard. This was mainly done for practical reasons as nearly all of the 
regulated operators applied  FOG-costing systems for their own purposes. Since the 
regulators had not yet developed their ow n concepts, they were practically obliged to 
accept the cost measures subnitted by the network operators. 
•  In  the  past twenty years  or so the  weaknesses of the  FOG-method  w ith  regard  to 
regulatory as  well as  managerial decisions have become rrore and rrore apparent. 
Therefore,  the  standard  of Long  Run  Incremental  Cost  (LRIC)  was proposed  and 
increasingly  adopted  as  an  alternative to  FDC because it  fulfills  the econonic and 
regulatory requirements to a rruch greater degree. 
In  the follow ing we w ill  present outlines  of the FDC costing approach as well as  of the 
Activity  Based  Costing  (ABC)  rrethod,  which is  the  approach that rruch  rrore nearly 
fulfills  real cost accounting requirements.  Further we discuss analytical cost rrodelling 
as an extension of ABC and as an instrument that can be used independently. 34  Study for the European Corll'Tission 
FOG costing method 
This  method  provides  for an  exhaustive  allocation  of all  costs  to  the  services  of the 
enterprise.  The  resulting  FOC  data  generally  include  the  costs  directly  and  indirectly 
attributable to  a service,  plus  a share of those costs with no  causal relationships,  i.e. 
joint and  residual cornn:>n  costs. The  methods  for allocation of the indirect costs  and 
overheads  are  supposed  to  be  causally  related,  but  in  practice  arbitrary  allocations 
prevail. 
FOC data are usually based upon an organisation's historical costs, i.e. they are based 
on the existing physical netw ark engineering capacity together with the comrercial and 
adninistrative  processes  within  the  organisation.  The  data  are  derived  from  the 
organisation's books and records. So they reflect the actual fixed assets used to provide 
the service, and the existing levels of capacity and  network utilisation inherent in  them 
There is normally no correction if for exarll'le there is excess capacity. 
There  are  different  methods  of  allocating  the  residual  joint  and  cornn:>n  costs  to 
individual  services.  To  divide  the  cornron  costs  over  all  services  equally  is  a  very 
sirll'le  and  crude  method  which  will  generally  lead  to  arbitrary  and  even  illogical 
allocations. The rrost common methods adopted in practice are:19 
The  "Relative  Output  Method"  (ROM)  where  costs  are  allocated  to  services  in 
proportion to their share of total output. This method is only possible when all outputs 
can be expressed in terms of a cornn:>n physical unit. 
The  "Gross  Revenue  Method"  (GRM)  where  costs  are  allocated  to  services  in 
proportion to their share of firm revenue. 
- The  "Net Revenue  Method"  (NRM)20  where costs  are  allocated  to  each  service  in 
proportion to its contribution to net revenue. 
- The "Attributable Cost Method"  (ACM)  where costs are allocated to  each service in 
proportion to the direct and indirectly attributable costs of the service. 
The application of the FOC method on regulatory and pricing decisions has caused a lot 
of criticism in  the  economic  literature.  The  main  arguments  can  be  surrrnarised  as 
follows: 
- The arbitrariness of cost allocations underlying the FOC data make them unsuitable 
for pricing decisions. 
19  See Arthur Anderson (1994). 
20  Not to be confused with the "Net Revenue Approach" discussed below  in Chapter 5 in the context of 
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- \/\/hen  GRM or NRM are applied as allocation rrethods the use of costs of service to 
set prices involves a circular argurrent as these rrethods are based on revenue. 
- A"ices  for goods set on the basis of FOC data generally lead to inefficient resource 
allocations as such prices do not reflect the real scarcity of the good.21 
- As Richard  D.  Emrrerson  has  shown in  his  "Death  Spiral"  exarllJie,  22  a profitable 
rrultiproduct firm rray  becorre unprofitable when it  withdraws a  product from the 
rrarket whose fully  distributed costs are higher than the  revenue generated by  this 
product. 
- The  FOC approach generally takes no account of technology changes as well as of 
potential inefficiencies in business processes and work practices. 
Given these weaknesses, the continuing use of the  FOC standard can be explained by 
tradition,  rraybe  by  the  fact that it simplifies  the  data  collection  tasks  and,  therefore, 
serves another accounting purpose -the creation of periodic financial staterrents- in  a 
cheaper way, but probably ultirrately by the fact that the pressures of COrllJetition  in the 
industries in question is not great enough yet to force its abandonrrent. 
ABC method 
Rigorously applied Activity Based Costing (ABC) overcorres rrost of the weaknesses of 
the  FOC rrethod.  ABC generated inforrration aims  at providing  an  accurate picture of 
the cost of producing,  rrarketing,  and  delivering products  or services to the  rrarket.  It 
differs from the traditional  FOC approach in  that it focuses prirrarily on  the underlying 
activities  required  to  produce products  and  services,  rather than  on  the  products  and 
services  themselves.  So  the  ABC  data  are  generally  better  capable  of  rreeting 
inforrration needs for the strategic decisions of an organisation's rranagerrent as well 
as those serving regulatory purposes. 
According to the ABC rrethod,  costs are attributed to products and  services based on 
an analysis of the causes of those costs which are called cost drivers. Costs are traced 
and  allocated  on  the  basis  of the  activities  perforrred  for the  products  and  services 
produced.  So  the  ABC  approach  establishes  a  clear  cause-and-effect  relationship 
between activities perforrred, their associated costs, and the output resulting from those 
activities. 
21  Accordingly, with regard  to  the theme  of this  study  the  use  of  FDC  data  is  likely  to  lead  to  an 
overestimation of the USO costs. 
22  Emmerson  ( 1994), page 2.9-2.12.  Emmerson  shows  in  this  exat11Jie  of a 4-product-firm with a 
positive  corporate  profit that  the  profit  may  become  negative  and  further  decreases  if  the  firm 
withdraws  "unprofitable"  products  in  a  fully  distributed  costing  approach.  The  reason  for  this 
phenomenon  lies  in  the  fact that the  products  are not really  unprofitable as  their  revenues  are 
higher than their incremental costs so that they provide contributions to the cornmn costs of the 
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A  step-by-step  review  of the  functioning  of an  ABC system consists  of the  following 
essential measures: 
•  Identification of the products and services offered by the organisation. 
•  An activity  analysis  to  define the  set of activities  required  to  produce,  rrarket and 
deliver the product or service. 
•  Identification of the  cost drivers which deternine the  level of costs  incurred for the 
level of activities performed. 
•  Attribution  of  direct  and  indirect  costs  to  the  activities  performed  based  on  the 
consurll)tion of these cost drivers. 
•  Linkage of activities and their attributed costs to products and services produced.23 
As  ABC systems  use  a  wider  variety  and  greater  nurrt>er  of  allocation  bases  for 
assigning overhead costs to products and services, accountants attain greater precision 
in  assigning  costs  according  to  causation  and  resource  consurll)tion.  ABC systems 
focus on activities as the driving forces behind cost incurrence and consider all costs in 
the value chain from research and  development to customer service. So they  provide 
the appropriate foundation for measuring  LRIC and  for linking  them to the  responsible 
products and services.  24 
ABC systems  provide not only  the  relevant inforrration for pricing  decisions,  they  are 
also an effective tool for the control of production processes and thereby for cost control. 
It is rrainly for this reason that they are increasingly applied in the econorrtf, i.e. to serve 
the  derrands  of a vigorously  corll)etitive process.  V\lhen  installed  and  being  used for 
these purposes they  provide what is  really  also  required  for a USO costing  exercise: 
cost data reflecting efficient production. 
There are a nurrt>er of companies in the telecommunications industry reporting that they 
already have installed or are in the process of installing ABC systems. Arrong them are 
Mercury  (UK},  Telia  (Sweden),  and  Deutsche  Telekom  (Gerrrany).  In  the  case  of 
incurrt>ent  network operators,  how ever,  one  rrust  be  careful  when  evaluating  cost 
inforrration when produced by their ABC systems. These rray be accurate in respect of 
cost  causation  but  not  necessarily  reflect  efficient  service  provision  given  the 
inefficiencies that these companies  have been  prone to  in  the past and  given that it is 
likely  that these inefficiencies still  persist.  Given the important degree of rrarket power 
23  If there is still a residuum of non-attributable corrmon costs after performing these steps one can 
think of a further step where these corrmon costs are allocated to the products by one of the above 
mentioned FDC allocation methods. This step, how ever, has to be rejected as it provides a mixture 
of  an  ABC approach  with  a  traditional  FDC  approach  and  its  accompanying  weaknesses  as 
mentioned above. The aim should be to reduce the residuum of non-attributable costs on the basis 
of cost causation as far as possible. 
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that they still conmand, they can hope to be able to cover these inefficiencies through 
the prices they earn in  the market.  If these inefficiencies are included in costs reported 
for the purpose of a USO net cost calculation,  how ever, the NRA  rrust make sure that 
the  inefficiency corrponents are elininated from the figures.  A"actitioners  that have in 
concrete cases gone through this  exercise report that the necessary corrections may 
run in the order of 20 to 30% of the originally produced figures. 
Two concluding  observations:  Rrst,  proponents  of the ABC approach refer to  its  cost 
rreasures  in  terms  that in  spirit correspond exactly to  the  (for our purposes  relevant) 
TSLRIC  version  of the  Long  Run  Incremental  Cost  concept.25  We  pointed  this  out 
already in Section 2.2.1  when introducing the LRIC concept. Second, as follows from the 
above discussion,  TOs  will need  to  install  powerful analytical!  costing  systems  of the 
ABC type for their  own purposes,  particularly  in  order to  be  able  to  face their  future 
corrpetitive environrrents. Any argurrent that may possibly be advanced from their side 
that such systems  will have to  be  installed  exclusively  for the  purpose of USO  cost 
deternination are therefore not valid. 
Analytical cost modelling 
VVhat makes the ABC approach discussed above so relevant for the requirements of the 
corrpetitive market place is  its  insistence on  cost causation at every analytical turn of 
the approach. The word "cost driver" is the one rrost often used. From the provision of 
this  kind  of analytical cost data to combining them in functional relationships that depict 
the productive process for a particular service is  only  a short analytical step.  A"ovided 
such functional  relationships  take  account of all  the  cost drivers,  they  w auld  be  in  a 
position to show cost profiles of services and service elerrents according to the different 
circumstances  of  delivery  and  for various  quantities  and  qualities.  One  would  then 
actually be using an analytical cost rrodel. Analytical cost rrodels have recently become 
irrportant in the regulatory process surrounding the universal service discussion in the 
25  Testirrony to this are the following excerpts from the section entitled "Long-Term Product Costs" in 
the standard work on  ABC costing  by  Johnson and  Kaplan  (1987),  pp.  234  and  235:  "The  rrost 
important  goal  for a  product cost system is  to  estimate  the  long-run  costs  of  producing  each 
product,  each  salable  output,  in  the  company's  product  line.  .. .  A  good  product  cost  system 
measures the long-run costs of each product. Conventional notions of fixed and variable costs are 
ignored because, for purposes of product costs analysis, the time period is long enough tow arrant 
treatment of virtually  all  costs as  variable .... That many  of the  rrost significant product costs are 
called  fixed  or  sunk  signifies  the  poverty  of current cost accounting  thinking.  All  costs  are  the 
consequences of managerial decisions at some time.  While some cost categories may  not vary 
currently, based on the quantity of current production output, that does  not mean that they  are not 
controllable or caused by  product-related decisions made every day. These so-called fixed costs 
have  been  the  rrost variable.  They  are the  costs that  have increased the  rrost during the  past 
several decades, as  a percentage of total manufacturing costs. The goal of a good  product cost 
system should be to  make rrore obvious, rrore transparent, how  costs currently considered to be 
fixed or sunk actually do vary with decisions made about product output, product nix, and product 
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United  States.  Indeed  they  are  a powerful tool  as  they  can  also  be  constructed  by 
outsiders to the firm the costs of which are in question. 
The characteristic property of analytical cost rrodels  -that sets them apart from typical 
cost accounting methods - is  that they  establish  functional  relationships  between the 
particular conditions  of service delivery  (say a local  network of a big  city  vs.  one  in  a 
thinly  populated  rural  area),  the  cost  drivers  relevant  for  these  conditions  and  the 
corresponding costs of that service delivery. Their advantage is thus  precisely that they 
allow  to assess the effects on the costs of a particular service of different network sizes, 
density of traffic, cont>ination of offering several services over the same structure, and 
so on.  Still  in  other words, they  allow  to  assess the effects on  costs of econorries of 
scale and econorries of scope. 
The antecedents of analytical cost rrodels  have been engineering cost rrodels.  These 
have always routinely  been  used  by  the engineering departments of network operators 
for their planning and investment purposes. Such rrodels have also been constructed by 
outside experts, especially researchers in universities and other research bodies, eager 
to  analyse  the  cost structure  of telecorrrrunications.  Such  engineering  cost rrodels 
have  in  the  past typically  focused  on  the  network cost side  of service  provision  and 
neglected the adrrinistrative and  marketing  cost side. This was mainly  a consequence 
of the then rronopoly situation and the interest of researchers at the time to test natural 
rronopoly  aspects  of  the  industry  and  whether  there  existed  overinvestment  in 
equipment due to the high and riskless returns that could be earned on such investment. 
Questions  of marketing,  customer care and  adrrinistration,  and their respective costs, 
were sirrply not at the forefront of regulators',  managers' and  researchers' concerns.  It 
is  wrong,  as  has  frequently  been  done,  to  disqualify  these  analytical  cost  rrodels 
because they would not pick up all relevant cost elements. These rrodels can be made 
as corrplete as one wishes through picking up the resource use cost of each cost driver 
identified  by  ABC for  the  delivery  of  a  particular  service.  They  are  then  the  natural 
extension of ABC. 
Analytical  cost  rrodels  can  be  constructed  by  experts  external  to  the  operators  in 
question because the largest part of the cost of delivering telecorrrrunications services 
is caused by the network and there is widespread know ledge of how  such networks are 
constructed, what the required  investments and corresponding costs are.  It is  true that 
for the  costs  of operations,  adrrinistration  and  marketing  there does  not exist such a 
good informational base and  the  rrodel builders  rrust for these rely  on  estimates.  Still 
such  rrodels  have  proven  to  yield  quite  good  approximations  to  network operators' 
service  costs.  They  thereby  becorre  powerful  tools  for  regulators  in  their  effort to 
overcorre  the  information  asyrTTT"etry  that  they  face  in  their  dealings  with  network 
operators.  In  particular of course the rrodels can be used by the regulators  in verifying 
network operators' claims for corrpensation of net costs of USO delivery. 
Finally, an advantage of analytical cost rrodels being constructed by outsiders lies  in the 
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COrllJiete contents of its  internal costing system, since these rrodels always retain their 
character of a conrron-know ledge based instrurrent. 
Discussions that are  conducted with their  help w auld  concern functional relationships 
between resources and outputs that all inforrred experts in the industry could in principle 
know  about.  As a result of such a discussion one w auld  hope to  reach agreerrent on 
rrore or less narrow ranges regarding concrete costs of USO services. 
Concluding observations 
Of the three approaches discussed, the FDC rrethod is  rrost widely used but the least 
appropriate for deternining the  cost of USO  provision.  The  ABC rrethod  is  the  rrost 
appropriate  approach  but  unfortunately  not  yet  practised  by  rrost  incunt>ent 
telecorrm.Jnications  operators.  There  rerrains  the  instrurrent  of  analytical  cost 
rrodelling  which can  be  used  as  an  extension  to  the  ABC approach.  Analytical  cost 
rrodelling  can  also  be  carried  out  by  external  observers  which  rrakes  this  tool  so 
valuable to the regulatory authority. 
Thus we conclude: 
1.  The  costing  system traditionally  used  in  telecommunications  is  Fully  Distributed 
Costing  (FDC).  l\llainly  because FDC data do  not provide an  appropriate basis for 
pricing  decisions,  the  approach  is  increasingly  under  criticism with regard  to  its 
adequacy for rranagerial as well as regulatory purposes. 
2.  Because of its  analytical approach to the cost causation processes, Activity Based 
Costing  (ABC)  is  the  rrost suitable  approach to  the  deternination of LRIC.  ABC 
systems are increasingly applied in the economy. USO providers should be required 
to install such analytical costing. 
3.  Analytical cost rrodelling should be used as an extension of ABC or in lieu of it if the 
USO provider has not yet installed a corresponding system 
2.3.1.3  Current vs.  historical input prices 
The costing systems of telecorrm.Jnications organisations have generally, as also those 
of companies  in  other industries,  been based on  historical prices of the inputs  used in 
the production process. As rrentioned in the preceding section, this was usually done in 
connection  with an  FDC  costing  approach.  There  are  rrainly  two argurrents  for the 
usage of historical cost data: 
•  The data are easily available as they are docurrented in the books and records of the 
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•  If the operator is  in a rrarket situation that allows it to base the prices of its products 
and  services  on  historical  cost  data  it  is  able  to  ensure  the  recovery  of  its 
expenditures actually incurred. 
In  recent  years  the  inadequacy  of  historical  cost  accounting  with  regard  to  pricing 
decisions has increasingly been recognised by rranagers as well as regulators. 
From rranagement's point of view, historical cost accounting is beconing inappropriate 
as  a  basis  for pricing  decisions  since telecorrm.mications  rrarkets  are  increasingly 
subject  to  competition.  In  the  course  of this  process,  incumbent  network operators' 
doninant rrarket positions are threatened and, correspondingly, the ability to charge any 
prices  to  cover  all  their  revenue  requirerrents.  Suppose  a  new  entrant  provides  the 
same services using rrodern equipment with much lower costs than the historical costs 
of the incumbent. The incumbent is then forced to set prices also on the basis of these 
current costs in order to rraintain its competitive position. 
From a regulatory point of view, historical cost accounting has to be rejected for reasons 
that are closely  related  to the  reasons that rrotivate rranagement.  In  areas  of service 
provision  where customers  need  the  protection  of the  regulator,  prices  should  also 
satisfy the competitive standard of efficiency. As we have seen,  however, prices based 
on  historical  data  do  not satisfy  this  criterion.  Since  competition  cannot be  relied  on 
directly, the regulatory  authority has to prescribe an appropriate cost standard which is 
the forward looking cost concept on the basis of current replacement costs of assets. In 
particular,  the  LRIC cost standard  is  a forward-looking concept.  Only  prices  based  on 
current cost data  provide for efficient resource use as  consumers  are encouraged to 
take account of the actual resource costs in their purchasing decisions.26 
In  sumrrary,  the  rrarket  forces  and  also  the  regulatory  requirements  provide  for an 
increasing need for current cost accounting (CCA) instead of historical cost accounting. 
One  can conclude that the advantages  of CCA  outweigh possible costs evolving from 
the creation of the data base. 
According  to  these  findings,  regulators  in  several  countries  in  the  process  of 
liberalisation  have  rroved  to  price  regulations  based  on  the  forward  looking  cost 
concepts and CCA methods: 
•  The Gerrran government's ordinance on the regulation of telecorrm.rnications tariffs 
of October 199627  provides for prices of doninant operators  based  on  the costs of 
efficient service provision which have to be deternined according to TSLRIC. 
•  In  its  last  publications  on  price  control,  the  British  regulator  Oftel  provides  for a 
deterrrination of Brs costs based on a CCA method.28 
26  See Oftel (1995), p.  19. 
27  Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1996), p.  1492ff. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  41 
The difference between CCA.  and  HCA  affects prirrarily investrrent goods since inputs 
that are used up soon after their purchase pose no problem in the context of CCA  vs. 
HCA.  CCA requires that the part of an equiprrent's value that is  allocated as  cost each 
year reflects this  year's equiprrent price.  In  terrrs  of level and  structure of costs,  the 
consequence of CCA is that the cost of using an investrrent good develops over tirre in 
step with the price of that investrrent good.  This  in  turn depends on  the  prices  of the 
inputs needed in the good's construction/rranufacture and on the rate of innovation and 
technical  progress  in  its  production.  V\lhen  investrrent goods  require  a great deal  of 
labour input their prices have a tendency to rise in step with the cost of labour, the sarre 
then holds for the cost of using this installation. Conversely, all equiprrent items that are 
benefiting a lot from innovation are beconing steadily less expensive and this also holds 
for using them. 
~ follows  that the  cost of a particular  service,  whether it  will be  higher  or  lower than 
according  to  HCA,  w ill  depend  on  w hether  the  service  uses  facilities  w hich  needed 
heavy labour input in  their construction or rranufacture, therefore w hether it has  had  a 
tendency  to  experience  price  rises  in  the  past,  or  whether  it  uses  facilities  the 
rranufacture  of w hich  experienced  a lot  of innovation  so that their  prices  have been 
decreasing.  In  respect  of  USO  services,  given  that  rmst of them are  local  network 
services,  both cost trends have been effective. The costs of switching and  electronics 
based transnission (e.g.  interoffice transnission and  increasingly  transnission in  the 
feeder cable part of local plant)  have been benefiting from price decreases of innovation 
incorporating  equiprrent  while  underground  w arks  have  rather  been  suffering  price 
increases in step with labour cost increases. 
In  order to  provide an  impression of the extent tow  hich  CCA.  rray affect various  cost 
components,  it  can  roughly  be  said  that  about 60  °/o  of the  capital  costs  of  a  local 
network are  driven  by  the  rate  of innovation  w hile  the  rerraining  40 % are driven  by 
labour costs.  capital  costs  in  turn  rrake  50  to  60  °/o  of total  cost of running  a local 
network.  Incidentally,  the  rerraining  costs  are  caused  by  operating  the  network, 
rraintenance  and  repair,  and  adninistration,  which in  turn  are  prirrarily  driven  by  the 
cost of labour. 
Issues that relate to how  the costs of capital goods should be spread over the units  of 
services produced during  its  useful life,  taking  CCA.  prescriptions  into account, will be 
treated in the follow ing section. 
From the discussion in this section so far we conclude: 
1.  There  is  an  increasing  need  for  telecommunications  operators  to  rmve  from 
Historical Cost Accounting (HCA)  to Current Cost Accounting (CCA)  as  a forward-
looking concept. The necessity errerges from rranagers' derrand for a proper data 
28  See e.g. Oftel (1996). 42  Study for the European Conmission 
base for pricing  decisions in  an  increasingly  corrpetitive environrrent as  well as 
from regulatory requirerrents for costs and prices satisfying the efficiency criterion. 
2.  CCA.  affects primarily the cost of capital goods. The cost of capital goods benefiting 
from innovation are lower and  the cost of capital goods the production of which is 
intensive in the use of labour are higher than under HCA. 
2.3.1.4  Netw ark costs due to depreciation of invested capital 
The discussion on  historical  vs.  current costs  in  the  preceding  section  has  given  an 
irrpression of the issues surrounding the deterrrination of costs caused by fixed capital 
investrrent.  In  addition  to  the  question  of  historical  vs.  current  prices,  it  involves 
questions  of  how  changes  in  the  prices  of  invested  equiprrent  and  expectations  of 
demand  growth and  the  associated  risk with  such  investrrents  are  to  be  taken  into 
account.  How  in  fact  should  capital  costs  enter  the  cost  calculation  for  pricing 
decisions? The answer to this question is certainly an essential elerrent for an effective 
regulatory oversight over prices in general and the deterrrination of any corrpensation to 
be granted for USO provision in particular. 
The fixed costs caused by investing equiprrent for a fixed period of tirre- during which it 
is productive and generates incorre for the corrpany- consist of the initial outlay for the 
capital item and the interest on the capital sunk into that investrrent (we disregard in the 
discussion  of this  section the  variable  operating  and  maintenance  costs).  In  order to 
express the initial investrrent outlay as cost per tirre period, it is converted into amounts 
of  depreciation  that  in  their  sum  cover  the  armunt  of  the  outlay.  The  number  of 
depreciation armunts corresponds to the expected number of years that the capital item 
is expected to be useful. DJring that period of useful life, interest is included to assure a 
return to the providers of capital. So much is  sirrple and  rather trivial. What is  not clear 
from this description is what must be done to make these cost figures based on "current 
prices" and how is the elerrent of risk taken into account. 
In  Appendix A we provide stylised exarll'les showing, first,  how  cost accounting deals 
with the risk aspect, second what the irll'lications are of using current prices for capital 
items  for  the  resulting  cost  elerrents,  and,  third,  how  future  demand  growth  and 
reserves to accorTlllJdate such growth should properly be taken account of. 
The exarll'les and the conclusions drawn from them are the following: 
•  The  straight  line  depreciation  regirre  is  the  rmst  conventional  approach  to 
depreciation.  It  implies  carrying  charges  for  an  invested  item  of capital  that  are 
constant per period over the item's useful life.  Relative to revenue streams that start 
with low  levels  but increase over tirre to  levels  high  enough  to  make  buying  the 
equiprrent  altogether  w orthw hile,  these  charges  w auld  appear  high  during  early 
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up  that  w auld  possibly  require  corrpensation  under  a  USO  scherre.  The  case 
derronstrates that alone through the application  of straight line  depreciation a bias 
towards an  early  amortisation of capital is  implerrented.  The  irrplied  premum can 
be defended on the grounds that there is  a COFll>Onent of risk to be included  in  the 
cost charged for long-lived equiprrent items. 
•  Another variant  is  degressive  depreciation.  Such  a  depreciation  policy  involves 
relatively high depreciation rates early on in the life of the equiprrent and lower ones 
toward the end.  The variant would be  relevant when there are declining equiprrent 
prices and the CCA requirerrent is adherent that the depreciation in any year reflects 
both the current price as well as the  current change in the price of that equiprrent. 
As a consequence, a higher risk prerrium is  included in the capital carrying charge. 
From this  follows that the  apparent deficits  in  the early  periods  are  larger and  the 
corresponding  prices,  respectively,  the  necessary  corll>ensation  to  cover deficits 
are higher than in the straight line depreciation case. 
•  In  a third  version,  which approaches  economic depreciation,  variations  in  demand 
are taken into account.  In  particular, if, what is typical for telecorrm.Jnications, there 
is  growing demand  and  if this  is  reflected  in  depreciation  rates  as  it  should,  this 
would counteract the effect of declining prices just discussed. The reason is that to 
each unit of output a corrparable arrount for the  use of the equiprrent should  be 
charged.  From this  follows that because of the growth in  demand the depreciation 
arrounts charged per period should in early periods be lower and in later periods be 
higher  than  otherwise.  If  this  rule  is  followed,  depending  on  demand  increases 
relative  to  price  decreases  over  tirre,  the  effect  of  declining  prices  may  be 
sorrew hat,  corrpletely or actually overcorrpensated.  In the just-corrpensating case 
we would  end  up  again  with  straight  line  depreciation.  Conversely,  if  there  are 
increasing  prices  of  investrrent  goods  coupled  with  increasing  demand  then 
progressive depreciation  rates  would  be justified  (these are,  how ever,  due  to  risk 
considerations hardly ever used). 
The discussion above has made clear that deterrrining the cost of USO provision based 
on  cost accounting  data  will always  involve expectations  of future  developrrents  and 
how  these should  be  taken  into account.  In  choosing  a particular variant one  irll>licitly 
also  always  makes  a  judgerrent  about  the  associated  risk.  This  risk  is  subject  to 
different evaluations  and  the  NRA  and  the  regulated  firm w ill  necessarily differ on  how 
this risk should be factored into costs. 
There is therefore a need for negotiations between the NRA and the managerrent of the 
regulated firm as tow  hat the proper safety margins should be that can be allowed to be 
included  as  part  of  costs.  V\lhat  the  NRA  should  be  wary  about  are  degressive 
depreciation  rates,  particularly  in  an  environrrent of increasing  demand.  Straight  line 
depreciation  is  probably  a  rough  and  ready  approximation  to  econorric  depreciation 
reflecting the effects of both decreasing prices and  increasing demand.  The lengths of 44  Study for the European Cornnission 
the lives of invested capital items are then still parameters in the depreciation calculation 
that require careful exanination. 
We conclude: 
1.  In  a capital-intensive sector like  telecorrmJnications  the choice of an  appropriate 
depreciation  policy  is  one  of the  central  strategic  parameters  in  the  area  of cost 
accounting. 
2.  From  a  regulatory  and  efficiency  point  of view  and  especially  with regard  to  the 
deternination of USO costs a depreciation method is preferable which is  as closely 
as  possible  in  line  with  the  method  of econonic  depreciation  (which takes  into 
account  changes  in  the  prices  of the  equipment  invested  as  well  as  expected 
changes in the demand for the output generated by the equipment). 
3.  In the current environment, straight line depreciation is  probably a rough and ready 
approximation  to  econonic depreciation  reflecting  the  effects  of both  decreasing 
prices of investment goods and increasing demand. 
2.3.1.5  The cost of capital 
The rate of interest to be used in deternining the annualised cost of capital goods, more 
precisely the cost of capital (CC) that the regulated company incurs for the use of capital 
tied up in its investments and that it must be allowed to earn on account of the services 
it supplies under the USO,  has  until now  been taken for granted. Like the selection of a 
particular type of depreciation policy, discussed in the preceding section, the value used 
for the CC has substantial influence on the level of costs arising from the capital goods 
used in the production of these services. 
The CC is derived as the weighted sum of the return that share holders require from the 
company on their shares (before deduction of corporate taxes) plus  the rate of interest 
payable on debt. If we let E stand for shareholders' required return, R for the interest rate 
on  debt,  a  for  the  share  of  equity  in  the  company's  balance  sheet,  and  T  for  the 
corporate tax rate, then the company's CC is deternined by the formula below : 
CC = a*E/(1-T) + (1-a)*R 
The values of the parameters E,  R, T and a  making up above formula vary from country 
to country. A realistic case w auld be the following: The operator in question has a capital 
structure with a 40 °/o equity share from which follows that a = 0.4; the corporate tax rate 
is  around  40 °/o,  thus  T =  0.4;  the  company  has  access  to  capital  from  lending 
institutions at very favourable interest rates that are currently estimated to run -on a real 
rate basis- at around 5 °/o,  and given a risk prenium of about 4% for this company, the 
shareholders  required  return  on  their shares  runs  about 9 o/o  (which means  that E/(1-Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  45 
T) =  15 o/o).29  Fitting  these  values  into  above  forrrula yields  a value  for CC  equal  to 
about 9 o/o. 
Since costs are to be determned following the prescriptions of CCA, the CC to be used 
should be a real rate,  i.e. the inflation induced upwards bias contained in a nomnal rate 
should be taken off. As indicated, the values used above for Gerrreny are based on real 
rates of interest. 
From this we conclude: 
1.  It  is  very irrportant that the proper rate for the cost of capital (CC)  is  used  in  the 
costing of capital goods errployed in the production of USO services as it has great 
irrpact on the level of overall costs. 
2.  The  CC is  to  be  derived  as  a weighted  average of the  rate  of return  that share 
holders  require  on  their  shares  in  the  corrpany  (before  deduction  of  corporate 
taxes) and the rate of interest that the corrpany pays on its debt. 
3.  Given that costing is  to be carried out on a CCA basis, the CC should be on a real 
rate basis, i.e. with the inflationary corrponent taken off from the nomnal rate. 
2.3.1.6  Operating, rreintenance and admnistrative costs 
There  does  not  exist  rruch  detailed  factual  inforrretion  on  the  costs  of  operating, 
maintaining  and  administering  a  telecomrunications  system  that  is  accessible  to 
external observers. The  inforrretion used in  analytical cost rrodels  is  of a rudimentary 
kind  in  that they  postulate sunmary relationships  between the level of investment,  the 
nurrber of subscriber lines in a local network and these costs respectively. 
Therefore, the NRA  rn.~st order the regulated firm to provide it with inforrretion on these 
costs that is  as  detailed as  possible. As they are rrost probably not available from an 
ABC system, studies should be carried out with the objective to provide such information 
according  to  the  standards  of ABC.  The  studies  should  document  in  particular  the 
deployment of labour for the various activities and  how  the level of these activities  are 
driven by the derrends of an efficient operation,  rreintenance and admnistration of the 
network in question. 
The cost analyses should be as  corrprehensive as  possible leaving  in  the category of 
true comrron costs only those cost corrponents for which the actual cost drivers can in 
fact not be traced to individual services. This comrron cost category should contain only 
29  The term E/(1-T) should be used in the formula of the text in lieu of simply E because in order to be 
able to offer shareholders a return of 9% after corporate taxes, the company must earn 15 %  to 
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those  cost elerrents  that  effectively  do  not  vary  in  the  long  run  with  the  volurre  of 
services. 
Thus we conclude: 
1.  With  regard to operating,  maintenance and  adninistrative costs, the USO provider 
should subnit information to the NRA that is as detailed as possible. 
2.  The  data  submtted  should  decurrent that  the  costs  correspond  to  an  efficient 
operation, maintenance and adninistration of the network in question. 
2.3.1.7  Treatment of sunk costs 
A  business  decision  taken  at  some  point  in  tirre  entails  a  "sunk''  cost  whenever 
rescinding  the  decision  at  a  later  tirre  would  not  cause  this  cost  to  disappear.  A 
classical sunk cost is a telecorrrrunication cable buried into the ground which cannot be 
used for anything else but for the transport of telecollTTllnications signals  between the 
given points in space. After the fact of investment, the cable cannot, except at prohibitive 
additional costs, be taken away and be placed somewhere else and put to an alternative 
use. The cost of the cable is thus sunk and cannot be recovered except through using it 
for the initially intended purpose of the investment. 
The non-recovery aspect of sunk capital cost has  relevance as  long  as  the item is  not 
w ritten  dow n  to  zero  and  arrortised  through  the  generation  of  services  sold  to 
customers.  It  has  particular relevance if there has  been  inefficient overinvestment and 
the  investment outlays  are still on  the books  while the equipment giving  rise to  capital 
charges  does  not  give  rise  to  income.  The  network operators  may  argue  that  they 
should be allowed to include these extra burdens in their prices, in particular also in the 
USO deficit figures that should be corllJensated. Our position on this  is  that such extra 
burdens should be taken care of through the use of special depreciation charges so that 
only  those  sunk costs  remain  on  the  books  that  correspond  with  the  revenues  still 
expected to be generated by the capital iterrs in question (see the discussion at the end 
of Appendix A). 
Sunk  costs  due  to  capital  investments  have  a  particular  irllJiication  affecting  the 
deternination of the  cost of USO services.  V\lhen  a network operator has  cormitted 
itself to rolling out a local network, it has  little choice but to connect all prenises in that 
area,  as  it  can  generally  not be  known beforehand which customers  will generate  an 
unsatisfactory level of revenue. Having judged that in toto the area will be econonic, the 
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inhabited by  uneconomc custorrers.lO  If,  as  it were after the fact,  custorrers with low 
revenues are identified in the area the relevant cost that could be saved by discontinuing 
services  to  these  custorrers  would  not  include  the  sunk  cost  of  connecting  their 
prenises as  these costs could not have been avoided. Only the variable costs caused 
by  these  custorrers,  such  as  the  current  cost  of  operation,  rraintenance  and 
adninistration as well as the line ternination equiprrent, should be set against their low 
revenues  in  order to deternine the net cost of serving them The  rerraining sunk cost 
have to  be considered  non-avoidable even if there were no  USO.  Costs  like these are 
part of the risk that is inherent in any business enterprise. They are not part of the costs 
caused by the usa. 
Sunk costs arise not only  as  a consequence of capital investrrents; they also arise in 
the context of erll>loyrrent policies. Pension liabilities are a very irll>ortant case in point. 
They  are sunk costs  because they stem from past policy decisions and  they continue 
irrespective of whether the policy  is  still appropriate or not. As a rratter of fact, pension 
policies  that  appeared  to  be  right  in  the  past  have  ceased  to  be  so  in  the  new 
corll>etitive environrrent. The typical case is that of pension liabilities due to retired civil 
servants which in  corll>arison to alternative current contributions  into a public  pension 
scherre or into a reserve for corll>any sponsored retirerrent benefits are much higher. 
Since,  however, the corresponding cormitrrents cannot be changed retroatively, there 
arise burdens  in  excess of what would otherwise be  norrral.  Being  sunk costs due to 
past inappropriate policy decisions, the sarre reasoning applies to these burdens as to 
sunk costs due to  inefficient and  redundant capital  investrrent.  They  are  not costs  of 
current efficient service provision and therefore also not part of the cost of the  USO.  In 
Appendix  B  we  provide  a  discussion  of  the  problem  of  pension  liabilities  and  the 
possibilities of dealing with that problem 
Thus we conclude: 
1.  A USO provider's sunk cost due to redundant investrrents are not part of the cost of 
efficient service provision and are therefore also not part of the cost of the USO. The 
USO provider should apply special depreciation charges to take care of these sunk 
costs. 
2.  For  uneconomic  custorrers  in  an  economic  area  that  it  would  not  have  been 
possible to identify beforehand, the net costs of serving them under the USO do not 
include sunk costs incurred at the tirre of investrrent. 
30  Even if uneconorric customers were known beforehand, not laying cable till close to their premises 
w auld  be  unwise because a prerrise inhabited  now  by  an  uneconomic  customer  may  in  a few 
years be inhabited by  an econorric one.  Thus  it w auld  make sense to incur the extra cost of also 
laying the distribution plant in these cases, in particular since the corresponding incremental cost in 
a local network being  constructed anyhow  will be  substantially  lower than  the  average  cost per 
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3.  Sunk costs arising out of inappropriate past pension plan policies are not part of the 
cost of efficient service provision and therefore also not part of the cost of the USO. 
2.3.1.8  Treatrrent of cornmn costs 
The  discussion  in  Section  2.3.1.6  on  the  costs  of  operation,  maintenance  and 
adrrinistration has shown that on the basis of a thorough analysis of cost drivers only a 
relatively small proportion of total costs ought to be left without establishing a causal link 
between the service in question and the cost causing activity. 
The remaining  costs of the enterprise will either be caused by  other services, i.e.  non-
USC services - and  belong  on the cost accounting records of these services- or they 
are true cornmn costs. True corrm:m costs do not change when the volurre of activity 
changes and they w auld thus  not change if the firm discontinued to serve uneconorric 
custorrers. Thus  they are not part of the long-run increrrental costs that are the basis 
for the  calculation  of the  cost of  USO  services.  They  should  therefore  not  find  any 
consideration in that calculation. 
Thus we conclude: 
1.  True comrron costs are costs that do  not vary with the level  of activity  of a firm. 
Detailed  cost and  activity analyses are necessary to deterrrine this  residual share 
of costs as precisely as possible. 
2.  As true comrron costs do not change if a firm discontinues to serve specific areas 
or custorrers they are not part of the corresponding LRIC of USOs. 
2.3.2  Issues relating to (local) network structure 
2.3.2.1  1\/t)st recent available vs.  most recent employed technology 
The  test  whether  a  business  organisation  efficiently  provides  a  service  in  a  truly 
corll>etitive environrrent is  its  ability to survive and to prosper. That organisation w auld 
use the best productive technology available for its  business or,  if not,  see to  it that the 
costs  caused  by  it  are  not  higher  than  that  of that  technology.  As  we have  seen  in 
Section 2.3.1.4 an appropriate depreciation and amortisation policy may be part of such 
a strategy. 
Regarding the choice of the best technology,  the firm rrust often find the right balance 
between the  one  that  is  proven and  reliable  and  represents  more  or less  the  current 
state of the  art,  and  the  one  that is  new, perhaps  revolutionary,  prorrising  great cost 
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w auld  therefore  often  find  that  firms  prefer  the  existing,  current  state-of-the-art 
technology to avoid the risks  associated with a new  technology.  Such decisions w auld 
prove to be sound or not depending on what other firms in the industry will do facing the 
sarre decisions and whether those that go for the new  technology gain an edge or not. 
In other words the market place decides. 
The situation sketched above is  currently typical for telecorTllUnications.  For exai'Jl)le, 
there exists now the new technology of the wireless local loop instead of the twisted pair 
of copper wire or optical  fiber  to  connect custorrers  to  the  telephone  network.  This 
technology may  actually have the potential of realising substantial cost savings in what 
are currently  high  cost areas.  There  has,  however,  until  now  only  been  relatively  little 
coi'Jl)etitive pressure towards widespread use of this  new  technology. This  can be due 
to the effects of sunk costs (since the existing copper in the ground has no other uses, it 
is  not worthwhile pulling  it out and  replace  it  by  sorrething else,  although,  if the  initial 
investrrent had to be made now , one w auld use WLL, see Section 2.3.1. 7)  or because 
the technology is still so surrounded by uncertainty that it w auld be too risky to use it on 
a wide scale. 
The  NRA  rrust decide on  the basis  of which technology the cost of efficient provision 
should be calculated. For this purpose the NRA can, however, not substitute its decision 
for that of the operator as to which technology should currently be the rrost efficient one 
in use.  tt will have to go by what at the present tirre is  in fact the rrost recent equiprrent 
in use and accept cost calculations based on this basis using Current Cost Accounting. 
The  possible error and  overstaterrent of costs  may  then  not be  too great and  to  the 
extent that overstaterrents do occur rrust be tolerated.  If the NRA proceeded differently, 
this could lead to larger errors. 
Thus we conclude: 
1.  Costs  of  telecorTllUnications  services  depend  on  the  type  of  equiprrent  used. 
These  costs  may  becorre  lower  as  rrore  and  more  innovative  technology  is 
becoming available. 
2.  The  NRA  should calculate the costs of efficient provision of USO services on  the 
basis of the least-cost technology that is currently in actual use and not on the basis 
of the best available technology but not yet in use. 
2.3.2.2  Optimal vs.  existing structure of local network 
The  question of whether throughout an  optimal  network structure should  be  assurred 
when making usa cost calculations is different from that we discussed above regarding 
the most efficient technology.  In  this  case there is  in  general no  uncertainty any  more 
that larger local netw arks should be designed because of both econonies of scale in the 
switching technology  and  lower cost of transrrission which allows feeder cables to be 50  Study for the European CoiTITlission 
longer.  In  a corrpetitive  situation,  say,  where a large  district now  served  by  several 
smaller  local  netw arks  of  the  incunt>ent  operator  could  be  threatened  by  a  new 
competitor- if the existence of sunk costs on the part of the incunt>ent did not prevent 
this - this  corrpetitor w auld  of course use the  rrost efficient network design to  get the 
benefit  of  lower  costs  and  corrpetitive  advantage.  In  order  to  take  account  of  this 
corrpetitive  threat,  the  incunt>ent  operator  should  depreciate  the  book  value  of  its 
several smaller local netw arks  down to the value of the large rrost efficiently designed 
network.  This  w auld  be  the  rrore  appropriate  if  the  incunt>ent  had  already  begun  to 
consolidate its network structure according to an optimal network design. 
The  instrument of analytical  cost rrodelling  can  actually  cope with this  aspect as  in 
principle such rrodels  can without any  great problem be used to calculate the network 
costs  of any  given  size,  using  each  time  the  rrost appropriate technology.  Here  it  is 
rrore the question of the strength in technical matters of the NRA  vis a  vis the regulated 
firm w hether it has the authority to argue convincingly  in  each individual case w hat the 
right network structure should be and accordingly the relevant costs. One should make it 
dependent on  this  corrpetence w hether to insist on  a costing of USO services on  the 
basis  of  such  least  cost  network  designs.  On  the  basis  of  rough  rule-of-thunt> 
calculations,  differences  in  costs  of local  netw arks  due  to  optimal  network design  in 
relation  to  current network structure  may  run  from 5%  to  1  0°/o,  so they  are  not  of  a 
negligible magnitude. 
Thus we conclude: 
1.  There  is  a  case to  have the  local  network USO  costs  be  based  on  the  optimal 
design  of local netw arks.  O:>st differentials  that are  at stake may  run  from 5°/o  to 
10%. 
2.  The NRA should, however, be nindful that it may not be in a strong position to argue 
conclusively with the TO on technical questions as to what the optimal design of a 
local network should be. 
2.3.2.3  Cost savings through non-USO services 
A local network is typically not designed to provide exclusively those services covered by 
the definition of universal service. Others can be leased line services, data transnission 
or broadband delivery services. Facility sharing may  also occur regarding transnission 
equipment, such as multiplexers and line ternination equipment. Of course, the possible 
degree of sharing depends on the actual configuration of the network. 
Cost savings occur, when the same facilities are used for either services. This is always 
the case in service-integrated netw arks  (e.g.  ISDN). At least in the physical layer of the 
network- i.e.  in  the  access  network consisting  of ducts,  copper wire or optical  fibre, 
etc.- is  here  shared  use by  multiple  applications.  In  other  cases,  the  total  cost of a Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  51 
network allowing  the  sharing  of facilities  by  different services  - including for exarrple 
broadband services - tends to be higher than the cost of a stand-alone network for, say, 
standard telephone services. There may  then,  however, well be econonies of scale or 
scope leading to a reduction of the cost attributable to  a single service corrpared with 
the situation where subsets of services are carried on separate networks. 
V\lhenever a local network or a segrrent of a local network is in respect of USO services 
under  review  as  a  potential  unecononic  area,  and  the  cost of  that  area  is  to  be 
deternined as  part of the net cost calculation,  the question addressed above whether 
there are lower costs due to the sharing of facilities  arises.  To what degree non-USO 
services are actually irrplerrented in the area is  a matter of fact that only the TO itself 
can answer. In cases where there is  an offer of such services (for exarrple leased line 
services) the cost decreases caused by  the joint production should be  ascertained by 
an appropriate analytical cost accounting approach and,  alternatively, be deternined by 
a correspondingly  specified analytical  costing  rrodel.  Since,  as  we know  by  now, the 
netw ark operator w ill  in  rrost actual cases not yet have irrplemented the required cost 
accounting approach and not be in a position to provide the relevant cost data, the NRA 
should  require  it  to  provide  the  factual  data  regarding  facility  sharing  so  that  the 
necessary cost rrodelling can be carried out. 
Thus we conclude: 
1.  As rrodern  telecormunications  netw arks  provide the  basis  for the  provision of a 
bundle of rrultiple  - USO  and  non-USO- services,  it  needs  to  be  ascertained  to 
what extent the underlying equipment costs are to be shared between the services. 
2.  Since the  netw ark operator will rrost probably  not be  in  a position  to  provide the 
relevant cost information from its own records, the NRA should require the netw ark 
operator to provide the factual information so that the corresponding cost rrodelling 
can be carried out. 
2.3.2.4  The appropriate size of a USO area 
Before addressing the question of what the proper size of a USO area is,  it is  useful to 
carry out a couple of prelininary analytical steps. First, one should get an idea what the 
options  are that an  operator faces when making decisions about netw ark investments. 
Then  one  should  ask oneself whether considerations  regarding  any  single subscriber 
could play a role in this  decision. Only  after that w auld one be able to define the criteria 
on the basis of which the proper size of a USO should be deternined. 
At the time when an operator has to decide on laying out a local netw ark,  or an addition 
to an existing one,  it normally has only incomplete information about the revenues from 
the prospective subscribers. The TO will have to  rely on its experience aided  by  socio-
derrographic  information  about the  population  of the  district under consideration.  For 52  Study for the European Connission 
exarllJie  a  district  inhabited  by  blue-collar  workers  w ill  elicit  different  revenue 
expectations than one inhabited  by  civil servants, or pensioners,  or one in which there 
are mainly student dormtories. 
l!ll>licit in the above description of the operator's decision situation is  that there is  very 
rarely  such  a  decision  regarding  a  particular  single  custorrer.  In  the  overw helmng 
nurrber of cases, individual custorrers are part of a local network and do not enter as 
potential individual custorrers into the decision about laying  out a local network. Either 
individual custorrers live in an area that the TO has decided is economc, or they live in 
an uneconomc area, and in this case the status of uneconomc custorrers applies to all 
of them.31 
Now, an area should in principle only be a candidate as an uneconomc area if the USO 
provider  could  from the  start  have  decided  against  connecting  this  area.  Again,  in 
principle,  if  at  the  tirre  the  area  in  question  had  been  accepted  as  economc  and 
afterwards  it  had  turned  out the  other way round,  the  corrpany  should  be  obliged  to 
absorb  the  losses  as  part  of  its  normal  risk  taking.  However,  the  decision  about 
declaring a particular area as  uneconomc must in  rTl)St cases be taken  ex post - i.e. 
after the  netw arks  in  question  have  already  been  in  existence for quite  a nurrber of 
years. Given this we suggest that an area should be considered unecononic when the 
NRA on the basis of a current evaluation can reasonably judge that the TO would today 
choose not to connect it.  From this follows that one has to provide criteria by which such 
a region can be identified from this  ex post position.  In  particular,  one  needs  criteria by 
which to determne what the mnimum size of such an unecononic area should be. 
Without being  categorical about the criteria deternining the  ninimum size of an  area 
that could be uneconomc, the rTl)St sensible appear to be the following: 
•  The area selected w auld have to require some ninimum netw ark configuration about 
which the operator can be expected to make a separate investment decision. 
•  The  size of the area should  be  linited from above.  ~should not be  profitable for a 
potential  colll>etitor to  pick up  a subset of potentially  econonic subscribers within 
this single unecononic area. 
The  first criterion  is  of  a  comrTl)n-sense  nature.  lnvestrrent  decisions  that we are 
considering come  generally  in  ninimum sizes and  concern units  regarding which it  is 
worthwhile for the planning  departrrent of the TO to  make separate decisions. Such a 
ninimum unit, except in special circumstances, w auld in our estimation not consist, for 
exarllJie,  of a block of houses  w ithin  a city,  tow n or village;  one  would expect these 
houses to be included in a relevant network configuration even if one could suspect that 
the average revenue would lie below  the critical average. 
31  This by thew ay is also the position taken by the European Public Telecoi11Tl.lnications Operators' 
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The  second  criterion  is  connected  w ith  the  other  one.  fvlarket  entrance  by  new 
cof11)etitors  will  have  to  occur  on  the  basis  of  a  reasonable  mnirrum  nunt>er  of 
customers  and  some  rrinirrum  netw ark  configuration.  The  area  making  up  an 
unecononic  area  may  contain  in  it  islands  of econonic  customers.  It  w auld  in  our 
opinion destabilise the USO arrangement if in an area that is overall unecononic it w auld 
have to  be expected that the econonic islands within it should  be subject to  be taken 
aw ay  by competitors.  In other words, the USO area should be deternined in a way that 
the  relationship of custorrers  in  it,  and,  therefore,  the  revenues  obtainable  in  it by  the 
USO provider,  stand  in  a stable relationship to  the  costs incurred for it.  This  condition 
w auld  be  jeopardised  if  smaller  groups  of econonic customers  that rright exist in  it 
could easily be picked up by cof11)etitors. 
Based  on  the above argurrents we propose as  an  area potentially  to  be  classified  as 
unecononic an exchange area w hich is directly served either by a parent local sw itch or 
by  a  rerrote  concentrating/sw itching  unit.  Such  an  area  is  large  enough  to  w arrant 
separate  netw ark planning  and  investrrent.  On  the  other  hand,  it  w auld  probably  be 
small enough that,  if it were unecononic overall,  it w auld  not contain within it islands of 
econonic custorrers that it w auld  be w orthw hile for a competitor to compete for w hile 
leaving out all the unecononic customers. A typical nunt>er for the subscribers in such 
an  exchange area w auld  be  between 2,000  and  5,000.  In  smaller  local  netw arks  the 
nunt>er could be smaller, in big urban local networks it could exceed this range. 
An  if11)1ication  of  above  analysis  is  that  the  definition  as  USO  net  cost  areas  of 
geographies that sorrehow  corrbine (parts  of) different exchange areas or even (parts 
of) different local netw arks should not be acceptable for the reason that they w auld give 
rise  to  arbitrary  cost allocations  and  probably  lead  to  cost figures  in  excess  of what 
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We conclude: 
1.  I is inherent in a network operator's planning of local networks that no consideration 
is given to the question of whether individual subscribers would be econonic or not. 
The decision unit is always a larger segrrent of the local network in question. 
2.  Any deternination of a network segrrent or of a served area to be classified w hether 
being econonic or not should be guided by the following principles: 
- The  area selected would have to  require sorre ninirrum network configuration 
about  which  the  operator  can  be  expected  to  make  a  separate  investrrent 
decision. 
- The size of the area should be linited from above. I should not be profitable for 
a  potential  competitor  to  pick  up  a  subset  of  subscribers  within  this  single 
uneconorric area. 
3.  Based  on  these  principles  we propose as  an  area  potentially  to  be  classified  as 
unecononic  an  exchange  area  which is  directly  served  either  by  a  parent  local 
sw itch or by a rerrote concentrating/sw itching unit. 
2.3.3  Methodologies for cost determnation 
In the comparison of cost accounting approaches of Section 2.3.1.2 we pointed out that 
rrost network operators  have currently  not yet installed  an  analytical cost accounting 
system of the ABC type.  In these cases the preferred approach should then be the use 
of analytical cost rrodelling to obtain estimates of the relevant cost figures. We argued 
that the information from such an approach could be expected to be rrore reliable than 
the data provided by the network operator's  FOC accounting system w hich then w ould 
have to be adjusted to conform to the LRIC standard. 
Alternatively to analytical cost rrodelling carried out under the auspices of the NRA,  the 
latter could ask the network operator to provide data obtained on the basis of analytical 
studies and statistical data collected for the purpose that could be used to calculate the 
costs of serving custorrers  in  different local network settings.  This  would basically  be 
the approach followed by Oftel. 
In  the  following  we will  first,  drawing  substantially  on  Oftel  (1997),  present what the 
approach of having the  operator carry out the studies  and  provide the data involves  in 
terms  of instructions to  the  network operator.  This  consists  primarily  in  specifying the 
various cost components  and the levels of disaggregation to which the latter are to  be 
broken  dow n.  Thereafter we will  discuss  the  essential  elerrents  of an  local  network 
analytical cost rrodel.  In  doing this we emphasise that the local network should  be the 
main  focus in  the cost rrodelling effort. The  reason  is  that,  under an  affordability price 
constraint, the greatest part of the costs of USOs  are caused by  the cost variations  in 
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2.3.3.1  Cost studies perforrred by the network operator 
When there is no reliable analytical cost accounting system available and the operator is 
requested to provide the relevant cost data, the latter will have to be given discretion as 
to what analytical approach to  use.  It could  be  an  analytical cost rrodel or sorre other 
rrethod to compile cost data that reflect the required LRIC standard.  It would have to be 
verifiable  by  the  regulator showing that the  cost figures  correspond  to  that of efficient 
provision. 
Following  rrostly  the  Oftel  Consultative  Decurrent  on  universal  teleconm  .. mications 
services32  we present  below  the  requirerrents  for  unecononic  areas,  unecononic 
custorrers and unecononic public pay phones. 
Uneconomic areas 
Total  avoidable  costs  for an  area  clairred  to  be  uneconorric  should  be  deterrrined 
broken  down according  to  all  relevant services  and  service components  identified  as 
cost drivers. Cost drivers are 
•  the nunt>er of access lines in the area, differentiated according to lengths; 
•  the nunt>er of business and residential telephone connections in the area, 
•  the  nunt>er  of  each  local,  national  and  international  call  rrinutes  (outgoing  and 
incorring) at different tirres of the day, 
For each of above cost drivers, data should be provided covering 
•  depreciation  and  cost  of  capital  employed,  broken  down  by  network elerrent  or 
business function (e.g. access cables, concentrator centre or rerrote switching unit, 
dedicated  transrrission  links  to  parent  local  exchange,  local  switching,  billing 
systerrs), and 
•  the  costs  of  operation,  maintenance,  and  adninistration  broken  down by  relevant 
activity  (e.g.  provision  and  installation,  maintenance of telephone  lines,  servicing of 
switching equiprrent, custorrer care). 
For  the  purpose  of identifying  the  drivers  of variations  in  the  cost levels  of  network 
elerrents  and  operation,  maintenance  and  adrrinistration,  the  following  information 
should be provided: 
•  actual capacity of the various network elerrents (in use as well as held in reserve), 
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•  actual levels of operating activities, and 
•  average travel tirres. 
Due to the statistical study approach, such detailed data will rrost probably be available 
only for a linited nurrber of areas. Thus for any particular area that may be unecononic, 
one w auld have to estimate costs of service delivery with reference to results from these 
sample areas. It is then useful to define representative types of exchange areas (in Oftel 
terninology:  different geotypes),  representing  rural and  remote  exchange areas,  using 
one or in corrbination all of the following characteristics: 
•  the average density of access lines, 
•  the location of the area, and 
•  the length and the capacity of the outer-core transnission. 
The average density is the most important indicator of local network costs as these vary 
substantially depending on the nurrber of customers per square kilometre. The location 
of the area is also important as  it deternines the type of terrain and depending on it the 
necessary underground work and the corresponding cost,  or  - if this  is  an option - the 
possibility of placing aerial cable which involves less cost. The length and the capacity of 
the  outer-core transnission  links  may  also differentiate significantly  between areas  if 
their distances from the next centre with a parent local exchange vary substantially. 
Part of all this information may not be available on a per area basis at all.  In these cases 
one may have to resort to national averages to obtain estimates of the relevant data. 33 
If  above information  must be  obtained  for areas  that are  still  in  the  process of being 
rolled out, it will necessarily have to consist primarily of estimates of planned costs as in 
these  cases  there  is  yet  no  actual  experience  to  refer  to.  In  these  cases  the  term 
"avoidable" more so than in the other cases implies "incremental" cost - in the sense of 
TSLRIC- that  must  in  future  be  incurred  for  serving  custorrers  in  that  area. 
Conceptually there is  no difference, since the two types of costs converge for the long 
run.  In practical terrrs there is  a substantial difference as the crutch of referring back to 
actual cost data does not exist. 
Uneconomic customers 
An  unecononic  custorrer  as  a  separate  entity  may  occur when the  area  in  which 
he/she lives is econonic but this  particular customer's bill fails to cover relevant costs. 
33  For exai'TlJie  in  the UK out of a total of rrore than 5000  exchange areas  BT was able to  provide 
relevant data for 299 of them. Further, after rrore than two years of regulatory attention to the matter, 
a substantial arrount of required data could not be provided even for these sai'TlJie areas (see Note 
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As  regards  the  relevant  costs,  there  are  two possibilities  depending  on  whether the 
custorrer could be  identified as  unecononic before he/she is  connected,  or not.  In  the 
first case  not only  variable  costs  but  also  a share of otherwise sunk costs  could  be 
avoided, in the second case only variable costs are avoidable (see Section 2.3.1. 7). 
Normally  the  second  of  above  cases  applies  so  that  only  variable  costs  qualify  as 
avoidable. For these, the specific cost drivers are 
•  the custorrer specific line ternination equiprrent in the local switch, and 
•  the  nunt>er  of  each  local,  national  and  international  call  ninutes  (outgoing  and 
inconing) at different tirres of the day. 
These  cost drivers  should  be  considered  as  avoidable  also  in  the  short run  as  the 
corresponding capacities can be redeployed for the purpose of serving other custorrers. 
As in  the  case of unecononic areas,  the  data should  cover depreciation  and  cost of 
capital  erll>loyed  as  well  relevant  costs  of  operation  and  maintenance.  Costs  of 
operation, maintenance and adninistration will in general -i.e. not only  in  respect of the 
COrll>Onents  listed  above but also  in  respect of maintaining  and  servicing the  line  and 
other such operations - vary in the short run  with the nunt>er of custorrers so that the 
average per custorrer should be considered as avoidable. 
One should  not COrll>letely  disniss the case where the  network operator could  at the 
tirre of laying out the network- expected overall to be econonic - have anticipated that in 
this network there would be a nuni:>er of unecononic custorrers. This  is  not to say that 
the operator would have been able to recognise individually these custorrers, how ever, 
that it would have been  able to  predict that there is  going  to  be a certain fraction of all 
custorrers  that would  demand  service  under  the  affordable  price  constraint  but  not 
generate enough  revenue  to  cover costs.  Deciding  at this  point  of tirre  that  it  would 
decline to  serve these  custorrers the  operator would plan  and  construct the  network 
with a certain  lower capacity  than  otherwise  and  therefore  have  avoidable  cost.  Our 
position is that this is an unlikely scenario and that the NRA should place a heavy burden 
of proof on  the  operator to  make  this  case plausible.  Only  if it can  provide this  proof 
should it be allowed to include a share of sunk costs, in particular 
•  depreciation  and  cost of  capital  erll>loyed  of  the  relevant  network elerrents  (as 
discussed above in respect of unecononic areas), 
as part of avoidable costs if these custorrers were not served. Otherwise the operator 
should be required to absorb this cost as part of its normal business risk. 
In  contrast, if unecononic custorrers in  an overall econonic local network (usually the 
network of a larger city) are clustered in distinct districts that can readily be identified, the 
situation would approach the case of an unecononic area discussed at the beginning of 
this  section.  In  this  case  it  would  be  justified  for  the  operator  to  argue  that  if  it 58  Study for the European Corrn1ssion 
discontinued to serve that area all the sunk costs associated with feeder and distribution 
plant as  well as  the  sw itching  machine w auld  in  the  long  run  be  avoidable  as  in  the 
cases of uneconorric areas. 
In  addition,  there  will  certainly  be  individual  cases  where  the  current  request  for 
connection  from  a  prospective  customer  may  be  recognisable  as  a  loss-making 
prospect so that the customer can beforehand be identified as  uneconorric. This  could 
for exarrple be the case of a new  low-incorre housing project.  If  the connection were 
then  declined the avoidable cost w auld  also consist of a share of the sunk cost.  This 
w auld then probably not be the total costs of trenching and of the feeder cable, but most 
probably only of a share of the cost for distribution plant and the dropw ire.  If,  as another 
example, a customer living alone in a remote place is to be connected, then there may in 
fact be  a substantial share of sunk cost that w auld  be avoidable.  These are individual 
and probably relatively few cases that should be handled separately. They should not be 
allowed to  serve as  a reason to include in  general a large share of the sunk costs as 
part of the avoidable costs of individual uneconorric customers. 
Uneconomic public pay phones 
Total  avoidable  costs  for  a  public  pay  phone  claimed  to  be  uneconorric  should  be 
deterrrined broken dow n according to the follow ing cost drivers: 
•  the booth of the public telephone; 
•  the line to the exchange (essentially equivalent to a subscriber access line); 
•  the  number  of  each  local,  national  and  international  call  rrinutes  (outgoing  and 
inc erring) at different times of the day, 
For each of above cost drivers, data should be provided covering 
•  depreciation  and  cost  of  capital  errployed,  broken  down  by  netw ark element  or 
business function (e.g. access cables, concentrator centre or remote switching unit, 
dedicated  transrrission  links  to  parent  local  exchange,  local  switching,  billing 
systerrs), and 
•  the  costs  of operation,  maintenance,  and  adrrinistration  broken  down by  relevant 
activity  (e.g.  provision and  installation,  maintenance of telephone  lines,  servicing of 
switching equipment, custorrer care). 
V\lhen  corrpiling these data on  a sample basis, care should  be  taken that the sample 
data allow  to  differentiate between the  costs  of groups  of pay  phones  having  different 
causes  for  their  unecononic  status.  The  principal  causes  are  the  high  cost  of 
rraintenance and repair in some areas (often due to vandalism) and/or the low  average 
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Concluding observations 
The  deternination  of the  cost of actual service delivery  to  custorrers  is  probably  the 
rrost corrplex part of the calculation of the net cost of USOs and the area w here rruch 
discretion will have to be left to the netw ark operator if asked to provide the relevant data, 
as  discussed in  this  section.  R-oof  to this  corrplexity  and  the degrees of freedom the 
NRA w auld have to concede consists in the virtual irrpossibility to discuss in the space 
of  the  present  analysis  every  detail  of  the  rrany  aspects  of  that  cost  calculation. 
Therefore,  rruch reliance w ill  have to be placed on the verification of the data obtained 
from the operator.  In  order to assure that these data report costs that correspond to an 
efficient service provision, due attention should be given to the aspects we discussed in 
Sections 2.3.1  and 2.3.2. 
The  task  of  verification  should  be  carried  out  by  expert  auditors  faniliar  with 
telecomrrunications  networks and  rrodern cost accounting practices. If the  NRA  does 
not have the expertise available  in  its  ow n organisation  it w auld  have to obtain  it from 
outside, perhaps with the assistance of the European Comnission. 
From the discussion in this section we conclude: 
1.  V\lhen  the  netw ark  operator  delivering  USO  services  has  no  analytical  cost 
accounting  system installed  but  is  requested  to  establish the  avoidable  costs  for 
these  services,  it  should  be  required  to  carry  out  special  studies  and  use  an 
adequate rrethodology to assure cost data that correspond to the efficient service 
provision. 
2.  The  data  should  essentially  cover the  costs  for unecononic areas,  unecononic 
custorrers  and  unecononic  pay  phones  differentiated  according  to  the  different 
cost drivers (different services, different service elerrents, etc.) and types of costs 
(costs of equiprrent and facilities, variable costs). 
3.  The  subnitted cost data  should  be  audited  as  tow  hether they  correspond to  the 
cost of efficient service provision. 
4.  If necessary, the  NRA should use for the purpose expertise obtained from outside, 
perhaps with the assistance of the European Comnission. 
2.3.3.2  Analytical cost rrodelling 
V\lhen the NRA decides to carry out cost estirrates on its own with the help of analytical 
cost rrodelling,  it takes  itself the initiative in deternining what these costs shall be. The 
NRA  should then  have at its  disposal a rrodelling  tool that is  in  a position to generate 
estirrates  with  a degree  of reliability  that  allows  to  enter  discussions  with the  USO 
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In this section we provide an overview  over the structure that such a rrodel should have 
in  general,  concentrating  thereby  on  the  rrodelling  of a local  network.  In  the  follow ing 
section we will provide results from a specific local network rrodel that give an indication 
w hat to expect from this rrethodology. 
Analytical  cost rrodels  are  generally  designed  to  represent  an  efficient local  netw ark 
structure on the basis of state-of-the-art technology. One distinguishes between rrodels, 
which take  the  location  and  type of switches in  the existing  network of an  established 
operator as  given  and  rrodels  which set switch type and  location endogenously  as  a 
result of a network optirrisation  procedure.  \1\thether  the  one  or the  other approach  is 
taken  depends  on  the  particular  circumstances.  In  general,  a  rigorous  application  of 
forward-looking LRIC rrethodology w auld  require cost determnation to be based on an 
optirrised  structure.  This,  how ever,  w auld  require  that  the  optimal  network structure 
w auld  alw ays  be  implerrentable w hich  is  a very rigorous  demand  to  be  placed  on  the 
network operator and also puts a heavy burden on the rrodel results  in respect of their 
precision. Therefore it is sensible to take the existing structures for the local netw arks in 
question and derive the costs on their basis. If, how ever, the NRA is unable to obtain the 
information on local network structure from the operator, the inclusion of an optirrisation 
feature  in  an  analytical  cost rrodel  w auld  allow  to  proceed  anyhow  (this  approach  is 
followed  for  the  benchmark  calculations  reported  on  in  the  following  section);  a 
concession  with respect to  the  level  of costs  reflecting  the  actual  network structure 
could be made at that tirre when the rrodel estimates are eventually confronted w ith the 
data from the operator. 
The  rrodel rrust be  in  a position  to  provide cost estimates  for the  rrost important of 
USO services, i.e. local access and local calls.  It should also be able to provide at least 
basic  cost information  on  the  provision  of non-switched  services  (leased  lines)  and 
public  pay  phones  (it  has,  however,  no  advantage  in  providing  information  on  the 
presumably  largest  cost  items  of  public  pay  phones,  i.e.  their  booths  and  their 
maintenance). 
In  the following we discuss the major components,  cost drivers and  types  of cost that 
should be incorporated in the rrodel: 
•  Netoork elements  The  rrodel  should  explicitly  provide  for the  following  network 
elerrents:  the  local  loop,  local  switching,  interoffice transrrission  (in  cases  where 
rrore than one sw itch is present in the local exchange network) and connection to the 
national network via  the  appropriate  interface.  The  network constructed  should  be 
based  on  w ireline  technology  which  is  currently  the  actual  standard.  V\lireless 
connection of custorrers to  the  central office or to  sorre concentrating  point within 
the local loop  may  becorre the cost-rrinirrising access technology  in  the future.  In 
this  case it should be included in the rrodel as  a reasonable alternative to traditional 
w ireline  access.  This  evaluation  also  applies  to  alternative  w ireline  access 
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•  Local loop  The  local loop  is  defined as  the whole plant that connects customers 
to  the  central office,  thereby  providing  a transnission path  for signalling,  data  and 
voice.  Starting  at the  customer's  prenise,  it consists  of the  drop wire,  distribution 
cable, cross connection points, feeder cable and ends at the main distribution frame 
(MDF)  located  in  the  central  office building.  The  MDF  can  be  seen  as  the  cross-
connect between access network (feeder and distribution) and the local switch. The 
investment for line  ternination  (line  cards)  can  be  included  in  the  cost module  for 
switching  equipment.  How ever,  the  resulting  costs  are  definitely  line  related  and 
should be allocated to the overall cost of access. The physical layer in the distribution 
plant usually  consists  of twisted copper pairs,  in  the  feeder section  it  may  also  be 
optical fibre.  For narrow band voice telephony,  the deployment of optical fibre can be 
justified,  when  the  distance  from  the  primary  cross  connection  point  near  the 
customers  prenises and  the  local switch exceeds  a certain  threshold.  The  model 
should  distinguish  between cables  laid  in  trenches,  cables  running  through  conduit 
systems and aerial cable.  The model should allow  the user to define different nixes 
of cable installation types, so that it is  possible to replicate an existing outside plant, 
or  alternatively  assume  what is  considered  to  be  optimal  in  terms  of  costs  and 
characteristic of the area. 
•  SVtitching  The model should assume throughout digital switching technology. This 
is  reasonable  for  a  cost  scenario  built  on  a  forward-looking  basis  although  the 
nigration  from  analog  or  even  mechanical  switching  is  not  yet completed  in  all 
European  countries.  Remote  units  w ith  linited  sw itching  capabilities  should  be 
modelled for the purpose of handling internal traffic as well as concentrating external 
traffic to allow  cost savings  due to  shorter loops  and  efficient transport to  the local 
switch on a digital transnission link. 
•  Interoffice transmission and connection to the national netv.,ork If  there  is  more  than 
one switching centre in a local network, an interoffice transnission network should be 
modelled.  Also  each  local  switching  centre  should  be  connected  to  a  tandem 
switching  centre  to  allow  customers  the  placement  of  long-distance  calls.  If  the 
location  of the  tandem  switch  is  unknown,  it  is  reasonable  to  place  it  inside  the 
business district of a city,  possibly  co-located with a local switching centre.  In  rural 
exchange  areas  with a  relatively  small  number  of subscribers  it  makes  sense  to 
locate  the  long-distance  switching centre  outside  the  exchange area  reflecting  the 
fact that such offices are typically located in larger cities. Costs for links between the 
local  and  long-distance switching  centres  should  also  be  included  in  the  costs  of 
interoffice transnission. 
•  Capital costs  The  annual costs of the  netw ark elements  described above should 
be  derived  by  transforning  the  prices  of the  investment goods  into  annual  values 
using a carrying charge factor. The latter should reflect the proper depreciation policy 
as well as the appropriate cost of capital that the company faces in its capital market. 62  Study for the European Cormission 
•  Operations, maintenance and administration  The drivers for these costs can only 
very irrperfectly  be  rrodelled  by  an  external observer.  For  this  reason,  one  should 
request the  necessary  information  from the  network operator as  discussed  in  the 
preceding section. If the operator cannot provide such data, estimates from the public 
record, as  irrprecise as  they may  be,  should be used (this  procedure is  followed in 
the benchmark calculations reported on in the following section). One should expect, 
that the resulting cost figures are generally higher than those warranted by an efficient 
operator. 
The irrplementation of a rrodel of a local network as outlined above requires in any case 
extensive data input. Generally, the operator whose costs are to be rrodelled should be 
asked to provide any necessary information.  However, if data from the operator are not 
provided  in  time  or if the  operator refuses to  disclose data  at all,  calculations  on  the 
basis  of  publicly  available  information  are  nevertheless  possible.  Besides  the  cost 
information regarding operations, maintenance and adninistration mentioned above, the 
rrost irrportant types  of required  information  concern  the  number  and  distribution  of 
subscribers within a local  network area and  the  procurement prices  of capital goods. 
The former are available from statistical offices and the latter can be obtained from trade 
associations  and  specialised  professional  services.  Furtherrrore,  the  proper 
depreciation policy should be specified. The NRA should make its own deternination on 
this question aided by experts from outside the network operator under review. 
One of the great advantages of an analytical cost rrodel irrplemented by the NRA is that 
all  the cost accounting concerns discussed in  Section 2.3.1  can  be  addressed  in  the 
proper way. 
The results from such a rrodelling exercise should be confronted with those presented 
by  the network operator and,  if necessary, be reconciled with them This  reconciliation 
w auld  reveal  where  the  rrodelling  exercise  possibly  has  neglected  essential  cost 
corrponents or where the operator's data reflect overinvestment and inefficiencies. 
There  exist  rrodels  on  the  market  that  are  in  a  position  to  perform the  necessary 
calculations,  for local network services as well as for switched long-distance services. 
They can provide the NRA with estimates of the costs of service provision which can be 
expected  to  be  substantially  closer  to  the  required  cost standard  than  cost  figures 
obtained from network operator's cost accounting records on an  FDC basis. As before, 
if the  NRA  does  not dispose of the expertise to  handle this  kind  of cost rrodelling  (an 
existing rrodel w auld rrost likely have to be adjusted to reflect national characteristics), it 
should be able to obtain adequate assistance from outside. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  63 
We conclude: 
1.  The  application  of  analytical  cost  rrodels  can  provide  the  NRA  with  useful 
inforrration about the cost that an efficient usa provider would have to incur. These 
cost estirrates can be contrasted with the data presented by the current provider. 
2.  An analytical  cost rrodel should  be  in  a position to  rrodel  various  elerrents  of a 
network in  a  transparent  and  understandable  rranner.  ~ should  be  possible  to 
clearly identify line dependent and usage dependent cost elerrents. 
3.  An analytical cost rrodel should offer the NRA  a high degree of freedom regarding 
the adjustrrent of input data according to their specific needs. This also enables the 
NRA to carry out a detailed sensitivity analysis to assess the irrpact of the various 
cost drivers on average and increrrental cost. 
4.  The rrodel should offer the opportunity to perform calculations exclusively with data 
taken  from the  public  dorrain  for cases  in  which requested  data are slow  to  be 
provided by the network operator, or for the purpose of contrasting cost figures from 
the operator w ith independently derived results. 
5.  The  local network rrodel should  be  in  a position to  capture the diversity of actual 
exchange areas, e.g. regarding the actual distribution of subcribers in the areas and 
the corresponding concrete topology  of the network,  in  order to avoid calculations 
based on  the simplifying  assurrptions of uniform population density or equal loop 
length. 
6.  There  are  rrodels  available  w hich  rreet  all  these  requirerrents,  but  have  to  be 
adjusted for national features. The NRA should be able to obtain external assistance 
in  order to  becorre faniliar with the  application  of these  rrodels  and  rrake  the 
necessary rrodifications. 
2.3.3.3  Benchrrark calculations with a specific local network analytical cost rrodel 
For the calculations  reported  in  this  section, a local network rrodel constructed by the 
two Arrerican researchers David Gabel and  rv1ark Kennet34 was used. The  rrodel was 
adapted for the purpose by  WIK to  serve as  a tool for relevant regulatory  decisions in 
Gerrrany.  ~ has here also been used to estirrate costs for countries with different input 
prices than for Gerrrany, in particular for labour intensive operations and for facilities the 
construction of which is labour intensive. 
34  Both  David  Gabel  and  Mark  Kennet  are  recognised  regulatory  experts  in  the  USA.  Gabel  is 
professor  at  Queens  College,  New  York,  but  currently  on  leave  to  assist  State  Public  Utility 
Commissions  on questions of universal service and  interconnection. Kennet is  currently with the 
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The  model  rreets  all  the  requirerrents  placed  on  such  a  rrodel  above.  ~ explicitly 
rrodels  the  netw ark elerrents  local  loop  (subdivided  into  distribution  section,  feeder 
section  and  MDF),  rerrote  concentrating  or  switching,  local  switching,  transnission 
between local switches or between local switches and  rerrote units,  and  transnission 
to the national netw ark via a tandem switch. Lacking inforrration about switch locations 
calculations  were perforrred  in  the  optinisation  rood e.  This  rreans,  that the  rrodel's 
search  algorithm  is  used  to  deternine  the  cost  ninimising  combination  of  local 
switching centres and rerrote switching units and their locations. The distribution as well 
as the feeder sections of the access netw ark in all cases consist of twisted copper pairs 
as  the physical layer.  For long feeder routes,  four-wire digital transnission turns out to 
be the cost nininising technology. We set up the rrodel in away that no concentration 
occurs in the access network, so that every subscriber has  a dedicated voice channel 
up  to  the  local  switch or to  the  remote  switching  unit.  For  host-rerrote  links  and  for 
interoffice transnission links, we assurre that fibre is  always the technology of choice 
irrespective of cost.  ~turns out that traffic volurre and distance between offices in roost 
cases justifies the deployrrent of fibre even from a cost nininising point of view. 
Throughout we assurre that the  network is  entirely  built  for the  provision  of switched 
voice services.  ~ follows that there is  no  cost sharing  between different services,  e.g. 
between switched services  and  non-switched (private line)  services.  Furtherrrore, we 
assurre that the costs resulting from infrastructural investrrent like conduit systems or 
trenches are fully allocated to the telecorrm.mications netw ark.  In reality, these facilities 
are often used by  other netw arks  as  well, e.g.  by  cable operators,  electric  utilities  and 
the like. 
The distribution of subscribers within a local exchange area was derived on the basis of 
census data for Gerrrany. For the comrunities for which we carried out the rrodelling, 
we assurre that each household is connected to the netw ark and estirrated the number 
of additional business lines as a fraction of residential lines, which varies with population 
density.  A"ices  for  excavation  w ark,  cable  laying,  telecomrunication  cables  and 
supplerrentary  rraterials  (e.g.  pipes  or rranholes)  were collected  from a specialised 
Gerrran  source.  To  provide  cost estirrates  for  countries  with  different price  and  in 
particular different wage levels, we allowed cost levels for excavation and cable laying to 
vary  depending  on  these  differences,  holding  the  price  for  rraterial  constant.  This 
approach  is  justified  on  the  grounds  that the  comrron  rrarket  in  Europe  leads  to  a 
convergence of prices  of tradable goods,  whereas for prices  of non-tradable services 
(like excavation w ark) differences exist today and will likely persist in the future. 
We have carried out rrodel calculations for Gerrrany, the "high cost country" case, and 
two additional cases. The "rredium cost country" case is rreant to reflect the price level 
in Spain, whereas the "low  cost country" case refers to Portugal. The adjustrrent factors Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  65 
applied  to the  prices  and  wages for Germany  were derived from OECD-statistics  on 
purchasing power parities.35 
A-ices  for transnission and  switching  equipment are for the  Dr\I1S  100 system from 
Nortel w hich is  beside Lucent the leading  manufacturer in  North America.  A" ices were 
taken from a study conducted in New  Zealand and therefore should equal world market 
prices.  Costs  for  operation  and  maintenance  are  expressed  as  a  fraction  of  total 
investment in  a specific category,  e.g.  switching equipment.  They  correspond to  data 
taken from the US-ARMIS reports36 and therefore reflect the ratio of historic expenses to 
eni:>edded investment, which is not fully satisfactory for a forward looking approach. The 
resulting  figures  should  be  valued  as  rather  conservative  in  the  sense  that  they 
represent an upper linit on the cost of an efficient operator. For the niddle and low  cost 
country cases, the mark-ups on the investment sum were lowered to take into account 
the different level of labour costs in these countries. Here, adjustment factors are based 
on data from B.Jrostat covering labour costs of ElJ fvlember States.37 
Costs for operation and  maintenance together with capital costs and depreciation form 
the annual carrying charge factors used to transform investment into annual costs (see 
Appendix C for detailed discussion). Netw ark access costs per subscriber on a m:>nthly 
basis were calculated  for several types  of local exchanges  and  are presented  below. 
Access costs comprise the cost for the local loop plus  the cost of connecting a line to 
the switch. The line includes all equipment up to the first point of concentration which is 
therefore directly attributable to  a single subscriber.  For each exchange we distinguish 
between the three cases (high, medium and low  cost country) described above. 
35  OECD (1996). 
36  ARMIS  stands for Automated  Reporting  Management  Information  System.  It  was established  in 
1987 by the FCC and is used for the periodical collection of financial and operating data from local 
exchange carriers in the US. Since 1989 most of the ARMIS data is no longer considered proprietary 
by the FCC. 
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Table 2.3.3.3-1:  Access costs per subscriber 
1  .·  2  3  4  5  6.  7 
Name of  German  Number of  Density of  · .  r.tmthly T  costs~  subscriber  Average 
municipality used  inhlbitants  population  high cost  medium  row cost  loop length 
cost 
for modelling  subscribers  eCU 
lichtenau  10,461  55/ krrf!  15.49  13.54  9.68  3.20 km 
3,432 
NOrvenich  10,760  163/ krrf!  14.34  12.63  9.22  2.67 km 
5,647 
Wachtberg  28,849  270 I krrf!  10.83  9.55  6.99  2,13 km 
12,338 
Meekenheim  24,558  705/ krrf!  9.22  8.17  6.08  1.76 km 
12,229 
Herdecke  26,278  1  ,  173 I krrf!  9.94  8.86  6.69  2.18 km 
16,251 
Euskirchen  52,205  374/ krrf!  10.27  9.12  6.82  2.66 km 
28,627 
Cologne  965,697  2,383/ krrf!  7.51  6.70  5.08  0.97 km 
429,642 
Source:  WIK 
In  the reported calculations,  per subscriber access costs for the entire local exchange 
network fall  in a range between 15.5 ECU and  7.5  ECU in  the high cost country case. 
For the low  cost case the respective values are 9.7 and  5.1  ECU.  If the cost results for 
the  sparsely  populated exchange areas  appear to  be  rroderate,  even  in  the  high  cost 
case,  it  should  still  be  kept  in  nind  that  these  results  were  obtained  with  rather 
conservative assurrptions regarding input prices. For exarrple, expenses for operations 
and  maintenance were estimated on the basis of historical accounting data taken from 
the  US  ARMS  reports  which  were  not  corrected  for  possible  inefficiencies  on  the 
operator's side. Furtherrrore, all infrastructure costs were fully allocated to the telephone 
network 
We note that even sparsely populated areas do not automatically cause very high costs 
as  long  as  custorrers  are  clustered  and  not distributed  evenly  across  the  exchange 
area. Even in small exchanges the optimal netw ark structure requires the deployrrent of 
rerrote switching units. As a result,  the maxirrum average loop length in the sarrple is 
3.2  km which  is  rather  short corrpared  with the  0.97  km  for the  extrerrely  densely 
populated inner districts of Cologne at the other end of the spectrum. One should note 
that the deployrrent of rerrote switches or rerrote concentrators leads  to  a shift from 
line  related  to traffic related  costs.  This  trade off is  reflected  in  the  rrodel calculations 
since it is throughout assurred that each custorrer generates a certain arrount of traffic. 
Optinisation  is  done over total  netw ark costs which include access and  conveyance, 
not over access cost alone. The results suggest that additional investrrent in switches, 
especially  in  rerrote  units  that  one  night  judge  at  a  first  glance  as  a  kind  of 
overinvestrrent, is within certain linits outweighed by the obtained savings in loop costs. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  67 
Table  2.3.3.3.-2  shows  average  network usage  costs  per  ninute.  The  values  were 
calculated  in  the following manner:  The  annual cost for switching equiprrent and  inter-
office  transnission  was  reduced  by  the  fraction  of  switch  costs  which  is  directly 
attributable to access. The residual was then divided by total network usage ninutes per 
year.  To  obtain that nurrber, we assurred that busy-hour traffic makes  up for 10 % of 
total daily traffic and that the busy-hour can occur on 250 days per year. For the sake of 
sirrplicity we assurre all non-line related switch costs to be traffic sensitive. Doing this, 
we neglect the  fact that sw itch  technology  exhibits  indivisibilities  w hich  lead  to  fixed 
costs, especially costs for the central processor and the switching network. These may 
vary  significantly  between  system manufacturers  according  to  the  offered  degree  of 
rrodularity. 
Table 2.3.3.3-2:  Network usage costs 
Name of  Local network usage costs 
German  per minute 
municipality  high cost  I medium cost  I  low cost 
Cents of an ECU 
Llchtenau  1.26  1.11  0.79 
NOrvenich  0.85  0.74  0.52 
Wachtberg  0.52  0.45  0.30 
Meckenheim  0.32  0.28  0.19 
Herdecke  0.26  0.22  0.14 
Euskirchen  0.25  0.21  0.14 
Cologne  0.20  0.17  0.11 
Source: WIK 
The  costs  per  mnute  reported  above  should  be  interpreted  as  an  average  that 
corrprises  three different types  of usage,  narrely  usage for locals  calls  that originate 
and terninate at the sarre switch, usage for locals calls that originate and terninate at 
different  switches  but  within  the  local  exchange  area,  and  network usage  for  long-
distance calls.  They  fall  in  a range  between  1.26  cents  of an  ECU  for the  smallest 
exchange  in  the  high  cost country  case  and  0.11  cents  of an  ECU  for  the  largest 
exchange in the low  cost country case. As is not surprising, usage costs are highest for 
small  exchanges  and  decrease with exchange size.  One  reason  lies  in  the described 
trade  off between the  cost of access  and  the  cost of conveyance that in  the  balance 
leads  to  the deployrrent of little  utilised  rerrote switching  units.  Another  is  that in  the 
context of the  rrodel  even  the  smallest  exchanges  are  served  by  at least  one  host 
switch, which as rrentioned exhibits fixed costs.  In these cases one can argue that the 
area  of optinisation  has  been  chosen  too  small.  Indeed  it was found  that  it  can  be 
econonical to serve small exchanges in rural areas with rerrote switching units which 
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In  closing  the  discussion  of this  section,  we erll>hasise  again  that  the  cost figures 
presented  above  are estimates  based  on  rrodel  calculations.  They  provide  what we 
consider  realistic  estimates  for  ranges  of  costs  for  the  two  service  categories  in 
question, given different labour cost levels and densities of networks. In concrete cases, 
estimates would have to  be  derived on  the  basis  of a rrodel adjusted to the particular 
country using input data that reflect the  real  cost situation as  closely  as  possible.  The 
cost estimates are for retail services as the focus of this study is on the cost of services 
brought  to  the  final  custorrer.  They  include  custorrer  specific  costs  and  are  for 
corrbinations  of network corll>onents  different from those  required,  for exarrple,  for 
interconnection services at the local level. 
Appendix  C will provide  a rrore  detailed  discussion  of model  results,  in  particular  in 
respect of the increrrental costs of subsets of subscribers. Here we conclude from the 
discussion above: 
1.  An analytical cost model can be used to calculate directly the Long Run lncrerrental 
Costs both for access and for local network traffic. 
2.  In  the  high  cost country  case,  average monthly  subscriber access  costs fall  in  a 
range  between  15.5  ECU  for very  low  and  7.5  ECU  for high  subscriber density 
networks, and  in the low  cost case, correspondingly  in the range between 9.7 and 
5.1  ECU. 
3.  In the high cost country case, local network usage costs per ninute fall in  a range 
between  1.26 cents  and  0.2  cents  of an  ECU,  and  in  the  low  cost country  case, 
correspondingly between 0.8 cents and 0.1  cents. 
4.  If our benchmark calculations have led to cost levels that appear rroderate to low, it 
should  still  be  kept  in  nind that sorre of the cost estimates  m.Jst  be  considered 
conservative as  the  results  are  based  on  historical accounting  data  for operating 
expenses and assurre no cost sharing between USO and non-USO services. 
2.3.4  Surrrrary staterrent of steps to be undertaken by the NRA 
Chapter 2 has  been a rather extensive discussion on the question of the approach that 
the  NRA  should  take  for  the  deternination  of  the  costs  of  USO  services.  The 
extensiveness is a tribute to the corrplexity of the problem. The material covered ranges 
from  the  conceptual  problems  of  w hy  a  cost  standard  reflecting  efficient  service 
provision should  be  used  and  what this  standard would be,  to  associated  accounting 
issues  and  issues  concerning  network structure,  to  the  practical questions  of actually 
obtaining cost estimates reflecting the required standards. 
All this needs to be sut11TBrised into a set of prescriptions that can be followed when the 
actual work of cost deternination has  to be undertaken by  an  NRA.  Below, we list the Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  69 
steps  that rrust be  carried out in  order to  obtain  good  cost rreasures caused by  the 
provision of USO services. This list forrrs the closing set of conclusions to the chapter: 
1.  Data on the costs of all potentially unecononic areas, unecononic custorrers living 
in  econonic  areas,  and  public  pay  phones  should  be  requested  from the  USO 
provider. Cost data should be based on the LRIC standard. Since an analytical cost 
accounting  system will probably  not be  available,  it should  be  requested  that the 
cost information are to be based on special studies using sal'll>le data. 
2.  As a check on the data provided by  the network operator,  benchmark calculations 
with analytical cost rmdels should be initiated. The rmdels used should incorporate 
the  accounting  standards  necessary  to  get estimates  of an  efficient provision  of 
service. 
Even  if the nurrber of local areas to be covered is  large,  the effort to calculate the 
cost of subscriber lines  and  calls  for each of the  prospective unecononic areas 
would be rmderate. Many of the data required for this costing exercise are normally 
in the public domain. 
3.  For deriving total  cost figures,  volurre figures  need  to  be  obtained  from the USO 
provider, i.e.: 
- volurre of business and residential local, national and international calls at 
different tirres of the day, 
- volurre of interconnect calls, outgoing and inconing, at different tirres of the 
day, 
- the nurrber of subscriber lines of unecononic custorrers in econonic areas 
classified according to the cost per subscriber that could be avoided (in rrost 
cases this should only be variable costs, see the discussion in Section 2.3.3.1), 
As regards call volurre figures, these are essentially the sarre that are going to be 
discussed  in  Chapter  3  in  the  context  of  assessing  revenues.  Here  they  are 
addressed as a COI'll>Onent of total cost. 
4.  The data supplied by the USO provider will have to be verified whether they reflect 
the  considerations  discussed above  in  Sections  2.3.1  and  2.3.2.  This  rreans  in 
particular whether the following applies: 
- a rigorous application of the LRIC standard; 
- use of Current Cost Accounting; 
- use of the proper depreciation policy; 
- use of the proper cost of capital; 
- inclusion of no rrore capacity reserves as required for accomrmdating realistic 
future demand; 
- inclusion of services not falling under the USO to trace the effects of shared use 
of facilities on increrrental costs; 
- incorporation of access, switch and transnission technology that either is the 70  Study for the European Cormission 
cost nininising one for the exchange area in question or, if this is the regulatory 
perspective taken, of the technology currently used by the operator. 
5.  Great care should  be  exercised  in  the  deternination of the  cost of USO  service 
provision  and  for  this  purpose  in  carrying  out  the  tasks  listed  above.  If  the 
organisation of the NRA has not sufficient expertise for this at its disposal, it should 
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3  The Approach to Revenue in the Net Cost Calculation 
3.1  The problem to be solved 
If  custol113rs  were disconnected  or public  pay  phones  withdraw n,  revenues  would be 
foregone  as  well.  VVhen  analysing  whether  areas,  custol113r  classes  or  public  pay 
phones are unecononic, those revenues should be deducted from the avoidable costs 
since they reduce the financial loss due to USOs. 
V\lhen calculating universal service costs, the unit of analysis should not be an individual 
custol113r  or  individual  public  pay  phone.  Rather,  the  analysis  should  look  at  all 
custol113rs  within a particular area or all  custol113rs  belonging  to a particular category. 
Likewise,  we should  focus  on  particular  categories  of  public  pay  phones.  As  the 
appropriate size of  an  area  that could  be  unecononic we have defined  an  exchange 
area which is  the  area that is  directly  served  either  by  a parent local sw itch  or  by  a 
rerrote  concentrating/switching  unit.  Custol113r  categories  should  be  defined  by  tariff 
options or special sche1113s,  beneficiaries of voucher schel113s where applicable, and by 
bill segments (by 5 ECU steps).  A.Jblic  pay phones should be categorised according to 
revenue segl113nts and type of area where the pay phone is located. 
In  order  to  calculate  universal  service  costs,  disaggregated  data  on  revenues  are 
needed for each potentially unecononic area, customer category and category of public 
pay  phones.  In  contrast,  there is  no  need  for revenue information  on  individual areas, 
categories of custorrers or public pay  phones that can be considered to be econonic 
from the outset.  ~ is  sufficient to  analyse econonic areas,  categories of customers or 
public pay phones as a whole. 
~ should  be  noted  that  in  this  chapter,  we are  looking  at  revenues  foregone  from 
disconnecting  an  unecononic  area,  a  category  of  unecononic  customers  or 
unecononic public pay phones. If, for exarrple, service is w ithdraw n from several areas, 
the total revenues foregone are not sirrply calculable as the sum of revenues foregone 
of  individual  areas.  Sirrply  sunning  up  revenues  foregone  would  result  in  calls 
exchanged  between  unecononic  areas  being  counted  tw ice.  Hence  total  revenues 
foregone  would  be  overstated.  Likewise,  revenues  from  unecononic  custorrer 
categories would lead to calls exchanged between customers being counted twice. The 
procedure to correct for double countings is described in Chapter 4. 
We conclude: 
1.  VVhen measuring the universal service cost, revenues foregone from disconnecting 
areas, and categories of custorrers and public pay phones m.Jst be set against the 
long-run avoidable costs. 
2.  As  unit  of  analysis  for  revenues  foregone,  NRAs  should  use  exchange  areas, 
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schemes where applicable, bill segments, etc.) and public pay phone categories (by 
revenue segments and types of area). 
3.  USO providers  should  subnit disaggregated data on  revenues  for each potentially 
uneconorric  area,  customer  category  and  category  of  public  pay  phones.  In 
contrast, there is  no need for revenue information on individual areas, categories of 
customers  or  public  pay  phones that can  be considered  to  be econorric from the 
outset.  It is sufficient to analyse econorric areas, categories of customers or public 
pay phones as a whole. 
3.2  Revenues foregone of areas 
Revenues  foregone  for  a  (potentially  uneconorric)  area  A  should  be  calculated  as 
follows: 
Access and outgoing call revenues 
+  lncorring call revenues 
+  Called-party-pays revenues 
+  Interconnect revenues 
Revenues from replacement calls 
=  Revenues foregone if area A were disconnected 
Access and outgoing call revenues of area A are revenues billed to customers  in  area A 
that include 
•  (annualised) connection charges and line rentals, 
•  outgoing call revenues from local and long-distance calls as well as from international 
calls (net of outpayments to foreign operators). 
lncorring  call  revenues  of area A are  revenues  billed  to  customers  in  other  areas  for 
calls made to customers in area A. 
Called-party-pays revenues of area A are revenues billed to customers in other areas for 
calls made by customers in area A, such as calls to freephone nurrbers. 
Interconnect revenues  of area A are revenues  billed  to other operators  for transporting 
calls to and from customers in area A. 
Not the full  arrount of those  revenues  would  be foregone  if an  individual area A were 
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area A w auld be replaced by calls from or to lines (or public pay phones) in other areas. 
Revenues from such replacerrent calls  have to be deducted from the revenues  above 
since they reduce the arrount of revenue foregone. 
Access and outgoing call revenues 
The NRAs should require the USO provider to subrrit data on access and outgoing call 
revenues for each (potentially) unecononic area.  Ideally, the NRA would obtain for each 
of  the  areas  in  question  individually  rreasured  figures,  both  for  revenues  and  the 
underlying volurres  of calls.  ~ is  unrealistic,  however, to  expect that this  kind  of finely 
disaggregated  data  are  available  so  that  the  NRA  should  be  prepared  to  accept 
estimates prepared on the basis of representative data. We recorrrrend that estimates 
are  prepared  on  the  basis  of  the  following  information  to  be  provided  by  the  USO 
provider:38 
•  Average number of (outgoing)  call minutes per line,  differentiated by distance and 
time of day,  separately for residential and business customers.  ~can be  expected 
that  nation-wide  averages  are  available  from the  USO  provider's  records.  These 
averages would have to be adjusted on the basis  of specific information concerning 
the  different  geotypes  of  potentially  unecononic  areas.  The  adjustrrents  would 
normally affect the total nurrber of calls as well as the pattern of calls.  For example, 
in  low  incorre areas  nurrber of calls would be lower than the national average, and 
evidence from the  UK suggests that calling  rates  from low -density areas  are about 
10 % higher than the  national average.  39  Evidence  on  the  variation  of call  patterns 
across different types  of area should  be derived from representative surveys of the 
USO provider's custorrers. 
•  Number of lines in  each area for residential and business customers.  To  be  taken 
from USO provider's records. 
•  Average access revenues (annualised connection charge and rental) per  line. 
•  Average revenue per call minute by distance (local,  national,  international)  and time 
of  day of  call.40 
On  the basis  of this  information,  access and  outgoing  call revenues  can be estimated 
for each (potentially) unecononic area. Access revenues of area A are given by: 
38  See Oftel (1997), for a simlar procedure. 
39  See Analysys (1995), Annexes, p. 25. 
40  Average  revenue  per  minute  of  an  international  call  should  be  net  of  outpayrnents  to  foreign 
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Average access revenues per line 
x  Nurrber of lines in area A 
=  Access revenues of area A 
On the basis of the information described above,  outgoing  call revenues of area A can 
be  calculated for each type of custorrer (residential or business)  for different types  of 
call defined by  distance (local,  long-distance,  international)  and  tirre of day,  and  taking 
into account the geotype of the area (density of subscribers) as: 
Average revenues per call ninute 
x  Average nurrber of (outgoing) call ninutes per line 
x  Nurrber of lines in area A 
=  Outgoing call revenues of area A 
Incoming call revenues 
Data  on  inconing  call  revenues  are  unlikely  to  be  available  for individual  areas  and 
should, therefore, be estimated starting from outgoing call ninutes per line.  Until further 
evidence becomes available, the nurrber of inconing call ninutes per line could be set 
equal to the nurrber of outgoing call ninutes. It could also be assumed that call patterns 
of inconing and outgoing calls are identical. 
Since we are interested in the nurrber of ninutes from calls made by customers outside 
area A to customers in area A, we cannot set the full arrount of outgoing call ninutes of 
customers  in  area  A  equal  to  inconing  call  ninutes.  The  share  of  local  traffic  that 
remains  w ithin  area  A  has  to  be  deducted  from average  outgoing  call  ninutes.  This 
w auld  be  relatively  easy  where unecononic areas  make  up  corrplete local netw arks, 
w hich is  not an  unlikely case for rural parts of the country.  In  this  case intra-area calls 
comprise  all  local  calls,  and  in coning  call  ninutes  of area  A  can  be  calculated  as 
outgoing call ninutes less ninutes from local calls, or simply: ninutes of outgoing long-
distance and  international calls.  If  the  unecononic area  is  part of a larger area w ith  a 
local calling  rate,  the share of internal  local calling  w auld  have to  be estimated  on  the 
basis of the nurrber of custorrers in the potentially unecononic area as  a share of the 
total nurrber of customers with whom local calling is possible. 
lnconing  call  revenues  of  area  A  should  be  calculated  for  each  type  of  customer 
(residential or business), for different types of call defined by distance and tirre of day, 
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Average revenues per call ninute 
x  Average nurrt>er of ninutes per line from outgoing calls less average nurrt>er 
of ninutes per line from local calls (or a proportion of if several exchange areas 
make up a local network) 
x  Nurrt>er of lines in area A 
=  lnconing call revenues of area A 
Revenues from interconnect calls 
The usa provider should also provide information on revenues from interconnect calls. 
Data to be subnitted to the NRA should comprise: 
•  Average number of  minutes per line from interconnect calls to and from the area. 
•  Average revenue per minute of  an interconnect call. 
Using the information above, interconnect revenues can be calculated for each area as: 
Average revenues per ninute of an interconnect call 
x  Average nurrber of ninutes per line from interconnect calls 
x  Nurrber of lines in area A 
=  Interconnect revenues of area A 
Called-party pays revenue 
The usa provider should also provide estimates for called-party-pays  revenues  on  an 
area-by-area basis. 
Replacement call revenue 
In  order  to  arrive  at  the  relevant  arrount  of  revenues  foregone,  revenues  from 
replacement  calls  have to  be  deducted  from all  four revenue  components.  The  NRA 
should  require  the  usa  provider  to  subnit information  on  the  likely  arrount  of call 
replacement that would errerge if an  area were disconnected. A  priori,  the  ability  of a 
disconnected customer to replace calls will depend on a nurrt>er of factors, such as  (a) 
ease of access to alternative lines  belonging  to friends  or neighbours, to w ork phones 
and  public  pay  phones;  (b)  difficulties associated with compensating customers to the 
lines  on  which  replacerrent  calls  are  made;  and  (c)  the  degree  of  substitutability 76  Study for the European Coi'TI11ssion 
between day tirre calls and after hour calls.41  Oftel, for exarrple, proposes the following 
replacerrent rates for outgoing and incomng calls if an area is disconnected:42 
•  Share of outgoing calls replaced:  0-20%. 
•  Share of incomng calls replaced:  0-10%. 
The replacerrent rates proposed by Oftel provide a reasonable starting point until further 
evidence  becorres  available.  The  rates  reflect the  fact that  it  is  rrore  difficult for a 
subscriber on the network to  reach a disconnected custorrer than for a disconnected 
custorrer to make a call to another subscriber. This  is  why it can be expected that the 
degree of call  replacerrent for incomng  calls  is  significantly  lower than  for outgoing 
calls. 
Finally,  it should  be  taken  into  account that a  proportion  of replacerrent calls  will be 
made  to  and  from  lines  operated  by  corrpeting  operators.  Revenues  from  such 
replacerrent  calls  do  not  reduce  the  USO  provider's  revenues  foregone.  The  USO 
provider's  market share should  be taken  as  a proxy for the proportion of replacerrent 
calls that are made from and to lines belonging to the USO provider.43 
Section 3.5 will provide a sarrple calculation for a hypothetical area showing in detail the 
different steps that need to be taken. 
3.3  Revenues foregone for customer classes 
Revenues  foregone for each  potentially  uneconorric custorrer category  C should  be 
calculated as follows  :44 
Access and outgoing call revenues 
+  lncorring call revenues 
+  Galled-party-pays revenues 
+  Interconnect revenues 
Revenues from replacerrent calls 
=  Revenues foregone if custorrer category C were disconnected 
41  See Cave, Milne and Scanlan (1994), pp. 34-36. 
42  See Oftel (1997), Detailed explanatory notes, p. 8. 
43  A better proxy would be the share of economc customers served by the universal service provider. 
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Access and outgoing call revenues 
The NRAs should require the  USO provider to subnit data on access and outgoing call 
revenues for each potentially  unecononic custorrer category (defined by  tariff scherre 
and  annual  bill  segrrent).  Ideally,  the  NRA  would  obtain  for  each  of  the  custorrer 
categories  in  question  individually  rreasured  figures,  both  for  revenues  and  the 
underlying volurres of calls.  As in the case of areas,  it is  unrealistic to expect that this 
kind  of finely  disaggregated  data  are  available  and  the  NRA  should  also  in  this  case 
accept estimates  prepared  on  the  basis  of representative data.  We  recorrrrend that 
estimates  are prepared  on  the  basis  of the following inforrration to  be  provided by  the 
usa provider:45 
•  Average  number of (outgoing)  call minutes  per line  for residential customers,  by 
distance and time of day.  Available nation-w ide averages w ould  have to be adjusted 
on the basis  of specific inforrration concerning the different categories  of potentially 
unecononic custorrers. As in  the case of areas,  the  adjustrrents would affect the 
total  nurrt>er  of calls  as  well as  the  patterns  of calls.  Evidence  on  the  variation  of 
nurrt>er  of calls  and  call  patterns  across  different custorrer categories  should  be 
derived from representative surveys of the usa provider's custorrers. 
•  Number of  customers in each category. To be taken from USO provider's records. 
•  Average access revenues (annualised connection charge and rentals) per line. 
•  Average revenue per call minute by distance (local,  national,  international)  and time 
of  day of  call.  46 
On  the basis  of this  inforrration, access and  outgoing call  revenues  can be estirrated 
for each (potentially)  unecononic category of custorrers. Access costs of category  C, 
for example, Light User Scherre custorrers, can be calculated as 
Average access revenues per custorrer 
x  Number of custorrers in category C 
=  Access revenues of category C 
Outgoing call revenues of category C can be calculated for each type of call defined by 
distance and tirre of day, as 
Average revenues per call ninute 
45  See Oftel (1997), for a similar procedure. 
46  Average  revenue  per  minute  of  an  international  call  should  be  net  of outpayments  to  foreign 
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x  Average nunt>er of call rrinutes per line 
x  Nunt>er of lines in category C 
=  Outgoing call revenues of category C 
Incoming call revenues 
Data on incorring call revenues should be estirrated starting with the assurllltion that, 
for a residential customer, the average nunt>er of incorring call rrinutes is equal to the 
average  nunt>er  of  outgoing  call  rrinutes.  lncorring  call  revenues  for  category  C 
customers can then be calculated for each type of call defined by distance (local,  long-
distance, international) and time of day, and taking into account particular characteristics 
of the category, as 
Average revenues per call rrinute 
x  Average nunt>er of (outgoing) call rrinutes per line 
x  Nunt>er of lines in category C 
=  lncorring call revenues of customers in category C 
Revenues from interconnect calls and called-party-pays calls 
The  USO  provider  should  also  provide  estirrates  on  revenues  foregone  from 
interconnect calls and called-party-pays calls. 
Replacement call revenue 
The  replacement rates  used for customer categories  should  be  higher than those for 
areas. Oftel, for exarrple, proposes the following replacement rates:47 
•  Share of outgoing calls replaced:  0-40 °/o. 
•  Share of incorring calls replaced:  0-20%. 
As it is  the case for areas, we can expect the degree of call replacement for in coning 
calls  to  be  significantly  lower than  for outgoing  calls.  The  levels  of call  replacement, 
however,  are  likely  to  be  higher  for  individual  unecononic  customers  than  for 
uneconorric  areas.  Rrst,  the  ability  of a former  customer  to  use  alternative  lines  is 
affected  by  the  extent  that  neighbouring  customers  are  also  disconnected. 
47  See Oftel (1997), Detailed explanatory notes, p. 9. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  79 
Disconnected customers  in  a given area will have less difficulty in  finding  access to  a 
neighbour's or friend's  phone,  or to  a public  call box,  if the area remains  being  served 
corrpared  to  a  situation  where  the  area  is  disconnected.  Second,  unecononic 
customers  in  econonic areas  are typically  those with lower incomes  and  lower billed 
revenues.  Since,  for those customers,  the  nunt>er  of outgoing  and  inconing  calls  is 
small,  the share of essential calls  is likely to be relatively higher. As a consequence, the 
level of call replacement for individual customers  in  econonic areas  is  higher than for 
customers in unecononic areas. 
Again,  a  certain  proportion  of  replacement  calls  w auld  be  made  from  and  to  lines 
provided by corrpetitors. Revenues  that accrue to corrpetitors do not reduce the USO 
provider's revenue foregone figure and hence should not be deducted for the calculation 
of universal service costs. The market share of the USO provider can serve as a proxy 
for the proportion of replacement calls  that w auld  be  made from lines  provided  by  the 
usa provider.48 
The  sarrple  calculation  for  a  hypothetical  area  in  Section  3.5,  showing  in  detail  the 
different  steps  that  need  to  be  taken,  can  also  serve  as  exarrple  for  unecononic 
customer groups since there are no essential differences in the procedure. 
3.4  Revenues foregone for public pay phones 
Finally,  when looking  at  the  universal  service  costs  of  public  pay  phones,  revenues 
foregone have to  be  set against avoidable costs.  If  a category  P of public  pay  phones 
were withdrawn, the following revenues w auld be foregone: 
Outgoing call revenues 
+  Called-party-pays revenues 
Revenues from replacement calls 
=  Revenues foregone if category P of public pay phones were disconnected 
Outgoing call revenues of category P of pay phones are revenues collected for local and 
national calls and for international calls (net of outpayrrents to foreign operators). 
Called-party-pays  revenues  of  category  P pay  phones  are  revenues  billed  to  other 
customers  for calls  made  from category  P pay  phones,  such  as  calls  to  freephone 
numbers. 
48  A better proxy would be the share of econonic customers served by the universal service provider. 80  Study for the European CoiTITlission 
lnconing call revenues billed to other custorrers for calls rrade to public pay phones are 
onitted from the calculation since they  are either negligible or non-existent.  Revenues 
from interconnect calls  can  also  be  neglected  if  the  incurrbent operator  is  the  USO 
provider. 
Again,  if  service were w ithdraw n from a public  pay  phone,  sorre of the calls  would be 
replaced by  using other lines. The replacerrent call revenues have to be deducted from 
the revenue corrponents above. 
Outgoing call revenues collected 
The  USO  provider  should  subnit data  on  outgoing  call  revenues  for each  class  of 
potentially  unecononic public  pay  phones.  For the estimates,  the following inforrration 
should be obtained: 
•  Average number of (outgoing)  call minutes per public pay phone,  by distance and 
time of  day.  Representative data on nurrber of calls and call patterns across different 
classes of pay  phones  can only  be obtained from the  records of the  USO provider. 
The data should be sufficiently differentiated to be able to sort potentially unecononic 
pay phones into the different classes. 
•  Number of public pay phones in  each category.  To  be  taken  from USO  provider's 
records. 
•  Average revenue per call minute by distance (local,  national,  international)  and time 
of  day of  call.  49 
On  the  basis  of this  inforrration,  outgoing  call  revenues  can  be  estirrated  for each 
(potentially)  unecononic  category  of  public  pay  phones.  Outgoing  call  revenues  of 
category P  can  be  calculated  for each  type  of call  defined  by  distance  (local,  long-
distance, international) and tirre of day as 
49  Average  revenue  per  minute  of  an  international  call  should  be  net  of  outpayments  to  foreign 
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average revenues per call ninute 
x  average nuni:>er of call ninutes per public pay phone 
x  nuni:>er of public pay phones in category P 
=  outgoing call revenues of category P of public pay phones 
The  sarrple  calculation  for  a hypothetical  area  in  Section  3.5,  showing  in  detail  the 
different steps that need  to  be  taken,  can  also  serve as  exarrple for unecononic pay 
phones since there are no essential differences in the procedure. 
Surrrring up the information requirerrents for calculating revenues foregone described 
in Chapter 3, we conclude: 
1.  The NRA should require the USO provider to subnit the following information for (a) 
each  potentially  unecononic  area,  (b)  each  potentially  unecononic  category  of 
custorrers and (c) each potentially unecononic category of public pay phones: 
- Access revenues50 and outgoing call revenues 
- lnconing call revenues51 
- Called-party-pays revenues 
- Interconnect revenues 52 
2.  Access  and  outgoing  call  revenues  should  be  estimated  on  the  basis  of  the 
following information to be provided to the NRA: 
- Average nuni:>er of (outgoing)  call ninutes per line for residential and  business 
custorrers, by distance and tirre of day, and by geotype of area 
- Average nuni:>er of (outgoing) call ninutes per public pay phone, by distance and 
tirre of day, and by revenue segrrent and location of public pay phone 
- Nuni:>er of lines in each potentially unecononic area, for residential and business 
custorrers 
- Nuni:>er of lines in each potentially unecononic category of custorrers 
- Nuni:>er  of public  pay  phones  in  each  potentially  unecononic category  of pay 
phones 
- Average access revenues  per line (  annualised connection fees  and  rentals)  for 
different categories of custorrers 
- Average revenues per call ninute by distance and tirre of day 
- Average revenues per call ninute per public pay phone 
Where  information  cannot  be  taken  directly  from the  USO  provider's  records,  it 
should be derived from representative custorrer surveys. 
50  Not for public pay phones. 
51  May be neglected for public pay phones. 
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3.  lncorring  call  revenues  should  be  estimated  on  the  basis  of  evidence  on  the 
relationship  between  outgoing  and  incorring  calls  for  customers.  lncorring  call 
revenues  of  an  area  do  not  include  revenues  from  intra-area  calls.  To  enable 
estimates of intra-area calls, the usa provider should subrrit information on 
- average nurrber of rrinutes from local calls per residential and business line,  by 
time of day, and by subscriber density of area and 
- w hether a single exchange area makes up the local network, or w hether the local 
network comprises several exchange areas. 
4.  usa providers should also subrrit information on 
- called-party-pays calls and 
- interconnect calls. 
5.  NRAs  should require the  USa provider to  subrrit evidence on  the  likely  degree of 
call replacement if areas or customer categories were disconnected. Estimates on 
the degree of call replacement should be based on consumer surveys. 
3.5  Sample calculation for net revenues foregone of  an area 
Table 3.5-1  provides a sample calculation of revenues foregone for a particular area.  In 
the calculation, it is assumed that 
•  the nurrber of lines in the area is 3,000 lines, 
•  the  replacement  rates  are  0.15  for revenues  from outgoing  calls  and  called-party-
pays call, 0.05 for revenues from incorring calls, and 0.10 for interconnect calls. 
The  table  shows  for  the  area  the  net  revenues  foregone  made  up  of  access  call 
revenues,  outgoing  call  revenues,  incorring call  revenues,  interconnect revenues  and 
called-party-pays revenues, each after deduction of replacement call revenues. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  83 
Table 3.5-1:  Sarrple calculation for annual revenues foregone of area A 
ECU 
1  Average connection fee per line (annualised)  2 
2  Average rental per line  58 
3  Average access call revenues per line  60 
4  Access call revenues of area (60 x 3,000)  180,000 
5  Average revenues per line from outgoing local calls  34 
6  Average revenues per line from outgoing long-distance calls  53 
7  Average revenues per line from outgoing international calls  9 
8  Average revenues per line from outgoing calls  96 
9  Average replacement call revenues per line at a replacement rate of 0.15  14.4 
10  Average outgoing call revenues per line,  net of replacement call  81.6 
revenues 
11  Outgoing call revenues of area, net of replacement call revenues  244,800 
(81.6 X 3,000) 
12  Average incoming call revenues per line if set at average outgoing call  62 
revenues per line (ECU 96) less average revenues per line from local 
calls (ECU 34) 
13  Average replacement call revenue per line at a replacement rate of 0.05  3.1 
14  Average incoming call revenues per line,  net of replacement call  58.9 
revenues 
15  Incoming call revenues of area, net of replacement call revenues  176,700 
(58.9 X 3,000) 
16  Average interconnect revenues per line  2 
17  Average replacement call revenues per line at a replacement rate of 0.10  0,2 
18  Average interconnect revenues per line,  net of replacement call revenues  1,8 
19  Interconnect revenues of area, net of replacement call revenues  5,400 
(1.8 X 3,000) 
20  Average revenues per line from called-party-pays calls  1 
21  Average replacement call revenues per line at a replacement rate of 0.15  0,15 
22  Average revenues per line from called-party-pays calls, net of  0,85 
replacement call revenues 
23  Called-party-pays revenues of area, net of replacement call  2,550 
revenues (0.85 x 3,000) 
24  Total revenues foregone of area (sum of lines 4,  11,  15, 19 and 23)  609,450 84  Study for the European CorT'Ilission 
4  Net costs of USOs 
4.1  The problem to be solved 
After the discussion of potentially avoidable costs of USO services in Chapter 2 and of 
corresponding  potentially  foregone  revenues  in  Chapter  3,  it  remains  to  derive  the 
resulting net costs. For this, two steps are required, first deriving the  direct net cost by 
bringing the two strands of analysis  in Chapters 2 and 3 together, deducting from costs 
of USO services the relevant revenue figures, and second, to deduct from the resulting 
direct net cost figure  the  value  of the  indirect  benefits  that  are  flowing  to  the  USO 
provider due to this status, to obtain the overall net cost. 
Section 4.2 will discuss the steps that are needed to obtain the direct net cost of USO 
services. This involves the following: 
•  For  potentially  unecononic areas,  unecononic customers  and  unecononic public 
pay  phones,  the  matching  of  per  unit  cost  of  services  with  relevant  volumes  of 
services and deducting from them corresponding revenues foregone. 
•  The  deternination  of the  areas,  customers  and  public  pay  phones  that would  be 
unecononic according to the difference between costs and  revenues deternined in 
the step above. 
•  For  both  uneconomic  areas  and  unecononic customers,  the elinination  of double 
counted inconing call revenue to obtain both the final nurrber of unecononic areas 
and unecononic customers and the corresponding arrounts of direct net costs. 
Note that the elinination of double counted inconing call revenue can only be carried out 
after the unecononic areas  and  customers  are already  identifiable  - since the  double 
counted income relates to calls made from'by them- so that for this reason the step can 
be undertaken only at this point in the analysis. 
In  Section  4.3  we will  analyse  how  to  deternine  the  value  of  indirect  benefits  and 
discuss the steps that need to be undertaken. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations 
4.2  Determining the direct net cost of uneconomic areas, uneconomic 
customers and uneconomic public pay phones 
4.2.1  Unecononic areas 
4.2.1.1  Calculation according to the sirll'le difference between costs and revenues 
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The following are the elerrents needed to deternine the direct net cost of unecononic 
areas (before elinination of double counted inconing call revenue (see Section 4.2.1.2), 
but after elinination  of those  areas  that  are  econonic  in  the  long  run  (see Section 
4.3.1)): 
•  A listing of all potentially uneconomic areas each with its nurmer of subscriber lines. 
•  For  each  of  the  potentially  unecononic  areas,  the  average  annual  cost  per 
subscriber  line, either 
- for each area individually (as for exarll'le derived from an analytical cost rmdel), 
or 
- if areas are grouped according to density, the average for each such group (as 
provided by the USO provider or derived from an analytical cost rmdel). 
•  Volumes  of outgoing calls,  i.e.  local,  national  long-distance  (according  to  different 
distance bands) and international calls at different tirres of the day, as an average per 
subscriber line, either- depending on availability- for 
- each of the potentially unecononic areas individually, or 
- each group of uneconomc areas, or 
- as an average over all unecononic areas, or 
- as a national average over all areas, uneconomc and economc ones, 
net of replacerrent calls. 
•  Estimates of the volumes of  incoming calls in the sarre detail as for outgoing calls. 
•  Volumes  of interconnect calls  to  and  from other operators•  points  of presence at 
different tirres of the day, as  an average per subscriber line,  either  -depending on 
availability - for 
- each of the potentially uneconomc areas individually, or 
- each group of uneconomc areas, or 
- as an average over all unecononic areas, or 
- as a national average over all areas, uneconomc and economc ones, 
net of replacerrent calls. 
•  Volumes of called-party-pays calls at different tirres of the day,  net of replacerrent 
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•  For each type of call (local, long-distance, international, interconnect, for different time 
zones) the corresponding costs per  minute, which rrost likely will only be available as 
a national average cost figure. 
•  For each of the different potentially unecononic areas or types of unecononic areas, 
average  revenue  per  subscriber  line  foregone  corresponding  to  the  volumes  of 
services listed above. 
The calculation of the avoidable net cost of an individual area A, if it were elininated from 
the network, is then as follows: 
Average cost of access per subscriber line times number of subscribers 
+  Average ninutes of outgoing calls per subscriber line times cost per ninute of 
calls (each for local, long-distance, and international calls and differentiated 
according to relevant time zones) times number of subscribers, net of the cost of 
replacement calls 
+  Average ninutes of inconing calls per subscriber line times cost per ninute of 
calls (differentiated as for outgoing calls above) times number of subscribers, net 
of the cost of replacement calls 
+  Average ninutes of interconnect calls per subscriber line times cost per minute 
of calls (differentiated according to relevant time zones) times number of 
subscribers, net of the cost of replacement calls 
+  Average ninutes of called-party-pays calls per subscriber line times cost per 
ninute of calls (differentiated according to relevant time zones) times number of 
subscribers, net of the cost of replacement calls 
Revenues foregone if area A were disconnected 
=  Net cost avoided if area A were disconnected 
The data on the cost per unit of service (per subscriber line or per call  ninute) will be 
available follow ing the procedures discussed  in  Chapter 2,  w hile the data on  revenues 
and on call volumes (which are demand related and therefore stand in close relationship 
w ith revenues) w ill be available follow ing the procedures presented in Chapter 3. 
Section 4.2.4 will provide sample  calculations  to  deternine the  net cost for the  same 
hypothetical area for which sarrple calculations were done in Section 3.5 in  respect of 
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We conclude: 
1.  The data that has been COrll'iled in the course of work to ascertain per unit costs as 
well as  revenues  of areas,  as  described in  Chapters  2 and  3,  should  be  used to 
calculate the net cost of an area. 
2.  The  calculations  should  always  be  in  terms  of  volurres  of service  (nurrt>er  of 
subscriber lines,  volurres of call  ninutes per subscriber lines)  times the  relevant 
per unit cost (average cost per subscriber line for the area in question, average cost 
per call ninute). In this way it can be assured that on the cost and revenue sides the 
underlying rreasures are consistent with each other. 
3.  The relevant service volurres for an unecononic area are: 
- nurrt>er of subscriber lines in the area, 
- outgoing calls per subscriber line in the area, 
- inconing calls per subscriber line in the area, 
- interconnect calls per subscriber line in the area, and 
- called-party-pays calls per subscriber line in the area, 
w here all call volurres are reduced by nurrt>er of replacerrent call ninutes. 
4.  The calculations should be carried out with the set of (potentially) unecononic areas 
that are left after elirrination of those areas that w ill not be unecononic in the long 
run (according to the life-cycle-effect test of Section 4.3.1). 
4.2.1.2  The elinination of double counted inconing call revenue from the net cost 
calculation for uneconorric areas 
As discussed  in  Chapter  3,  the  revenue  from inconing  calls  is  part of the  revenue 
attributed to a potentially  uneconorric area.  Double counting occurs because revenues 
from inconing calls that are themselves corring out of unecononic areas are counted 
there already as  outgoing calls  and  included in outgoing call revenue. Since the double 
counted  COfll>Onent  can  only  be  known with sufficient precision  after the  uneconorric 
areas  are  clearly  identified  and  since  for  this  identification  the  double  counted 
cofll>onent should itself be known already, an iterative procedure is called for. 
The procedure essentially consists of the following steps: 
•  All  areas  that are  candidates  for unecononic area status  according  to  the  sifll>le 
difference between costs and revenues should be listed. The areas should be ranked 
in descending order of the difference per subscriber line. The list should include at the 
end  areas  with  apparent  per  subscriber  line  surpluses  that  may,  how ever,  upon 
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•  The next step consists of deterrrining for each of the areas identified above the part 
of incorring call revenue that corres from the other uneconorric areas. There is  to 
our know ledge so far no erll'irical information to guide one in the setting of the share 
of double counted incorring call revenue. Therefore an approach based on plausibility 
is called for. The approach that we suggest is as follows: 
(1)  Note the number of custorrers in all uneconorric areas considered. 
(2)  Note the share of this nurmer in the total nurmer of the USO provider's custorrer 
base. 
(3)  Use  the  assurll'tion  that  in  general  the  outgoing  calls  of the  USO  providers' 
custorrers  have  an  equal  chance  to  go  to  any  other  of  the  USO  provider's 
customers. 
(4)  The assurll'tion under (3) irll'lies that in any one area an incorring call may with 
equal probability corre from any other of the custorrers of the USO provider. 
(5)  Use therefore the share defined under (2)  above as  an estimate of the share of 
incoming call volume that corres from uneconorric areas. 
(6)  Use  this  share  as  an  indicator  for the  share  in  incorring  call  revenue  that  is 
double counted and needs to be rerroved. 
•  Deducting  the  double  counted  incorring  call  revenue  as  deterrrined  above  w ill 
increase the  deficit.  It  rrust be  verified whether this  increase will shift sorre areas 
from an apparent surplus into a deficit position and make them uneconorric. 
•  The  last step w auld  consist in  verifying whether due to  a change  in  the  nurmer of 
uneconorric areas the basis  for deterrrining the share of double counted incorring 
call revenue has shifted which would require a (possibly only slight)  readjustrrent of 
the initial correction for double counted incorre. 
The  procedure is  best illustrated with an exarll'le like the one given in Table 4.2.1.2-1. 
The  exarll'le  supposes  that  there  are  24  potentially  uneconorric  areas  identified 
according to the sirrple difference between their costs and revenues. They are identified 
as  potentially  uneconorric  because that sirll'le difference is  positive,  or it  is  negative 
(rreaning that there is  a surplus and not a deficit) but close enough to zero that it could 
turn  into  a positive nurmer after adjustrrents for double  counted  items.  As described 
above,  the  ranking  is  according  to  the  difference  between  costs  and  revenues  per 
subscriber line  (  colurm  3)  as  this  per custorrer figure  is  a better  indicator for which 
potentially  uneconorric  areas  are  rrore  likely  to  turn  into  actual  net cost areas.  For 
exarll'le areas  21  and  22  have sirrilar absolute arrounts of surplus  (negative deficits, 
see colurm 4),  how ever,  the first one has  a per custorrer surplus closer to zero than 
the  second  and  is  therefore rrore susceptible to  turning  into  a net cost area than  the 
other. 
(The  exarll'le  w auld  fit  a  rather  small  country/operator  with  less  than  two  rrillion 
subscriber lines.  The  24  actually  and  potentially  uneconorric  areas  are  supposed  to 
have about 51,000 custorrers (not shown in  the table).  The table is  without its  "rriddle 
section"  covering  uneconorric  areas  4  to  15  as  this  part  is  not  relevant  for  the Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  89 
discussion and  leaving  it out facilitates  reading the table.  The  shaded elerrents  in  the 
first line indicate the area (through its sirrple difference between cost and  revenue and 
through  its  final  net cost)  that will serve as  the  exarrple for which in  Section  4.2.3 a 
sarrple calculation will be given.) 90  Study for the European CoiTTTlission 
Table 4.2.1.2-1:  ExarTl'le calculations to elimnate double counted incomng call 
revenue from uneconorric areas' net costs 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Area No.  Number of  Simple annual  First  Net cost of  Second  Net cost of 
customers  difference between cost  correction  area after  correction  area after 
and revenue  for double  first  for double  second 
per  over  counted  correction  counted  correction 
customer  customers  revenue  revenue 
in area 
ECU 
1  3,000  91  4,860  277,688  -572 
2  2,000  88  176,637  3,240  179,877  -381  179,496 
3  1,000  88  88,318  1,620  89,938  -191  89,748 
...  ...  .  ..  ...  ...  ...  .. .  .. . 
...  ...  ...  .. .  ...  ...  .. .  .. . 
"'  ...  ...  ...  ...  "'  "'  ... 
16  3,000  12  36,000  4,860  40,860  -572  40,288 
17  2,000  12  24,000  3,240  27,240  -381  26,859 
18  1,000  12  12,000  1,620  13,620  -191  13,429 
19  1,000  -1  -1,200  1,620  420  -191  229 
20  2,000  -1  -2,400  3,240  840  -381  459 
21  4,500  -1  -5,400  7,290  1,890  -858  1,032  -
22  1,000  -6  -6,000  1,620  -4,380  -16  -4,396 
23  2,000  -6  -12,000  3,240  -8,760  -32  -8,792 
24  3,000  -6  -18,000  4,860  -13,140  -48  -13,188 
In colurm 4 of the table the absolute arrounts of the siJll)le cost/revenue difference are 
shown (colurm 3 tirres column 2 which contains the nurrber of customers in the area). 
The  first round  correction of these arrounts for double counted  incorring call revenue 
occurs  in  column  5.  The  arrounts  shown there  are  calculated  here  as  3 % of the 
incorring call revenue (after deduction of costs) as the assurTl'tion is  that the share of 
the  nurrber  of custorrers  in  all  potentially  uneconorric  areas  in  relation  to  the  total 
custorrer base equals this percentage. The arrounts rrust be added to the arrounts of 
colurm  4  since  double  counted  incorring  call  revenue  reduces  costs  rrore  than 
allow able. Verifying the entries of colurm 6 showing the resulting new deficit figures, one 
observes for areas 19 to 21  that on account of the correction their surpluses have turned 
into deficits rreaning that they have to be included arrong the actual uneconorric areas. 
After the round of corrections discussed above, one needs to check whether there is the 
need for another round. This depends on whether the basis for double counted incorring 
call revenue has changed after the first round.  This  in turns depends on the nurrber of 
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now  includes areas 19 to 21  as the corrections turned their surpluses into deficits. Now, 
assurre  the  initial  double  counted  inconing  call  revenue  had  been  based  on  the 
expectation that all24 areas listed in the table would end up being uneconorric. Then the 
correction of round  1 would have included  inconing call  revenue from areas  22 to  24 
that in fact are not unecononic and therefore the correction would have been too large. 
Thus  a second correction rrust be carried out taking  back part of the first one.  This  is 
done in  colurm 7 on  the assurll>tion that the correct share is  2.65 °/o  and  not 3 °/o  as 
initially  applied.  This  second round  does  in  our case not lead  to the reclassification of 
any  of the newly found  unecononic areas  19,  20  or 21  as  each of them continues  to 
show  positive  net  costs.  Thus,  after  the  second  round  of  corrections  both  the  final 
nunt>er of unecononic areas and the total arrount of the direct net cost of these areas 
have been established. The total direct net cost is  shown by the shaded sum in colurm 
8 after area 21. 
From the above we conclude: 
1.  The  elinination of double counted  inconing call  revenue increases the calculated 
net cost of an area. This can turn a marginally surplus area into a deficit area. 
2.  V\lith no ei'Tl>irical data for an estimate for the share of double counted revenue due 
to inconing calls from unecononic areas, a pragmatic approach is to set it equal to 
the ratio of subscribers in all unecononic areas to the total nunt>er of custorrers of 
the  USO  provider.  The  reason  is  the  assurll>tion that each inconing call  has  an 
equal chance to corre from any one custorrer in the USO provider's total custorrer 
base.  Then  the  share of custorrers  in  unecononic areas  in  that total  base  is  a 
plausible estimator for the share of calls coning out of unecononic areas. 
3.  The count of unecononic areas on which to base the initial share of double counted 
inconing call revenue should include those marginal surplus areas that could turn 
into deficit areas after the adjustrrent for double counted inconing call revenue has 
been  carried  out.  A  second round  of adjustrrents will then  normally  be  necessary 
since not all of these marginal surplus areas will becorre deficit areas after the first 
round,  which rreans that the initial  ratio  of subscribers  in  suspected unecononic 
areas  to  total  custorrers,  used  to  estimate  the  double  counted  inconing  call 
revenue, was too large. 
4.2.2  Unecononic custorrers 
4.2.2.1  Calculation according to the sii'Tl>le difference between costs and revenues 
The following are the elerrents needed to deternine the direct net cost of (categories of) 
unecononic custorrers  (before elinination  of double  counted  inconing  call  revenue, 92  Study for the European Cormission 
see Section 4.2.2.2, but after elinination of those customers  that are econonic in  the 
long run, see Section 4.3.1): 
•  A listing of all potentially uneconomic customer categories, categorised according to 
their  distinguishing  characteristic  (which may  be  that they  are all  subscribers  to  a 
social tariff or some light user scheme; or that they have average bills within a given 
low  range), each with its number of  subscriber lines; 
•  For  each  of  the  potentially  unecononic  customer  categories,  the  distribution  of 
average annual cost per subscriber line that would be avoided.  The data should  be 
corrpiled  in  a  way  that  they  indicate  w hat  proportion  of  each  category  has  as 
avoidable costs 
- only variable costs, or 
- variable  costs  plus  a  part of sunk costs  because  customer  categories  are so 
clustered  within  econonic  areas  that  permanently  elininating  them  from  the 
network w auld in the long run also elininate some of this cost, or 
- the  total  average  long  run  cost  of  providing  a  subscriber  line,  which  for  an 
individual customer in an econonic area would rather be the exception. 
(See on this the discussion in Sections 2.3.1.7 and 2.3.2.4.) 
•  Volumes  of outgoing calls,  i.e.  local,  national  long-distance  (according  to  different 
distance bands) and international calls at different times of the day, as an average per 
subscriber line, either- depending on availability- for 
- each of the potentially unecononic custorrer categories individually, or 
- as an average over all unecononic customer categories, or 
- as a national average over all customers, 
net of replacement calls. 
•  Estimates of the volumes of  incoming calls in the same detail as for outgoing calls. 
•  Volumes  of interconnect calls to  and  from other  operators'  points  of presence at 
different tirres  of the day as  an  average per subscriber line,  either  - depending on 
availability - for 
- each of the potentially unecononic custorrer categories individually, or 
- as an average over all unecononic customer categories, or 
- as a national average over all custorrers, 
net of replacement calls. 
•  Volurres of called-party-pays calls  at different tirres  of the day,  net of replacerrent 
calls. 
•  For each type of call (local,  long-distance, international, for different tirre zones) the 
corresponding costs per  minute, which rrost likely will only be available as a national 
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•  For  each  of  the  different  potentially  unecononic  custorrer  categories,  average 
revenue per subscriber line foregone corresponding to the volurres of services listed 
above. 
The calculation of the avoidable direct net cost of a custorrer category C,  identified by its 
demand characteristic and its average avoidable cost, if the custorrers were not served, 
is then as follows: 
Average cost of access per subscriber line times nurrber of subscribers 
+  Average ninutes of outgoing calls per subscriber line times cost per ninute of 
calls (each for local, long-distance, and international calls and differentiated 
according to relevant tirre zones) times nurrber of subscribers, net of the cost of 
replacerrent calls 
+  Average ninutes of inconing calls per subscriber line times cost per ninute of 
calls (differentiated as for outgoing calls above) times nurrber of subscribers, net 
of the cost of replacerrent calls 
+  Average ninutes of interconnect calls per subscriber line times cost per minute 
of calls (differentiated according to relevant tirre zones) times nurrber of 
subscribers, net of the cost of replacerrent calls 
+  Average ninutes  of called-party-pays  calls  per  subscriber line  times  cost per 
ninute of calls (differentiated according to relevant tirre zones) times nurrber of 
subscribers, net of the cost of replacerrent calls 
Revenues foregone if custorrer category C were disconnected 
=  Net cost avoided if custorrer category C were disconnected 
As  in  the  case  of unecononic  areas,  the  data  on  the  cost per  unit  of service  (per 
subscriber line or per call ninute) will be available following the procedures discussed in 
Chapter 2, w hile the data on revenues and on call volurres w ill be available follow ing the 
procedures presented in Chapter 3. 
The sarrple calculation in Section 4.2.4 showing the steps leading to the net cost for a 
hypothetical area  can  also serve as  exarrple for the  calculation  of the  net cost for a 
custorrer category or a segrrent thereof. 
We conclude: 
1.  The data that has been corrpiled in the course of work to ascertain per unit costs as 
well as  revenues  of potentially  unecononic custorrer categories,  as  described in 
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2.  If  custorrers  identified  on  a first count as  belonging  to  an  unecononic custorrer 
category  live  in  unecononic areas they should  be excluded as  they  have already 
been taken into account when unecononic areas were considered. 
3.  Custorrer categories should be classified into different segrrents according to the 
extent that their avoidable costs, if not served, would differ. 
4.  The  calculations  should  always  be  in  terms  of  volurres  of service  (nurrber  of 
subscriber lines,  volumes  of call  ninutes per subscriber lines)  times the  relevant 
per unit cost (average cost per subscriber line, average cost per call ninute). In this 
way it can be assured that on the cost and revenue sides the underlying measures 
are consistent with each other. 
5.  The  relevant service volumes  for an  unecononic customer category  or segment 
are: 
- nurrber of subscriber lines in the customer category or segment, 
- outgoing calls per subscriber line in the customer category or segment, 
- incoming calls per subscriber line in the customer category or segment, 
- interconnect calls per subscriber line in the customer category or segment, and 
- called-party-pays calls per subscriber line in the area customer category or 
segrrent, 
w here all call volumes are reduced by nurrber of replacement call ninutes. 
6.  The  calculations  should  be  carried  out  with the  set  of (potentially)  unecononic 
customer categories that are left after elinination of those customers that will not be 
unecononic in the long run (according to the life-cycle-effect test of Section 4.3.1). 
4.2.2.2  The elinination of double counted inconing call revenue from the net cost 
calculation for unecononic custorrers 
Deternining  the  nurrber of unecononic  customers  and  the  amount  of the  net cost 
caused by them should be done  after the  unecononic areas  are known because this 
simplifies the procedure. The procedure regarding unecononic custorrers in econonic 
areas  is  more  complex  than  the  one  for unecononic  areas  as  the  search rrust be 
conducted  over two dimensions.  The  procedure  must look at potentially  unecononic 
custorrers on account of the average arrount of the revenue they generate as  well as 
on account of the avoidable costs and find those rmtches that end up with a net cost.  In 
doing this the problem of double counted inconing call revenue must also be taken into 
account. 
The procedure essentially consists of the following steps: 
•  Customer categories that are candidates for unecononic customer status should be 
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•  If  the listing has been prepared in away to include uneconomc custorrers that live in 
uneconomc  areas  identified  earlier  (see  Section  4.2.1),  care  should  be  taken  to 
rerrove these from the list. 
•  Each such custorrer category should be segrrented according to the arrount of cost 
that w auld be avoided if that segrrent were not served any rrore. 
•  For  each  segrrent  of  each  custorrer  category  calculate  the  simple  difference 
between costs and revenues. 
•  All  segrrents  of  custorrer  categories  that  are  candidates  for uneconomc  status 
according to the simple difference between costs and revenues should be ranked  in 
descending order of the difference per subscriber line.  Included at the end should be 
segrrents with apparent per subscriber line surpluses that may upon adjustrrent due 
to double counted incomng call revenue achieve deficit status. 
•  The  next step consists of determning for the  custorrers  in  the segrrents identified 
above  the  part  of  incomng  call  revenue  that  corres  from  other  uneconomc 
custorrers.  We  use  the  sarre  approach  that  in  Section  4.2.1.2  was  applied  to 
uneconomc areas: 
(1)  Note the total number of uneconomc custorrers considered. 
(2)  Note  the  share  of  this  number  in  the  total  number  of  the  USO  provider's 
custorrer base. 
(3)  Use  the  assumption  that  in  general  the  outgoing  calls  of the  USO  providers' 
custorrers  have  an  equal  chance  to  go  to  any  other  of the  USO  provider's 
custorrers. 
(4)  The  assumption  under (3)  implies  that for any  custorrer an  inconing call  may 
with equal probability corre from any other of the custorrers of the USO provider. 
(5)  Use therefore the share defined under (2)  above as  an estimate of the share of 
incoming call volurre that corres from unecononic areas. 
(6)  Use  this  share  as  an  indicator  for the  share  in  incomng  call  revenue  that  is 
double counted and needs to be rerroved. 
Deducting  the  double  counted  incomng  call  revenue  as  above  will  increase  the 
deficit,  and  in  particular may  shift sorre custorrer segrrents from a surplus  into  a 
deficit position and make them unecononic. 
•  The last step w auld consist in checking whether due to the correction the number of 
unecononic custorrers has changed and whether therefore the basis for determning 
the share of double counted  incomng call  revenue has  shifted.  If  this  is  the case it 
requires  a  (possibly  only  slight)  readjustrrent  of  the  initial  correction  for  double 
counted inconing call revenue. 
Double  counted  revenue  due  to  calls  between uneconomc  custorrer segrrents  and 
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the  tirre  unecononic  areas  were discussed,  the  nurrber  of  unecononic  custorrer 
segrrents were not yet know n, and above the treatrrent of double counted inconing call 
revenue  was  treated  syfl1113trically  to  the  case  of  unecononic  areas  for  easier 
understanding.  The  additional  correction  could  be  handled  in  two ways.  One  could 
proceed (a)  by removing here from unecononic custorrers' inconing call revenues the 
share  originating  with  unecononic  areas  and  (b)  by  turning  back to  the  calculations 
relating  to  unecononic areas • double counted  in coning  call  revenue  done  in  Section 
4.2.1.2  and  apply  the  further  correction  there.  The  other  way w auld  be  to  do  both 
corrections here by removing here from unecononic custorrers' inconing call revenues 
the  share  that  is  due  to  calls  originating  with  unecononic  areas  and  by  correcting 
unecononic custorrers' outgoing call revenues for that part of calls that are terninating 
in  unecononic  areas.  The  latter  approach  is  actually  the  more  convenient  one  as  it 
saves the trouble of taking up unecononic areas again. From this follows: 
•  From  the  uneconomic  customers'  inconing  call  revenue  should  be  deducted  the 
share that  is  originating  with unecononic areas.  The  share to  be  used should,  as 
before, be deternined according to the nurrber of custorrers in all unecononic areas 
to the total nurrber of the USO provider's custorrer base. The assumption, as before, 
is  that if  inconing calls  have an  equal  chance to  corre from any  custorrer of the 
USO provider, the likelihood that they corre from unecononic areas stands in relation 
to the share of all custorrers in these areas. 
•  From  the  unecononic  customers'  outgoing  call  revenue  should  be  deducted  the 
share that is terninating in unecononic areas. The share to be used should also be 
deternined according to  the  nurrber of all  custorrers  in  unecononic areas  to  the 
total number of the USO provider's custorrer base. The reason here is sinilarly that if 
unecononic  custorrers  • calls  have  an  equal  chance  to  go  to  each  of  the  USO 
provider's  custorrers,  the  likelihood  is  that  the  share  going  to  unecononic  areas 
relates to the share of custorrers in these areas. 
The procedure is illustrated by the example in Table 4.2.2.2-1. The table consists of two 
parts,  the  first,  part A,  showing different custorrer categories  and  their segrrentation 
according to levels of avoidable costs, the second, part B, ranking the different custorrer 
segrrents  according  to  the  level  of  the  apparent  per  custorrer  deficit.  In  part A we 
assurre that there are three custorrer categories that may give rise to net costs of USO 
provision:  a  light  user  scherre  (LUS)  custorrer category,  a custorrer  category  with 
average monthly  bills  of 5 to  1  0 ECU,  and  a custorrer category with average monthly 
bills  of 10 to  15 ECU.  Each is  segrrented according to the cost that may  be avoidable, 
the  assumption  here being  that for most of the  unecononic custorrers  only  variable 
costs could be expected to be avoidable (7 ECU per month), for a smaller nurrber of the 
custorrers also a certain share of the sunk plant cost (9 ECU per month), and only for a 
still  smaller  nurrber the  total  average  long-run  cost (13  ECU  per  month).  Given  the 
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second  category,  and  only  one  segrrent  of  the  third  category  have  actual  deficits 
according to the si111Jie difference between average revenue and avoidable costs. 
In  colurms 7 to  1  0 of part B,  the corrections  are carried  out.  In  colurm 7 the double 
counted  inconing call  revenue due to  calls  among  the unecononic custorrers under 
review  themselves is  shown. It is  calculated at an assurred share of 2.8 % that results 
according to the assurred share of the unecononic custorrers in  the USO provider's 
total custorrer base (the rate is chosen to be consistent with the 2.65 % that resulted for 
the  nunt>er of custorrers  used  in  the discussion concerning  unecononic areas,  see 
Table  4.2.1.2-1).  Colurm  8  makes  the  correction  for  double  counted  incorring  call 
revenue originating in the unecononic areas giving rise there to outgoing call revenue.  It 
is calculated at the rate of 2.65 % that we obtained  in Table 4.2.1.2-1  after the second 
round of corrections. Colurm 9 finally corrects for the unecononic custorrers outgoing 
calls  to  unecononic areas calculated  at the rate of 2.65  o/o  of assurred outgoing  call 
revenue. All three C0111Jonents  reduce the revenue that w auld be foregone and therefore 
increases the net cost of each custorrer segrrent considered. The result is  shown in 
colurm 1  0.  We observe that in  the exa111Jie  all  of the custorrer segrrents that initially 
showed surpluses (negative deficits) remain this way so that there is  no reason for an 
additional round of corrections. Thus  as  final result we have identified the unecononic 
custorrer segrrents  in  econonic areas as well as  the total amount of direct net cost 
that they  cause,  shown as  the  shaded  figure  in  colurm  10  after the  last custorrer 
segrrent with a positive net cost. 98  Study for the European Coi'Til'lssion 
Table 4.2.2.2-1:  Exarll>le calculations to elininate double counted call revenue from 
unecononic custorrer categories' net costs 
Designation of  Number  Average  Average  Sillllle difference 
customer category  of cust- monthly  monthly  between cost and rev.  Corrections for  Net cost of 
omers  revenue  avoidable  on annual basis  customer 
cost  double  double  outgoi"g  segment 
counted  counted  call revenue  after 
per  over  incomng  incoming  terminating  corrections 
customer  customers  can revenue  call rev.  in unecon-
in segment  internal to  originating  omic areas 
customer  in  unecon~ 
category  omic areas 
A 
Light user scheme 
(LUS) customers 
segment 1  2,500  4.5  13  8.5  255,000 
segment 2  5,000  4.5  9  4.5  270,000 
segment 3  20,000  4.5  7  2.5  600,000 
Customer category 
with 5-10 ECU 
monthly revenue 
segment 1  5,000  7.5  13  5.5  330,000 
segment 2  10,000  7.5  9  1.5  180,000 
segment 3  40,000  7.5  7  -0.5  -240,000 
Customer category 
with 10-15 ECU 
revenue 
segment 1  5,000  12.5  13  0.5  30,000 
segment 2  10,000  12.5  9  -3.5  -420,000 
segment 3  40,000  12.5  7  -5.5  -
2,640,000 
B 
LUS customers  2,500  4.5  13  8.5  255,000  840  795  398  257,033 
segment 1 
5-10 ECU  5,000  7.5  13  5.5  330,000  1,680  1,590  795  334,065 
customers 
segment 1 
LUS customers  5,000  4.5  9  4.5  270,000  1,680  1,590  795  274,065 
segment 2 
LUS customers  20,000  4.5  7  2.5  600,000  6,720  6,360  3,180  616,260 
segment 3 
5-10 ECU cusfrs  10,000  7.5  9  1.5  180,000  3.360  3,180  1,590  188,130 
segment 2 
10-15 ECU cust'rs  5,000  12.5  13  0.5  30,000  1,680  1,590  795  34,065 
segment 1 
5-10 ECU cust'rs  40,000  7.5  7  -0.5  -240,000  13,440  12,720  6,360  -207,480 
segment 3 
10-15 ECU cust'rs  10,000  12.5  9  -3.5  -420,000  3,360  3,180  1,590  -411,870 
segment 2 10-15 ECU cust'rs 
segment 3 
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From the above we conclude: 
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1.  \/\lith no errpirical data for an estimate for the share of double counted revenue due 
to in earring calls from other uneconorric custorrers, a pragmatic approach is to set 
it equal to the ratio of the  number of custorrers in  uneconorric categories to total 
number of custorrers of the USO provider. The reason is the assurrption that each 
incorring  call  has  an  equal  chance to  corre from any  one  custorrer in  the  USO 
provider's  total  custorrer  base.  Then  the  share  of  custorrers  in  uneconorric 
categories  in  that total  base is  a plausible estimator for the share of calls  earring 
from all these uneconorric custorrers. 
2.  The  calculations  for the  elinination  of  double  counted  inconing  call  revenue  for 
unecononic custorrers  should  be  done after unecononic areas  are known.  This 
facilitates  the  carrying  out  of  adjustrrents  due  to  double  counted  incorring  call 
revenue  caused  by  the  interaction  between  unecononic  custorrer  groups  and 
unecononic areas. 
4.2.3  Uneconorric public pay phones 
The following are the elerrents needed to deternine the direct net cost of unecononic 
public pay  phones  (after elinination of those pay  phones that are econorric in  the long 
run, see Section 4.3.1): 
•  A listing  of all  potentially uneconomic  public pay phones  categorised  according  to 
relevant distinguishing  characteristics  (which may  be  that they  are  prone to  heavy 
wear and tear (vandalism); or are located at places where they can generate only low 
average revenues). 
•  For each of the potentially unecononic categories of pay  phones, the  distribution of 
average  annual cost per pay phone  that  w auld  be  avoided.  The  data  should  be 
corrpiled  in  a  way  that  they  indicate  what proportion  of  each  category  has  as 
avoidable costs 
- only  the  costs  of the  booth  and  the  terninal  equipment  plus  maintenance  and 
repair,  and  no  part of the  local plant as  this  could  not have been  avoided  at the 
time of network construction, or 
- the costs as above plus the sunk costs of the local plant because the pay phones 
are sufficiently independent investment decisions that these costs could also have 
been avoided. 100  Study for the European Comnission 
•  Volumes  of outgoing  calls,  i.e.  local,  national  long-distance  (according  to  different 
distance bands) and international calls at different tirres of the day, as an average per 
pay phone, either - depending on availability - for 
- each category of the potentially uneconorric public pay phones individually, or 
- as an average over all unecononic public pay phones, or 
- as a national average over all public pay phones, 
net of replacerrent calls. 
•  Incoming calls should be a negligible quantity for public pay phones so that no activity 
as regards collecting their volurres should be initiated. 
•  For each type of call (local,  long-distance, international, for different tirre zones) the 
corresponding costs per minute, which rrost likely will only be available as a national 
average cost figure. 
•  For  each  of the  different potentially  unecononic categories  of public  pay  phones, 
average  revenue  per  pay  phone  corresponding  to  the  volurres  of services  listed 
above. 
The  calculation of the avoidable direct net cost of a category  P of public  pay  phones, 
identified by its demand characteristic and its average avoidable cost, if the service over 
these public pay phones were discontinued, is then as follows: 
Average cost of the relevant category (or subcategory) of public pay phone times 
nurri:>er of pay phones 
+  Average ninutes of outgoing calls per pay phone times cost per ninute of calls 
(each for local, long-distance, and international calls and differentiated according 
to relevant tirre zones) times nurri:>er of pay phones, net of cost of replacerrent 
calls 
Revenues foregone if service over category P of pay phones were discontinued 
=  Net cost avoided if category P of pay phones were elininated from the network 
As in the case of unecononic areas and unecononic custorrers, the data on the cost 
per unit of service (per public pay phone or per call ninute) will be available on following 
the procedures discussed in Chapter 2, while the data on revenues and on call volurres 
w ill be available on follow ing the procedures presented in Chapter 3. 
Since  incorring  call  revenue  for  public  pay  phones  can  be  considered  a  negligible 
quantity, there is no need to elirrinate double counted incorring call revenue. 
The sarrple calculation in  Section 4.2.4 showing the steps leading to the net cost for a 
hypothetical area can also serve as exarrple for the calculation of the net cost for public 
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\Mlat is  left to do is to list the different categories of pay phones each with its direct net 
cost as calculated according to the above procedure (due to its sirrple structure there is 
no token  exarrple for this  list).  Total direct net cost of uneconomc areas,  custorrers 
and  pay phones  is  then the sum over the arrount on this  list plus  the arrounts shown 
according to Tables 4.2.1.2-1 and 4.2.2.2-1. 
From the above we conclude 
1.  The data that has been corrpiled in the course of work to ascertain per unit costs as 
well as  revenues  of potentially  unecononic  public  pay  phones,  as  described  in 
Chapters 2 and 3, should be used to calculate the net cost of public pay phones. 
2.  calculations should always be in terms of volurres of service (nurmer of public pay 
phones, volurres of call rrinutes per public pay  phone)  times the relevant per unit 
cost (average cost per public pay phone in question, average cost per call ninute). 
In  this  way it  can  be  assured that on  the  cost and  revenue sides  the  underlying 
rreasures are consistent with each other. 
3.  The relevant service volurres for unecononic public pay phones are: 
- nurmer of public pay phones, 
- outgoing calls per public pay phone, 
- interconnect calls per public pay phone, and 
- called-party-pays calls per public pay phone, 
where all call volurres are reduced by nurmer of replacerrent call rrinutes. 
4.  The  calculations  should  be  carried  out  with  the  set of  (potentially)  unecononic 
public pay phones that are left after elinination of those that w ill not be unecononic 
in the long run (according to the life-cycle-effect test of Section 4.3.1). 
4.2.4  Sarrple calculation for the direct net cost of an area 
This  section serves to present a sarrple calculation of the direct net cost of an area. I 
supposes to reflect the calculations that led to the net cost of area 1 in Table 4.2.1.2-1 
before correction for double counted incorring call revenue. The revenue set against the 
cost will be that from Table 3.5-1. The volurres of calls  underlying the cost calculation 
are supposed to  corre from the  set of data that had  to  be  collected  for the  revenue 
calculations shown in Table 3.5.-1. 
The details of the exarrple are as follows: 
•  There are 3,000 custorrers in the area. 
•  The average cost of a subscriber line is 20 ECU per rronth. 102  Study for the European Col11'l'lssion 
•  Per rrinute costs of calls correspond to cost estirrates reported in a study carried out 
for Gerrrany.  53 We assurre that long-distance calls are over only one distance band 
(50-300  km)  and  that the  per  rrinute  cost of international  calls  is  the  cost to  the 
nearest international gateway (net of the settlerrent rate corrponent), assurred to be 
equal to the cost of the distance band used for the long-distance calls. 
•  Per rrinute cost for interconnection calls is at 85% of the cost of local calls. 
•  Per rrinute costs for called-party-pays calls are set equal to an assurred average of 
the costs of local and long-distance calls. 
•  The replacerrent rates are 0.15 for outgoing calls and called-party-pays calls, 0.05 for 
incorring calls,  and  0.10 for interconnect calls.  These rates  are in  agreerrent with 
those used for the foregone revenue calculation in Table 3.5-1. 
In the rrain body the table here, the calculation for the direct net cost of area 1 of Table 
4.2.1.2-1  is  shown,  before  correction  of double  counted  incorring  call  revenue.  The 
corresponding correction is  done at the end  of the table  in  one step by  deducting the 
arrount found in Table 4.2.1.2-1. 
Table 4.2.4-1:  Sarrple calculation for the direct net cost of area A 
ECU 
1  Average annual cost per line  240 
2  Access costs of area (240 x 3,000)  720,000 
3  Minutes of outgoing local calls during peak time times relevant cost per  5.35 
minute (500 x 1.07 c) 
4  Minutes of outgoing local calls during off-peak time times relevant cost per  8.56 
minute (800 x 1.07 c) 
5  Minutes of outgoing long-distance calls during peak time times relevant  9.94 
cost per minute (200 x 4.97 c) 
6  Mnutes of outgoing long-distance calls during off-peak time times relevant  7.04 
cost per minute (400 x 1.76 c) 
7  Minutes of outgoing international calls during peak time times relevant cost  0.994 
per minute (20 x 4.97 c) 
8  Minutes of outgoing international calls during off-peak time times relevant  0.70 
cost per minute (40 x 1.76 c) 
9  Costs of outgoing calls as an average per line  32.59 
10  Costs of outgoing replacement calls as an average per line at a  4.89 
replacement rate of 0.15 
11  Outgoing call costs, net of replacement call costs as an average per line  27.70 
12  Outgoing call costs of area, net of replacement call costs (27.70 x  83,099 
3,000) 
53  See Garcia and Hackbarth (1996). Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  103 
13  Minutes of incoming local calls during peak time times relevant cost per  2.68 
minute (250 x 1.07 c) 
14  Minutes of incoming local calls during off-peak time times relevant cost per  4.28 
minute (400 x 1.07 c) 
15  Minutes of incoming long-distance and international calls (differentiated  18.68 
according to line 5 to 8 and averaged) times relevant cost per minute (660 x 
2.83 c) 
16  Costs of incoming calls as an average per line  25.63 
17  Costs of incoming replacernent calls as an average per line at a  1.28 
replacement rate of 0.05 
18  Incoming call costs, net of replacernent call costs as an average per line  24.35 
19  Incoming call costs of area, net of replacement call costs (24.35 x  73,050 
3,000) 
20  Minutes of interconnect calls during peak tirne times relevant cost per  0.45 
minute (50 x 0.90 c) 
21  Mnutes of interconnect calls during off-peak tirne times relevant cost per  0.90 
minute (100 x 0.90 c) 
22  Costs of interconnect calls as an average per line  1.35 
23  Costs of interconnect replacernent calls as an average per line at a  0.14 
replacement rate of 0.10 
24  Interconnect call costs, net of replacement call costs as an average per  1.21 
line 
25  Interconnect call costs of area, net of replacement call costs (1.21  x  3,630 
3,000) 
26  Minutes of called-party-pays calls during peak time times relevant cost per  0.50 
minute (20 x 2.50 c) 
27  Minutes of called-party-pays calls during off-peak tirne times relevant cost  0.48 
per minute (40 x 1.20 c) 
28  Costs of called-party-pays calls as an average per line  0.98 
29  Costs of called-party-pays replacement call costs as an average per line at  0.15 
a replacernent rate of 0.15 
30  Costs of called-party-pays calls, net of replacernent call costs as an  0.83 
average per line 
31  Called-party-pays costs of area, net of replacement call costs (0.83 x  2,499 
3,000) 
32  Total avoidable costs of area (sum of lines 2,  12,  19, 25 and 31)  882,278 
33  Revenues foregone of area (see Table 3.5-1)  -609,450 
34  Total direct net costs of area (before correction for double counted  272,828 
incoming call revenue) 
35  Correction for double counted incoming call revenue  + 4,289 
36  Total direct net cost of area (after correction for double counted  277,117 
incoming call revenue) 104  Study for the European CorTI'Tlssion 
4.3  The indirect benefits of  the USO 
While  the  direct  net  costs  deternined  in  Section  4.2  measure  the  irrpact  on  the 
performance of the firm that derive directly from the services identified as unecononic, 
the  indirect  benefits  refer  to  pos~ive effects  on  this  performance  that  come  about 
because providing usa services has  repercussions on the firm's  other business. The 
rronetary value of these effects needs to  be deternined and  deducted from direct net 
costs of universal service to obtain the overall net cost (or benefit) to the USO provider. 
The following have been identified as potential indirect benefits: 
- life cycle effects, 
- enhancement of corporate reputation, 
- effects of increased ubiquity, 
- access to full range of telephone usage, and 
- advertising benef~  of public pay phones. 
Each of them will be discussed below. 
4.3.1  Life cycle effects 
The  .. life cycle effect  ..  refers to the effect of basing a decision on the net present value 
(NPV)  of the  business  proposmon  in  question,  instead  of  on  the  current  difference 
between costs  and  revenues.  The  business  proposition  would  be  to  serve particular 
areas  or customer groups  or to  maintain  pay  phones  that are potentially  uneconorric, 
taking into account the NPV of the expected business over the relevant future period. For 
this  purpose,  projections over this  future period of both costs and  revenues have to be 
made  and  the  decision  be  taken  on  the  basis  of the  difference between the sums  of 
these cost and revenue streams discounted to the present time.  One should essentially 
proceed  along  the  lines  discussed  in  Chapter  2.3.1.4  where  we  analysed  how 
depreciation  policy  can  have  the  effect of showing  a current  defic~ where on  a  NPV 
basis  there  is  in  fact a positive  balance.  One  would  in  particular  need  projections  of 
demand  over  the  relevant  future.  This  would  appear  not  too  hazardous  since 
telecorrrrLJnications  services  belong  at the  present time  to  those  activities  for which 
healthy growth rates can safely be predicted. 
These dynanic effects have different irrplications  for customer groups and  public  pay 
phones, on the one hand, and for areas, on the other, as we w ill see in the follow ing. Costing and Rnancing Universal Service Obligations  105 
Life cycle effects as regards potentially uneconomic customer groups 
Analysys  in  its  report to  Oftel54  describes  the  business  practice  in  other  businesses 
w hich have always been corrpetitive and which nevertheless are characterised by  the 
fact that at any one moment they maintain business accounts with customers that are 
currently  unecononic.  The  reason  that these  business  relationships  are  not severed 
resides  in  the fact that a large proportion  of them will turn econonic in  the future,  or 
more  precisely,  that the  proportion  of the  customers  that will turn  econonic is  large 
enough that it is justified to maintain the relationships with all of them at the current time. 
As suggested by Analysys, one should include into the group to be considered econonic 
despite current net cost all those who may be expected to show a positive balance after 
five  years.  This  is  therefore the  critical  question:  Is  it  possible  to  separate  apparent 
unecononic customers according to whether (a) they will possibly turn econonic in the 
future and (b) they would never do so? If this can be done, the group identified under (b) 
should  definitely  be  classified  as  unecononic.  In  respect of the  group  under  (a),  a 
judgement would have to be made whether a large enough fraction of these customers 
should be expected to turn econonic within the relevant future period so that their overall 
NPV  would be  positive.  If  the  answer is  positive,  this  whole customer group must be 
classified  as  econonic  since  it  is  irrpossible  to  pick  among  that  group  only  those 
individual ones that are going to fulfill the pronise. 
Analysys argued in  respect of the UK that under corrpetitive conditions  BT would find it 
irrpossible to  identify  any  of the  customers  according  to  these criteria  and  therefore 
recofllll3nds that none of the 2.2 nillion customers found unecononic on the basis of 
the current net cost calculation should in the longer-run perspective be so classified. 
Although we believe that the judgement would be sinilar in many other l\llerroer States, 
we also believe that the case cannot be  prejudged  in  general. The  classification would 
have to reflect the situation of the IVIerrber State in question. The network operator may 
be  in a position to produce the data allowing to make the (a) - (b)  separation described 
above and for the (a) group to carry out the evaluation w hether a large enough fraction of 
them would turn  econonic within five years.  In  such a case,  one could  come  to  the 
conclusion that not only all the customers classified under (b), but that also thew hole (a) 
group should be considered as unecononic. 
V\lhen the network operator is not able to produce the data needed to carry out the above 
analysis, all unecononic customers classified as  unecononic according to the current 
direct net cost calculation  should  be  considered  as  econonic.  We  concur here with 
Analysys55 that in such a case the USO provider should be disallowed to claim costs for 
unecononic customers since it is unable to identify these customers. 
54  Analysys (1995), pp. 26-29. 
55  Analysys (1995), 29. 106  Study for the European Corrn1ssion 
Finally,  it is  irll>ortant to note that the analysis discussed here rrust already have been 
completed before starting  the  deternination of the  total direct net cost of unecononic 
custorrers  as  discussed  in  Section 4.2.2.  The sorting that we discussed there should 
be  carried  out  only  w ith  those  custorrers  that  are  unecononic  according  to  the  "life 
cycle  test".  Rerrermer  that  this  sorting  has  to  be  carried  out  in  order  to  identify  all 
unecononic custorrers after taking double counted inconing call revenue into account. 
A'oceeding  in a different order w auld unnecessarily corll>licate the w hole process as  it 
could  rrean that the iterative procedure used  in Section 4.2.2 may  have to run through 
additional iterations. 
Life cycle effects as regards potentially uneconomic public pay phones 
In respect of public pay phones it has been noted for the UK that a substantial fraction of 
them exhibit revenue streams over the years that vary considerably from one year to the 
other.  From this follows that a pay phone showing a deficit according to the current net 
cost calculation  may  have  in  future  years  substantially  larger  revenues  and  therefore 
may on a NPJ basis be econorric. 
As in the case of unecononic custorrers, the critical question is whether it is possible to 
separate unecononic pay  phones  in  the two categories  of (a)  those that will possibly 
turn econonic in the future and (b) those that w auld never do so? If this can be done, the 
group identified under (b) should definitely be classified as unecononic. In respect of the 
group under (a), a judgerrent w auld have to be made w hether a large enough fraction of 
these pay phones should be expected to turn econonic within the relevant future period 
so that their overall NFV w auld be positive.  If the answer is  positive, this whole group of 
pay  phones  rrust be classified  as  econonic since it is  irll>ossible to  pick among  that 
group those individual ones that are going to fulfill the pronise. 
Analysys  picked  a figure  of  25  % of the  pay  phones  found  unecononic  on  the  initial 
count  as  being  econonic  on  the  NFV  evaluation.  As  in  the  case  of  unecononic 
custorrers,  we believe that the  situation  cannot  be  prejudged  in  general.  The  precise 
classification w auld  have to  reflect the  situation  of the  IVermer State  in  question.  The 
netw ark  operator  w auld  have  to  be  able  to  produce  the  data  allowing  to  make  the 
necessary  classification.  Again  as  in  the  case  of  unecononic  custorrers,  one  could 
corre to the conclusion that not only  all the pay phones classified under (b),  but that the 
whole group (a) should be considered as unecononic. 
As  in  the  case  of  unecononic  custorrers,  when the  netw ark  operator  is  not  able  to 
produce the data  needed  to  carry out the  above  analysis,  all  unecononic pay  phones 
classified as  unecononic according to the current direct net cost calculation should be 
considered  as  econonic.  The  USO  provider  should  be  disallowed  to  claim costs  for 
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Life cycle effects as regards potentially uneconomic areas 
The situation with potentially unecononic areas differs from unecononic customers and 
pay phones insofar as  in respect of each of them we have an entity that is large enough 
that it is  worthwhile to investigate whether that entity individually will become econonic 
over  the  foreseeable  future.  As  in  the  case  of  unecononic  customers,  one  should 
evaluate the  business  prospect of the  area  in  question  over a five-year future  period, 
taking into account the development of costs as well as of revenue. 
Analysis found for the UK that of the 375,000 lines found to be unecononic on the basis 
of current direct net cost,  210,000 turned econonic when calculated  on  a NPV  basis, 
although  the  effect on  the  total  arrount of the  net cost was much  srraller since only 
those areas  were affected that initially  were only  rrarginally  unecononic. We  strongly 
believe that the effect would be sinilar in  other l\llerrber States  and that the impact on 
the total arrount of net costs could  in several cases be rrore pronounced, for example 
when  it  is  the  question  of  newly  connected  areas  that  show  pronise  of  rapid 
development. 
As  in  the  case  of  unecononic  customers,  the  sorting  necessary  to  identify  the 
unecononic  areas  after taking  double  counted  inconing  call  revenue  into  account, 
discussed in  Section 4.1.2,  should for the same reason  be carried out only  with those 
areas that according to the "life cycle test" are unecononic. 
We conclude: 
1.  The  possibility  of  properly  applying  life  cycle  effects  to  the  classification  of 
unecononic customers and public pay phones depends heavily on the capability of 
the network operator to provide data that allows the identification of those categories 
of customers/pay phones that rray possibly be econonic after five years on a NPV 
basis.  ~ will further depend  on  the evaluation of whether of the category for which 
this is true a large enough fraction will in fact be econonic under this evaluation so 
that it would be worthwhile to continue serving the whole group. 
2.  In  the  absence  of the  inforrration  necessary  for carrying  out this  evaluation,  the 
whole group of each of unecononic customers  and  pay  phones  according to  the 
direct net cost measure should be classified as econonic. 
3.  Each area found unecononic according to the direct net cost calculation should be 
exanined according  to  w hether they  would  rerrain  so taking  the  development of 
cost of service delivery and revenues over the next five years into consideration and 
carry out the calculation on a NPV basis. 
4.  ~ should  be  expected  that  a  substantial  share  of  areas  found  unecononic  on 
account of current net cost will be  classified as  econonic when exanined on  an 
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5.  The  sorting  of  unecononic  areas  and  customers  taking  into  account  double 
counted inconing call revenue should be carried out after the life cycle tests of this 
section  has  filtered  out the  areas  and  customers  that  on  an  NVP basis  are  not 
uneconomic. 
4.3.2  Enhancerrent of corporate reputation 
Being  the usa provider  is  generally  well reputed  so that for this  reason  one  should 
expect the usa provider to gain an enhancement of its corporate reputation. This would 
not be a marginal effect. The size would depend on the nurrber of customers that would 
honour the usa function with additional loyalty in the face of advantageous offers from 
competitors. 
Oftel also  considers  this  effect to  be  quite  substantial because the  perception  of the 
operator by  all of its  customers, and by the customers of other operators, is  affected. It 
acknowledges  at  the  same  time  the  difficulties  of  properly  quantifying  the  resulting 
benefit. Apparently based on an expert evaluation, Oftel considers the value of the effect 
on  corporate reputation  to  equal approximately  20  °/o  of the advertising  and  marketing 
expenditure of BTs retail operations.s& This  assessment derives from the idea that the 
enhancement of corporate reputation  is worth the arrount of rroney that would have to 
be spent by the usa provider in order to obtain a comparable standing with customers. 
While  we propose  below  a different approach  - w hich  we think  is  rmre adequate -
Oftel's  approach  should  be  used  in  the  interim until  a  better one  can  be  applied.  As 
regards the concrete percentage figure for the share of the advertising  and  marketing 
budget, we would suggest to obtain advice from an expert on the matter.  In general we 
would recommend  to  apply  a percentage figure that takes  note of the  relation  of that 
budget to the usa provider's turnover.  If that relation is lower than in  BTs case - which 
is about 3.3 o/o- the percentage to estimate the benefit should correspondingly be higher 
than 20 % and vice versa. The reason is that in those cases where the network operator 
in question has so far engaged in advertising and marketing on a relatively low  level, the 
percentage of 20 °/o  would appear too low  to properly reflect the benefit,  and  of course 
vice  versa  if  there  are  particularly  heavy  advertising  and  marketing  efforts.  A.Jt 
differently, it may actually be better to express the benefit as a percentage of the relevant 
sales figure.  If in  BTs case Oftel had  proceeded this  way it should have evaluated the 
benefit BT gains from its usa status as being worth 0.65 % of its  retail sales in order to 
get the same estimate as with 20% of the advertising and marketing budget. 
A  rmre direct approach than  relying  on  the expenditure for advertising  and  marketing 
would be to measure directly to what degree customers extend a greater loyalty to the 
usa provider, and what commercial benefit the latter derives from this  greater loyalty. 
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This  would involve carrying out consurrer surveys in which representative sarrples of 
consurrers are faced with hypothetical choices between offers from different telephone 
corrpanies,  one  of them  being  the  USO  provider  who is  clearly  identified  as  such. 
Ftovided it is carefully designed, such consurrer research can yield reliable results. 
We believe that there w auld be value for NRAs to initiate consurrer research along this 
line.  There  are  indications  that the  results  w auld  yield  a substantially  larger benefit in 
terms  of enhanced  corporate  reputation  than  is  expressed  by  a  20  % share  of the 
advertising  and  marketing  budget  or  a  0.65%  share  of  turnover. 57  I  could  even 
realistically  be expected that the results  irrply a significant USO net benefit in  lieu of a 
net cost making the USO a privilege instead of a burden. 58  From this follows that NRAs 
w auld be well advised to concentrate efforts on deterrrining the value of indirect benefits 
before engaging in an elaborate cost deterrrination exercise. 
Based on this discussion we conclude: 
1.  The  benefit from USO provider status  in  terms  of corporate reputation  should  be 
expected to be quite substantial. 
2.  If  there  is  no  other  indicator,  one  should  use  as  a  rreasure  of  the  benefit  a 
percentage of the  USO provider's advertising and  marketing  budget,  like the 20% 
share of Brs corresponding expenditure used by Oftel, or a share of the turnover of 
the USO provider, which, to correspond to the 20% of the advertising and marketing 
budget, w auld in the BT case have been 0.65 °/o. 
3.  NRAs should initiate consurrer research in order to rreasure directly tow hat degree 
custorrers  extend  a  greater  loyalty  to  the  USO  provider,  and  what comrrercial 
benefit the  latter  derives  from this  greater  loyalty.  I  should  be  expected  that the 
results  w auld  yield  a substantially  larger  benefit  in  terms  of enhanced  corporate 
reputation  than  is  expressed  by  a 20  % share  of the  advertising  and  marketing 
budget or a 0.65 °/o share of the USO provider's turnover. 
57  A  consumer research project like  the one  suggested would have been  beyond the scope of the 
present study. Nevertheless we would like to report the results from answers to three questions that 
were put to a representative sample of more than 2,000 German residents, as  part of a consumer 
survey designed for a different purpose though also addressing telecommunications services. The 
results show  that a range of between 10% to 30% of the subjects, depending on  age, education 
and other socio-dernographic characteristics, would consider switching from Deutsche Telekom to 
a competitor not at all or only  at a substantial price difference, because of the enhanced reputation 
that Deutsche Telekom enjoys due to  its  USO status. Let us  take this  result as  suggestive and 
apply it to Deutsche Telekom's  sales with residential customers (in  1997 about 14 billion  ECU). 
Doing a quick calculation of what share of that business could according to the above percentages 
be  considered "safe", and taking a share of that business that would otherwise be threatened by 
competitors, one arrives at an  estimate of the benefit that would surpass by  a multiple the 20 % 
share of adverstising and marketing expenditure used by Oftel, respectively, the 0.65% of turnover 
as suggested by the authors in the main text. 
58  As a case in  point,  Oftel finds that BT enjoys  benefits from its  USO the value of which are about 
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4.3.3  Ubiquity 
Ubiquity  provides  a rrarketing  benefit to the  network operator that is  offering services 
nation-wide since all custorrers know  that they can order telephone services from it no 
rratter w here they  are on  the  national  territory.  The  operator to  w hich  this  character-
isation generally applies is the incurrbent network operator. 
In  particular,  ubiquity  is  of  value  if  custorrers  rrove  to  an  area  where  there  are 
corrpeting suppliers.  A  proportion of households will not be  aware of the existence of 
alternative suppliers and will choose the incurrbent operator as  its  supplier although  it 
w auld have chosen a corrpeting supplier had it been aware that it served the area. Over 
tirre  as  those  custorrers  get  inforrred  about  corrpeting  suppliers,  they  will tend  to 
switch away from the USO provider. The benefit of ubiquity is the present value of profit 
that is  obtained from those custorrers in the period before they switch to a corrpeting 
supplier. 
The  stock  of  lines  gained  each  year  as  a  result  of  ubiquity  can  be  calculated  as 
follows:59 
Nurrber  of  households  that  have  a  choice  between  the  USO  provider  and 
corrpeting access providers 
x  Share of households that rrove location during the year 
x  Share  of households  that  do  not know  about existence  of corrpeting  access 
providers 
x  Share of households  that choose the  USO  provider but w auld  have chosen a 
corrpetitive access provider if fully inforrred 
=  Stock of lines gained from ubiquity 
Ubiquity rray confer a substantial benefit. The relevant question in the present context is 
whether the gains from ubiquity would be significantly affected if the incurrbent operator 
no longer rret USOs  and withdrew  service from unecononic areas.  In  such a situation 
one w auld  need  to  consider  several cases  differentiated  according  to  which types  of 
areas rray be involved when custorrers are rroving: 
•  For  custorrers  rroving  from  econonic  areas  to  other  economic  areas  nothing 
changes regarding their perception of the incurrbent's ubiquity w hen the incumbent 
operator  ceases  to  serve  unecononic  areas.  This  is  so because  the  incurrbent 
continues to serve the areas tow  hich the custorrers are rroving. 
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•  For custorrers fTDVing to unecononic areas not served any fTDre by the incurrbent, 
there is  no choice that the fTDving  custorrer could  rrake in favour of the incurrbent 
because the latter has  - voluntarily  - pulled  out of the area.  Again the  perception of 
ubiquity that the operator values is not affected. 
•  For customers fTDVing from uneconomic areas to econonic areas there may  be an 
effect on people's  choice due to the change in  ubiquity  of the incurrt>ent if the area 
from which the customers are fTDving away is now served by other operators. These 
people are likely to be aware of alternatives in the areas they are fTDving to. 
The last case is the only one where a change in the incurrbent's status as USO provider 
affects its  ubiquity with any consequence.  It is, how ever, also one very likely to involve a 
very s rrall fraction of people.  The  incurrbent w ill  thus rerrain quasi-ubiquitous and the 
advantage  that  it  enjoys  in  terrrs  of  people's  perception  of  its  ubiquity  vis-a-vis 
corrpeting providers is hardly if at all affected. 
Benefits  of ubiquity  are thus  predoninantly  related  to  being  a large,  well-established, 
market  doninant  national  operator.  The  gains  would  still  exist  even  though  the 
incurrbent were no longer the USO provider. The calculation of the stock of lines gained 
as  a result of ubiquity,  as  described above,  would only  insignificantly  be  affected. We 
therefore argue that the benefits from ubiquity cannot be regarded as  an indirect benefit 
of USO provision and should not be set against the direct net cost of universal service. 
We conclude: 
1.  Ubiquous  presence  of  a  network operator  rrust  be  considered  to  confer  on  it  a 
substantial benefit. 
2.  This  benefit rrust in  the case of the incurrbent network operator be attributed to its 
status  of a  large,  well-established,  rrarket doninant national  operator.  The  effect 
would not cease to exist if the incurrt>ent as USO provider no longer provided service 
to unecononic areas. In such a situation the advantage that the incurrt>ent enjoys in 
terrrs  of  people's  perception  of its  ubiquity  vis-a-vis  corrpeting  providers  would 
hardly dininish. 
3.  Therefore,  benefits from ubiquity  cannot be  regarded  as  an  indirect benefit of USO 
provision and should not be set against the direct net cost of universal service. 
4.3.4  Access to full range of telephone usage data 
The incumbent network operator has because of its doninant rrarket position a superior 
know ledge  about  how  customers  use  the  telephone.  This  is  a  significant  rrarketing 
benefit as  there is  less  need  to  purchase rrarket research if  new  products  are to  be 
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effect is  prirrarily  related  to  the  incunt>ent  being  a  large,  rrarket  doninant national 
operator. 
The  fact that the  incunt>ent operator  is  also  the  usa provider adds  little  to  it.  If  the 
incunt>ent w ithdrew  its  USO services it would loose the inforrration for a set of areas, 
custorrers and  pay  phones  that it elects on  its  own not to  serve or provide any  rrore. 
From the latter observation follows rather irrrrediately that the operator must not value 
this  inforrration  very  much.  Access  to  this  extra  know ledge  that  becorres  available 
when providing  the  USO services  in  question  does  not appear to  be  a benefit worth 
taking into account w hen calculating the overall net cost of the USO. 
We conclude: 
1.  Access to the full range of telephone usage data provides a substantial benefit to the 
incunt>ent network operator. 
2.  This  benefit,  how ever,  is  predoninantly  related  to  being  a large,  rrarket doninant 
national  operator  and  would  prevail  even  if  the  incurrbent w ithdrew  service  from 
unecononic areas, custorrers and pay phones. 
3.  Therefore, benefits from this effect cannot be regarded as  an indirect benefit of USO 
provision  and  should  not  be  set against the  direct net  cost when calculating  the 
overall net cost of the USO. 
4.3.5  Advertising benefit of serving public pay phones 
A benefit of public pay phones is the value of the advertising of the operator's logo on call 
boxes.  Depending  on  the  location  of  the  public  pay  phone,  the  benefit  could  be 
substantial.  The  largest advertising  benefit is  generated  by  pay  phones  located  in  city 
centres.  However, those pay phones  norrrally do not create a direct financial universal 
service cost and  are econonic. The  advertising  benefit,  therefore,  is  unrelated  to  the 
provision  of USOs  and  cannot  be  counted  as  an  indirect  effect of  USOs.  Only  the 
advertising benefit of unecononic public pay  phones should be regarded as  an  indirect 
benefit related to  being the usa provider that has  to be set against the direct financial 
costs of unecononic pay phones. 
The advertising benefit could be roughly approxirrated as 
Nunt>er of unecononic public pay phones (after taking account of life cycle 
effects) 
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=  Advertising benefit foregone if service were withdrawn from unecononic public 
pay phones 
Unecononic public  pay  phones  are those that create a direct net cost in  the relevant 
year and that rerrein unprofitable even after life cycle effects are taken into account. The 
average  advertising  benefit  should  be  estirreted  using  as  a  proxy  the  price  for  an 
equivalent advertising presence in the relevant area. 
We conclude: 
1.  A.Jblic  pay  phones  that are unecononic (after taking  account of life cycle effects) 
create  an  advertising  effect that  w auld  be  foregone  if  these  pay  phones  were 
withdrawn.  This  indirect  effect  should  be  set  against  the  direct  net  costs  of 
unecononic public pay phones. 
2.  The cost of comparable advertising presence at the relevant location should serve 
as a proxy for the advertising benefit of a pay phone. 
4.3.6  Concluding observation on indirect benefits 
The  values  of  the  various  indirect  benefits  of  usa provider  status,  as  assessed 
according to above discussion, should be sumred and  set against the total direct net 
costs of unecononic areas,  custorrers  and  public  pay  phones,  as  derived  in  Section 
4.2. The total value of these benefits rrey be sufficiently large to reduce substantially the 
overall net cost of the usa, if not outweigh it completely. 
As an example, aftel calculated the direct net cost of the usa for BT to be about 45 to 
80 nillion pounds sterling. Against this it set an estirreted total value of indirect benefits 
ranging from 102 to 151  nillion pounds sterling. Hence, Oftel concluded that BT has no 
proven case of an undue financial burden placed on it because of the usa.  60 
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5  Financing the Net Costs of USOs 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter 5 of the report looks  at specific universal service financing scherres. l\llerrber 
States  that consider it  necessary to  share the  net costs  of USOs  through  a specific 
rrechanism  may  either  use  a  Universal  Service  Fund  (USF)  or  a  system  of 
supplerrentary charges paid by operators interconnecting with the usa provider.  61 
Section 5.1  lays out the particular requirerrents that specific universal service financing 
scherres should rreet: efficiency, market neutrality and non-discrinination, continuity of 
funding,  objectivity,  transparency  and  proportionality.  We  do  not address  financing  of 
USOs  out of general taxes, where all tax paying entities  contribute.  It  should,  how ever, 
be  noted  that  in  terrrs  of efficiency  and  market-neutrality,  financing  of  USOs  out  of 
general taxes  is  preferable to  specific universal service financing scherres where only 
the telecorrm.mications industry or parts of it contribute. 
Section  5.2  highlights  the  case  for  a  USF  where contributions  are  based  on  gross 
revenues net of certain deductible payrrents (usually terrred net revenues). This section 
shows  that  other  contribution  bases  fare  worse  in  terrrs  of  efficiency  and  market-
neutrality and sorre of them are clearly contrary to Conm.Jnity Law. The EU frarrew ark 
allows  l\llerrber  States  to  impose  contributions  on  all  organisations  operating  public 
teleconm.Jnications  netw arks  and/or  publicly  available  voice  telephony  services.  62 
Section 5.2 derronstrates why alternative fund designs where the scope of contributing 
operators is narrower should not be applied given the requirerrents laid down in Section 
5.1. 
Section  5.3  analyses  the  disadvantages  associated  with  a system of supplerrentary 
charges added to interconnection payrrents and argues that such a regirre, if a positive 
overall  net cost of universal  service in  fact exists,  should  only  be  applied  for a short 
period of tirre and be replaced by a USF. 
Section 5.4 provides a sarll'le calculation that shows the allocation of payrrents under a 
USF and a system of supplerrentary charges. 
5.2  Requirements for funding schemes 
Specific universal service financing scherres should respect the following requirerrents. 
First,  funding  scherres should  minimise a/locative  efficiency losses  that  result  from 
61  Article 5(2) Interconnection Directive in  corrm:m with Full Competition  Directive.  Besides  specific 
universal service financing schemes, the universal service burden may also be financed directly or 
indirectly by the State. Analysis of this alternative is not within the scope of the report. 
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operators passing on the financial burden to custorrers  via  price increases.  In  order to 
nininise such efficiency losses, the net cost of USOs  should be allocated across the 
broadest possible base. 
Second,  financing  scherres  should  be  able  to  generate  the  necessary funds  in  a 
continuous way.  In  particular, the chosen contribution base should be broad and stable 
enough to ensure the necessary contributions over tirre. 
Third,  financing scherres should  minimise distortions  to  the  competitive process and 
avoid discrimination. Payrrents into the scherre should be neutral with regard to market 
players, services, vertical structure, and technologies:63 
•  Neutrality vtith regard to market players: Contributions should be assessed on market 
players  proportionate  to  an  appropriate  rreasure  of econonic  activity.  Graduated 
contribution  scherres  in  w hich  particular  groups  of  operators  w auld  be  either 
exerrpted or allowed to  make  discounted  contributions  w auld  not be  corrpetitively 
neutral. 
•  Neutrality  vtith  regard  to  applications  and  content:  Funding  scherres  should  not 
favour any particular use of telecornrunications services over others (e.g., local calls 
over long-distance calls). 
•  Neutrality  vtith  regard  to  vertical  structure:  Funding  scherres  should  not  favour 
integrated  provision  of services  over unbundled  provision  (e.g.,  integrated  network 
over interconnection),  or vice versa.  In  order to ensure structural neutrality,  funding 
scherres  rrust  avoid  accurrulations  of  contributions  upon  contributions  across 
multiple stages. 
•  Technological  neutrality:  Funding  scherres  should  not  favour  any  type  of 
transnission  technology  over  another  (e.g.,  rrobile  over  fixed).  The  contribution 
charged should be independent of the type of transnission technology used. 
Fourth,  the principles of financing scherres and the outcorre of their application should 
be  objective and  transparent.  Operators  rrust be  able  to  perceive what they  will be 
required to contribute to funding.  tt is indispensable that the principles of cost sharing are 
clearly defined and made public in advance. 
Fifth, financing scherres should be practicable and  keep the adninistrative burden and 
related costs to the necessary ninirrum. Operators liable to contribute to funding should 
be  easily  identifiable  and  the  basis  for  assessing  contributions  should  be  easy  to 
rreasure  and  validate.  A  potential  trade-off  between  goals  is  likely  to  exist between 
efficiency and market neutrality on the one hand and practicability of the scherre on the 
other hand. W1en devising a funding scherre, this trade-off between different objectives 
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should be carefully weighed given the level of net USO costs to be  allocated arrongst 
market players in a particular Nleni:>er State. 
Sixth,  financing  schemes  should  irrpose  incentives  for a  cost efficient provision  of 
USOs.  As we have  argued  in  Chapter  2.2,  efficiency  incentives  are  provided  if  the 
calculation of the USO provider's corrpensation is  based on forward-looking costs and 
revenues. They should also allow  in the long run for the time when efficiency incentives 
can be further strengthened by putting out to tender the task of meeting USOs in order to 
deternine  the  USO  provider(  s)  and  the  required  corrpensation(  s).  This  kind  of 
corrpetition for USOs requires funding schemes that are neutral w ith regard to w ho the 
USO  provider  is  and  which allow  to  designate  other  USO  providers  than  the  market 
doninant operator. 
Finally, financing schemes should be proportional and give rise to corrpetitive distortions 
only to the extent that this is unavoidable when ensuring universal service objectives. 
We conclude: 
1.  Specific universal service financing schemes should be devised in a way that 
- nininises efficiency losses, 
- safeguards the continuity of funding, 
- respects the need for market neutrality and avoids discrinination, 
- ensures objectivity and transparency, 
- ensures practicability, 
-provides incentives to decrease the cost of USO provision over time, and 
- meets the need for proportionality. 
2.  A  trade-off  between  efficiency  and  rrerket  neutrality  on  the  one  hand  and 
practicability  of the  scheme on  the  other hand  is  likely  to  exist.  V\lhen  devising  a 
funding scheme, any trade-off should be carefully weighed. 
3.  It should be noted that the costs of a financing scheme in terms of efficiency losses, 
corrpetitive  distorsions  and  adninistrative costs  can  be  substantial.  Given  those 
costs,  Nleni:>er  States  should  not irrplement  specific  universal  service financing 
schemes as long as corrpetitive pressures irrposed on the USO provider are small 
and do not endanger its financial viability. 
5.3  The case for a net revenues-based Universal Service Fund (USF) 
5.3.1  Contributing organisations 
The  EU  framework allows  Nlember  States  to  share the  net  USO  costs  arrongst all 
organisations  operating  public  telecomrunications  netw arks  and/or  publicly  available I 
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voice  telephony  services.64  Hence,  organisations  liable  to  contribute  to  a  USF  can 
enCOrll>aSS 
•  organisations  that  operate  fixed  public  telephone  netw arks  and/or  fixed  public 
telephone services as well as 
•  organisations  that  operate  public  mobile  telephone  netw arks  and/or  public  mobile 
telephone services. 
Organisations that do not operate public  telecorrm.mications  netw arks and/or publicly 
available voice telephony  services  are excluded from funding.  Such organisations,  for 
example, include 
•  private  netw ark  operators  offering  corporate  networking  or  closed  user  group 
services, 
•  service providers offering data comrunications or value-added services (such as e-
mail), and 
•  service  providers  offering  enhanced  voice  telephony  services  such  as  video-
conferencing, voice mail  services,  and  voice enquiry/reply services such as  horre-
banking or tele-s hopping. 
A priori,  Member States that implerrent a USF should not additionally restrict the scope 
of organisations liable to contribute to the fund. Exempting particular groups of operators 
w auld  further narrow  the  basis  of the  fund  which could  lead  to  efficiency  losses  and 
pose  problerrs  for  the  continuity  of  funding.  Narrowing  the  scope  of  contributing 
operators could also violate neutrality requirerrents,  result in  discrinination and  distort 
the pattern of investrrent in the industry. 
How ever,  practicability  suggests  to  exempt  smaller  operators  from  contributions. 
Restricting  the scope of contributing  organisations  to  those above a certain  threshold 
level of econonic activity w auld strengthen the practicability of the rrechanism and keep 
adninistrative costs dow n.65  The  disadvantages of an  exemption w auld  be  small  and 
justified by the adninistrative costs avoided. 66 
We see no reason for exempting other groups of organisations.  In particular, exemption 
of mobile telephony operators w auld not be justified by practicability concerns. Excluding 
them would unnecessarily narrow the basis of the fund and lead to inefficiency.  ~ w auld 
favour a particular type of technology  and  service over others  (mobile  telephony  over 
64  Article 5( 1) Interconnection Directive. 
65  It has also been argued that exelll>tions should be provided to encourage market entry and growth 
of  new  competitors.  l-lowever,  we do  not  consider  a  Universal  Service  Fund  to  be  a  proper 
instrument for supporting new  market entry. 
66  Exemption of smaller operators is treated in more detail in section 5.3.2.4. 118  Study for the European Corrrrission 
fixed  link  telephony).  In  view  of  the  forecast  convergence,  an  exerll>tion  of  rrobile 
telephony  operators  w auld  not  be  COrll>etitively  neutral  and  discrininate  against 
operators of fixed public telephone netw arks. 
We conclude: 
1.  All  organisations  operating  public  telecomrunications  netw arks  and/or  publicly 
available  voice  telephony  services  should  contribute  to  the  fund.  Only  smaller 
operators  should  be  exerll>ted  from contributions.  V\lhile  the disadvantages  of an 
exerll>tion w auld be small, the benefits in terms of increased practicability and lower 
adninistrative costs w auld be high. 
2.  Exerll>tions  on  other grounds add  nothing to the practicability of the system w hile 
creating  inefficiency  and  market  distortions.  Exerll>tion  of  rrobile  telephony 
operators  w auld  not  be  COrll>etitively  neutral,  distort  investment  incentives  and 
discrininate  against  operators  of fixed  telephone  netw arks  in  a  situation  where 
markets converge. 
5.3.2  Basis for assessing contributions 
5.3.2.1  Volume, profit or revenues-based? 
In thew ide-ranging discussions regarding sharing mechanisms for the cost of the USO, 
the following measures have been proposed as a basis for assessing contributions to a 
USF: 
•  timed traffic volume, 
•  number of subscribers 
•  profits, 
•  gross revenues, 
•  retail revenues and 
•  gross-revenues net of certain deductible payments made to other organisations that 
contribute to the fund (usually termed net revenues). 
As we argue in the following, the last measure provides a neutral and non-discrininatory 
basis for allocating the net universal service costs. The other ones are associated with 
severe disadvantages and should not be used. 
Use of timed traffic volume as  measured in call ninutes w auld violate market neutrality 
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detail  below,  call  ninutes  cannot  provide  a  corrpetitively  neutral  basis  and  could 
discrininate against certain groups of operators: 
•  First,  call  ninutes  do  not  provide  a  basis  that  is  neutral  with  regard  to  use  of 
telecomn.mications  netw arks.  For exarrple,  a ninute of a long-distance call w auld 
bear the same usa charge as a ninute of a local call even though its value w auld be 
higher. 
•  Second, call ninutes are not neutral with regard to vertical structure. Dividing ninutes 
from interconnect calls equally between operators involved in carrying out the call, as 
it  is  sometimes  done,  does  not  solve  the  problem.  The  result  is  arbitrary  since 
individual  interconnecting  operators  may  add  telecorrm.mications  value  to  a  very 
different extent. 
•  Third,  it is  difficult to see how  call ninutes can be used for services other than voice 
telephony. 
Number of subscribers  even  fares  worse against the  four  neutrality  requirements.  A 
system based  on  the  nurrber of subscribers w auld  seriously  disadvantage operators 
that  predoninantly  serve  low -volume  users,  such  as  households.  It  is  clearly 
discrininatory in a way that w auld hardly be corrpatible w ith Corrm.mity Law . 
Profit is  sometimes  regarded as  a suitable basis for a tax because of its  neutrality with 
regard to the corrbination of inputs.  How ever, a profit-based contribution w auld  provide 
incentives for firrrs to  artificially  reallocate costs to  business  areas that are subject to 
contributions,  to  make  their  profits  appear  small.  As a  consequence,  cost allocation 
procedures would have to be closely monitored by the NRA. A profit-based approach is, 
therefore,  likely  to  create  an  unnecessarily  large  adninistrative  burden.  Furthermore, 
because corrpetition  reduces  profits,  any  profit-based  contribution  base w auld  erode 
over time.  As the  burden  is  passed  back to  a dininishing  group  of non-corrpetitive 
services,  the  fund  could  fail  to  cover the  usa provider's  net  universal  service  cost. 
Hence, any profit-based approach w auld encounter serious difficulties and w auld not be 
able to safeguard the continuity of funding. 
Corrpared to traffic volume, nurrber of subscribers or profits, a revenue-based measure 
is  obviously  preferable.  However,  care  nust be  taken  in  appropriately  defining  the 
measure.  Retail  revenues  or gross  revenues  should  not  be  used  as  the  contribution 
basis for the following reasons. 
Assessing contributions on retail revenues w auld be corrparable to a single-stage sales 
tax collected at end-user level.  Retail  revenue-based contributions w auld,  in  fact,  meet 
an irrportant requirement: neutrality with regard to vertical structure. Since contributions 
w auld only  become due at the interface with the end-user customer, there w auld be no 
accunulation  of  contribution  upon  contribution.  We  do  question,  how ever,  the 
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a  clear  separation  of  sales  to  end-users  (retail  sales)  from  sales  to  other 
teleconm.Jnications organisations involving many definitional problems. The corrplexity 
of the  system w auld  significantly  add  to  the  adrrinistrative  burden  of both  NRA  and 
contributing firms. We,  therefore, do not consider the retail revenue-based approach as 
a preferable solution. 
tf  contributions were sirrply based on  gross revenues (  corrparable to a sales tax), the 
contribution basis w auld also include (a)  interconnection payrrents received from other 
operators of public teleconm.Jnications netw arks, (b) payrrents received from resellers 
and (c) payrrents received for leased lines. Gross revenues-based contributions w auld 
virtually violate all neutrality requirerrents and w auld discrirrinate against operators with 
a low  degree of vertical integration.  For exarll'le, a new  operator of a voice telephony 
service that  uses  interconnection  with  the  dorrinant  operator  w auld  be  taxed  tw ice: 
directly on  its  gross revenues  and  indirectly on  interconnection payrrents made to the 
incurrbent.  aearly,  gross  revenues  are  not  an  appropriate  basis  for  assessing 
contributions. 
The  way  to  avoid  rrultiple  contributions  is  to  make  payrrents  for  interconnection, 
wholes  ale services and  leased lines  deductible from gross revenues.  How ever, if such 
payments were made to an organisation not contributing to the fund, they should not be 
deductible. There is no reason to subtract payrrents to organisations that are exerrpted 
from the scheme since such payrrents do not already incorporate a contribution to the 
fund.  In  consequence,  gross  revenues  net of payments  made  to  other contributing 
operators for interconnection,  Vtholesale  services  and leased lines  is  the  appropriate 
basis  for assessing contributions.  It  is  neutral with regard to market players, services, 
vertical structure and technologies and it is non-discrirrinatory. 
As an interrrediate result, we conclude: 
1.  Contributions into a USF should be based on gross revenues (before taxes), net of 
payrrents made to other organisations contributing to the USF for interconnection, 
wholes  ale services and leased lines  (exclusive of taxes). This  is  the only rreasure 
that meets  the need  for market neutrality and  non-discrirrination on  the one  hand 
and for practicability on the other hand. 
2.  Using  retail  revenues  w auld  not be  a practicable approach because it w auld  give 
rise to COrll>lex definitional problems and irll>ose a significant adninistrative burden 
on operators and NRAs. 
3.  Gross revenues, call rrinutes, and nurmer of subscribers should not be used as  a 
basis for assessing contributions since those rreasures violate virtually all neutrality 
requirements  and  are discrirrinatory  in  a way that make  them incorrpatible with 
Corrm.Jnity Law . Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  121 
4.  Any profit-based approach w auld provide incentives for firrrs to artificially reallocate 
costs,  encourage  distortions  and  w auld  not  be  able  to  ensure  the  continuity  of 
funding. 
5.3.2.2  International services 
In case of international services, operators in several countries are involved in providing 
the services. There are two options  for dealing  w ~h these services when establishing 
the contribution base "gross revenues net of deductible payments". 
- First  option:  The  domestic  operator's  gross  revenues  are  defined  to  include  the 
payments  received  from  foreign  operators  for terrrinating  international  or  cross-
border  calls,  which  may  be  either  payments  received  under  the  international 
settlement  system or  interconnection  payments  made  by  the  foreign  operator.  In 
case of outgoing international calls, only the revenue portion received by the domestic 
operator  is  taken  into  account.  In  other  words,  the  domestic  operator's  revenue 
portion w auld  comprise  revenues  billed to  customers  net  of payments  made  to 
foreign  operators.  Such  payments  could  be  payments  under  the  international 
settlement system or interconnection payments. This option is  not recommended for 
the reasons given below . 
- Second  option:  The  domestic  operator's  gross  revenues  are  defined  to  include  all 
revenues  generated  by  domestic  customers  in  originating  international  or  cross-
border calls.  In  contrast,  revenues  from  incoming  international  calls  are  excluded 
from contributions  to  the  USF.  The  full  revenue  of  outgoing  calls  enters  into  the 
contribution base, i.e.  payments to operators in other countries for the terrrination of 
calls  (payments  under  the  international  settlement  system  or  interconnection 
payments) are not deductible. 
By  choosing  the  first option,  a share of the  universal service cost in  a IVember  State 
w auld be allocated to customers in other countries that benefit from being able to make 
calls  to  and  receive  calls  from unecononic  areas/customers  in  that  IVember  State. 
Such subsidies w auld  in  principle be justifiable since call and network externalities also 
benefit  international  callers  in  other  countries.  The  problem,  how ever,  is  that,  on  a 
political  level,  contributions  of operators  in  one  country  to  the  USF of another country 
may  cause concerns. For example,  problerrs may  arise if one IVember State relies  on 
market forces to ensure universal service whereas in  another IVember State a USF is 
implemented to impose substantial contributions on liable organisations. IVember States 
and  other countries  night engage in  lengthy  arguments  about reciprocal contributions. 
The  second  option  avoids  those  problerrs  by  placing  contributions  only  on  services 
provided to domestic customers. Any USO cost in  a IVember State is  fully financed by 
that IVember State's  operators and  customers.  The contributions  that according to the 
first option w auld  be borne by  foreign callers  are approximately  assumed  by  domestic 122  Study for the European Cormission 
callers in that the full revenues of outgoing calls enter into the contribution base and are 
thus subject to the levy. 
In  order  to  take  account  of  international  services  we make  our  conclusions  of the 
preceding section rrore concrete as follows: 
V\lhen  assessing  contributions  into  the  USF,  dorrestic  gross  revenues  should  be 
defined  to  include  revenues  from international  services  billed  to  dorrestic custorrers. 
Revenue received from terninating international calls should not be included. 
5.3.2.3  V\lhich custorrers, which services? 
Having defined "gross revenues net of deductible payrrents" as the relevant contribution 
base,  the  custorrers  and  services  to  be  included  remain  to  be  specified.  First,  a 
contribution  should  not be  assessed on  net revenues  from unecononic custorrers  if 
regulatory constraints prevented the USO provider from passing on the burden to those 
custorrers. The reason is that any price increase for those custorrers w auld violate the 
affordability criterion.  If such regulatory constraints existed the USO provider would have 
to spread the total arrount of contributions to be paid over its econonic custorrer base. 
With  intense competition,  this  night not be fully feasible and  problems  for the financial 
viability of the USO provider could errerge. Hence, the USO provider should be allowed 
to deduct net revenues attributable to unecononic custorrers from its total net revenue 
figure. 
In order to carry out the deduction, (a) unecononic areas/custorrers rrust be identified, 
(b)  revenues  billed  to  unecononic  areas/custorrers  rrust  be  rreasured  and  (c) 
interconnect payrrents made to  other operators for terninating calls  from unecononic 
custorrers  rrust  be  estimated.  Since  these  data  are  also  necessary  for costing  of 
USOs, they are already available and do not lead to an additional adninistrative burden. 
Deduction  of the  net  revenues  of  unecononic  areas/custorrers  is  a  straightforward 
exercise. 
A second question is which service revenues should be included in the contribution base 
of liable  operators. Service revenues that should  be included  are revenues  from voice 
telephony  services  (fixed  and  rrobile),  interconnection  services  (fixed  and  rrobile), 
wholesale services (fixed and rrobile),  and  leased lines services. A complication arises 
from the fact that the  EU frarrew ork excludes certain operators  from contributing  to  a 
USF.  These are operators that are not offering the above services but are providers of 
corporate  networking  and  closed  user  group  services,  data  comrrunications,  value 
added  services,  or enhanced  voice telephony  services.  Since such operators  are  not 
liable  to  contribute  to  the  USF,  the  revenues  of  liable  operators  from  comparable 
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In contrast, w holes ale and leased lines services that a liable operator delivers internally 
to  its  downstream business areas offering the mentioned value-added services should 
be  included.  The  reason  is  that  non-liable  providers  of these  services  will contribute 
indirectly  to  the  USF w hen  they  buy  wholes  ale services or leased  lines  services from 
liable network operators since the latter will try to pass on any  levy to their customers. 
Downstream  value  added  service  operations  of  liable  operators  should  therefore 
sinilarly  contribute  by  being  internally  charged  with this  levy  on  the  network services 
they  use.  Otherw ise  the  independant  value  added  service  providers  w auld  be 
discrininated  against.  Including  these  internal  sales  of wholes  ale  and  leased  lines 
services  in  the contribution  base is  then  a logical consequence of this  requirement.  In 
order  to  make  the  calculation  of  internal  charges  transparent,  all  operators  liable  to 
contribute to the USF should provide the necessary separated accounting information. 
It should  be  noted  that the added  corrplexity  identified  above could  be  of a terrporary 
nature.  Structural  separation  of  basic  netw ark/telephony  services  and  other  services 
(value-added services, data communication services, corporate netw arks,  etc.) seems 
to  become the  norm in  many  IVIember States. With  corporate networking, closed user 
group  services,  data  communications,  value-added  services,  or  enhanced  voice 
telephony  services  being  provided  by  subsidiaries  of  network  operators,  internal 
revenues will be substituted by market revenues and calculation of the contribution base 
will be facilitated. 
We conclude: 
1.  V\lhen  assessing  contributions  into  the  USF,  net  revenues  from  uneconorric 
customers under the USO should not be included in the USO provider's contribution 
base if  regulatory  constraints  prevented  it from passing  on  contributions  to  those 
customers. Net revenues from uneconorric customers should be derived from data 
already generated and used for the calculation of universal service costs. 
2.  Net  revenues  from  corporate  networking  and  closed  user  group  services,  data 
comrunications,  value-added  services,  and  enhanced  voice  telephony  services 
should  not be  included  in  the  contribution  basis.  However,  internal revenues  from 
providing netw ark services within the corrpany to business areas that provide value-
added services, data communication services, corporate networking, etc. should be 
included.  To  ensure  transparency,  all  operators  liable  to  contribute  to  the  USF, 
should provide separated accounting information. 
5.3.2.4  Allowance 
In  order to ensure the practicability of the scheme,  organisations whose contribution to 
the fund is smaller than the cost of collection should not be liable to make contributions. 
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operators that are small in terrrs of gross revenues w auld  not have to contribute to the 
fund.  Also,  operators that do not sufficiently add  telecorrm.mications value in terms  of 
net  revenues  such  as  many  resellers  would  be  exerrpted  from contributions.  As an 
inmediate consequence, the nurrber of entities subject to contributions w auld decrease 
and  the  practicability  of the fund  be  strengthened.  It  rrust be  noted  that organisations 
exerrpted  from  contributions  contribute  indirectly  to  the  fund  when  using  network 
services  of  facilities-based  telecomrunications  operators  (which  are  assessed  for 
contributions).  It  is  only  the  added  telecorrm.Jnications  value  that is  not subject to  a 
contribution. 67 
There  are two alternatives  of  exerrpting  smaller  operators  which result  in  a different 
allocation of net universal service costs armngst market players: 
•  First,  operators  with net  revenues  not exceeding  the  threshold  X could  sirrply  be 
exerrpted  from contributions.  The  net  universal  service  costs  would  be  allocated 
armngst organisations  (with net revenues  of rmre than X)  in  proportion to their net 
revenues. 
•  Second,  all  organisations  could  have  an  allowance  for  the  first  X  units  of  net 
revenues.  The  net universal service  costs  w auld  be  allocated  in  proportion  to  net 
revenues, less the allowance of X. 
The  second alternative is  preferable to  the first one  since it treats  all  operators  in  the 
sarre way. care rrust, how ever, be taken to set the threshold X at a value that is related 
to  the  adninistrative  costs  that  can  be  avoided  by  exerrpting  a  corrpetitor  from 
contributions. 68 
We conclude: 
To strengthen the practicability of the USF,  operators whose net revenues are below  a 
threshold  level X should  be  exerrpted from contributions.  An allowance for the  first X 
units of net revenues is the appropriate procedure to irrplerrent the exerrption in a non-
discrininatory way. 
Sumning  up  the  previous  sections,  the contribution  base of each operator should  be 
calculated as follows: 
Gross revenues of operator,  before taxes, from 
fixed voice telephony services (national and outgoing international) 
67  It  should  be  noted  that  the  Interconnection  Directive  also  provides  thresholds  as  regards  the 
obligation for accounting separation. See Interconnection Directive Annex VI referring to Article 8(1) 
and (2). 
68  Avoided administrative costs should be interpreted to CO!ll>rise both the NRA' s and the operator's 
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rrobile voice telephony services (national and outgoing international) 
interconnection services 
wholes  ale services 
leased line services 
125 
+  Internal revenues from providing lMiolesale and leased line services (or the 
corresponding internal netlll.()rk services) Vlithin the company to dooostream 
business areas that provide value-added services,  data communication 
services,  corporate netlll.()rk ing,  etc.  (provided that the revenues are not already 
included in the first item) 
Expenditures,  exclusive of  taxes,  for 
wholes  ale services 
interconnection services (exclusive of inconing international traffic) 
leased-lines services 
Net revenues from uneconomic areas/customers/public call boxes, exclusive of 
taxes if regulatory constraints prevented the USO provider from passing on 
contributions to those custorrers (deduction for USO provider only) 
Allowance of  X 
=  Base for assessing operator's contribution into USF 
5.4  Disadvantages of supplementary charges added to interconnection 
payments 
As  an  alternative  funding  scherre,  the  EU  frarrew ork  envisages  a  system  of 
supplerrentary  charges  in  addition  to  interconnection  payrrents.69  With  such  an 
approach,  the  USO  provider  shares  its  net  USO  cost  with  other  operators 
interconnecting  w ith  its  network  Whereas  interconnecting  operators  pay  an  explicit 
supplementary charge in  addition to their interconnection payrrents, the  USO provider 
implicitly charges a share of the net USO cost to itself. Transparency requires that the 
USO provider's own irrplicit contribution is made public. 
The traditional understanding is that supplementary charges are based on the number of 
access minutes provided by  the  USO provider to  interconnecting operators.  The  USO 
provider  irrplicitly  contributes  on  the  basis  of  the  number  of call  minutes  of  its 
custorrers, w here it is  required  that its  internal calls  are tirred  tw ice,  both  w hen they 
originate  and  terninate.  For  one,  the  same  arguments  against this  contribution  base 
hold  here that we discussed in  the context of the  USF,  i.e.  that allocating the net USO 
69  See Art. 5(2) Interconnection Directive. 126  Study for the European Cormission 
costs on the basis of nurrber of rrinutes does not rreet the requirerrent for neutrality in 
respect of all the relevant pararreters: rrarket players, services, technology, and vertical 
structure. In addition the following caveats apply: 
•  First, there is  no convincing solution to the double contribution problem Even if calls 
that are internal to the  USO provider's netw ark were tirred tw ice  (at the origination 
and  terrrination  side),  structural  neutrality  w auld  not  really  be  ensured.  Giving  an 
interconnect call half the weight of a call  internal to the  USO provider's  netw ark  is 
purely  arbitrary  and  is  unlikely  to  reflect  the  telecormunications  value  that  an 
interconnecting operators adds. Neutrality with regard to vertical structure (the degree 
of vertical integration) w auld not be ensured. 
•  Second,  a system of supplerrentary charges  creates  inefficient incentives to  avoid 
interconnection, and it discrirrinates against the USO provider. Corrpetitors are liable 
to contribute to funding only to the extent that they use the USO provider's netw ark. 
Calls  that are internal  to  the  corrpetitors'  netw arks  or interconnect calls  that  only 
involve corrpetitors of the USO provider do not enter into the basis on which charges 
are levied. Supplerrentary charges to interconnection payrrents discrirrinate against 
the  USO  provider,  and  severely  distort  investrrent  incentives.  To  reduce  USO 
contributions,  operators  rray  interconnect w ith  local  access  providers  that are  not 
USO providers,  or vertically  integrate into  local access even though the  (resource) 
cost of interconnection with the USO provider were lower. If corrpetitors increasingly 
bypassed the USO provider's netw ark, the continuity of funding w auld be endangered. 
Alternatively, the net universal service costs could  be allocated between USO provider 
and interconnecting operators on the basis of net revenues  as defined.70 Such a basis 
for calculating  supplerrentary  charges w auld  avoid  sorre of the problerrs  associated 
with rrinute-based  charges:  First,  in  contrast to  rrinute-based  charges,  net revenue-
based charges are neutral w ith regard to services and netw ark use. Second, they do not 
create a double contribution problem Third,  an operator w auld only be able to avoid net 
revenue-based charges if it did not interconnect at all with the USO provider, a scenario 
which is unlikely in the short and rredium term. And finally, net revenues are rrore easy 
to validate by the regulatory authority than call rrinutes. 
In  fact,  supplerrentary charges  based  on  net revenues  lead  to the sarre allocation  of 
contributions as a net-revenue based USF if the following two conditions hold: 
•  There is only one USO provider (the rrarket dorrinant operator). 
70  A priori, net revenues are defined as gross revenues of voice telephony, interconnection, wholes  ale 
and  leased-lines  services  (before  taxes)  less  expenditures  for interconnection,  wholesale  and 
leased-lines services bought from other contributing operators. Possibly, net revenues from serving 
uneconomic  areas/customers/pay  phones  will  have  to  be  excluded  from  the  USO  provider' s 
contribution base. See section 5.3.2. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  127 
•  All  organisations  providing  public  telecornrunications  networks  and/or  publicly 
available voice telephony services are interconnecting w ith the USO provider. 
To derronstrate that the first condition m.Jst hold,  assume for a rroment that there are 
two USO providers (the market dorrinant operator and a smaller operator) as well as a 
nuni:>er  of  other  organisations  without  USOs.  Furtherrrore  assume  that  all 
organisations,  including  the  smaller  USO  provider,  are  interconnected  with  the 
incuni:>ent  USO  provider.  The  incuni:>ent  would then  be  able  to  spread  its  net  USO 
costs arrongst all organisations since it is interconnecting with all others. In contrast, the 
smaller USO provider would only be able to share its net USO costs with the incuni:>ent 
since  it  has  no  further  interconnection  relationships.  The  resulting  allocation  of  net 
universal service costs would be different from that with a USF. 
The  second  condition  is  also  straightforward.  Obviously,  organisations  not 
interconnecting with the USO provider cannot be made liable to contribute to funding. An 
exal'l1Jie  is  a  non  facilities-based  reseller  which would  have  to  contribute  to  a  USF 
whereas  it  could  not  be  made  liable  to  pay  a  supplementary  charge  since  it  buys 
wholes  ale  services.  With  resellers  not  participating  in  funding  under  a  system  of 
supplementary charges, the resulting allocation of contributions is, of course, different to 
that  of  a  USF.  The  difference  to  a  USF  would,  however,  probably  be  small  since 
resellers  w auld  contribute  only  small  arrounts  to  the  USF  because of their  relatively 
small net revenue basis. 
Hence,  if  the  conditions  above  held,  a  system of  supplementary  charges  w auld  be 
sirrilar  to  a virtual  USF  where organisations  make  contributions  directly  to  the  USO 
provider and a system of supplementary charges can therefore be justified. In the longer 
run,  how ever,  even  with  a  net-revenues  based  contribution  basis,  a  system  of 
supplementary charges has two disadvantages that render this  approach inferior to the 
USF: 
•  First, a system of supplementary charges creates inefficient incentives to build up an 
alternative infrastructure to avoid interconnection and supplementary charges. 
•  Second,  a system of supplementary  charges  to  interconnection payments  typically 
relies on the market dorrinant operator as  USO provider and offers little opportunities 
for putting  USOs  out to  COI'l1Jetitive  tendering.  Col'l1Jetition  for USOs  w auld  not be 
feasible. 
We conclude: 
1.  In general, a system of supplementary charges added to interconnection payments 
is  inferior to  a  USF.  It  creates  inefficient incentives  to  avoid  interconnection  and 
violates  market neutrality requirements,  in  particular,  if supplementary  charges are 
based  on  call  rrinutes.  tf  competitors  bypassed the  USO  provider's  netw ark,  the 
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also  ties  provision  of  USOs  to  the  market  dorrinant  operator  and  provides  little 
opportunities for putting USOs out to COITlletitive tendering. 
2.  Given  the  problems  involved  in  a  system  of  supplerrentary  charges  to  inter-
connection  payrrents,  such  a  scherre  can  only  be  terl'l'orarily  justified  in  the 
imrrediate aftermath of fullliberalisation, i.e.,  in  a situation normally  marked  by  the 
following characteristics: 
- There is one dorrinant operator in the market. 
- All  organisations  providing  public  telecomrunications  networks  and/or  publicly 
available voice telephony services are interconnecting w ith the market dorrinant 
operator (with the exception of non-facilities-based resellers which, by definition, 
do not interconnect but buy w holes ale services). 
3.  If  a  rv1ember  State  terl'l'orarily  applies  a  system of supplerrentary  charges,  the 
follow ing requirerrents should be rret: 
- USOs should be solely irl'l'osed on the market dorrinant operator. 
- All  operators  interconnecting  with  the  USO  provider  should  contribute  to  the 
funding  of  universal  service.  There  should  be  no  exerl'l'tions  for  particular 
groups of interconnecting operators such as rrobile telephony operators. 
-The net  universal  service  cost should  be  allocated  arrong  the  universal  service 
provider  and  interconnecting  operators  on  the  basis  of  net  revenue,  that  is, 
gross revenues  of voice telephony,  interconnection, wholes  ale and  leased-lines 
services less deductible expenditures for interconnection, w holes ale and leased-
lines  services.  In  contrast,  given  their  distortionary  and  discrirrinatory  nature, 
call  rrinutes  should  not  be  used  as  a  basis  for  supplerrentary  charges  to 
interconnection payrrents.  Because of their discrirrinatory nature,  call  rrinutes 
are incompatible with Comrunity Law . 
5.5  Sample calculation 
5.5.1  Universal Service Fund 
How  would a given arrount of net universal service costs  be allocated  arrongst liable 
operators if contributions  to  a USF were based on  net revenue? For an  illustration, we 
provide a sample calculation that is based on the assurl'l'tions that after liberalisation 
•  the incumbent (operator A) will retain a dorrinant market position; 
•  there w ill  be  two rrore  nation-wide network operators  (operators  B and  C)  w ith  a 
significant market share as well as a smaller one (operator D); Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  129 
•  in  addition  there w ill  be  1  0 other organisations  (  4 regional  network operators  and  6 
service providers)  that are liable to  contribute to  funding  (that is,  with net revenues 
above ECU 0.5 mio.); 
•  all operators liable to contribute to the USF have structurally separated other services 
from the basic network and voice telephony business, so there is  no need to assess 
internal revenues from providing network services w ithin the sai'Tl3 firm; 
•  the new competitors will all heavily rely on the incurment's infrastructure; 
•  USOs will only be imposed on the incurment operator (operator A); 
•  USOs  will cause a  net universal service cost of ECU  1  00  nio.  to  the  incurment 
operator A; 
•  the incurment operator A w ill be able to generate a net revenue of ECU 500 nio. from 
its USO custoi'Tl3rs (out of a total net revenue of ECU 26,090 nio.). 
Table  5.5.1-1  shows  a  hypothetical  distribution  of  gross  revenues  and  deductible 
payi'Tl3nts  for operators liable to contribute to the USF.  These are assui'Tl3d  to be four 
larger  operators,  designated  by  "A",  "B",  "C' and  "D'',  and  a  group  of  smaller  ones 
grouped under "others". Colurms (  1) to (  5)  contain gross revenues from retail services 
(national  and  international),  wholesale  services,  interconnection,  and  leased  lines. 
Colurms (7) to (9) show the deductible expenditures, that is, expenditures for wholes  ale 
services, interconnection and leased lines. 
It should be  noted that the total of interconnect revenues (column 4,  last line)  rrust be 
equal  to  the  total  of  interconnect  expenditures  (column  8).  IVbreover,  the  sum  of 
wholes  ale revenues (  colurm 3) rrust be equal to the sum of expenditures for wholes  ale 
services  (colurm  7).  In  contrast,  total  expenditures  made  for  leased-lines  services 
(column  9)  rrust not necessarily  be  equal  to  total  revenues  of leased-lines  services 
(column  5)  since  such  services  are  also  provided  for corporate  networks  and  other 
closed  user groups  w hich  are  not  liable  to  contribute  to  the  USF.  Because  of this 
inequality,  the sum of retail  revenues  (colurms  1 and  2)  differs from the  sum of net 
revenues (column 11) by 15 nio. ECU. 
Each operator's contribution basis is calculated as 
Retail revenue national (  colurm 1) 
+  Retail revenue international (column 2) 
+  Revenues from wholes  ale services (  colurm 3) 
+  Revenues from interconnection (column 4) 
+  Revenues from leased lines (column 5) 130  Study for the European CorTTTission 
Expenditures for w holes ale services (  colurm 7) 
Expenditures for interconnection services(  colurm 8) 
Expenditures for leased lines services (  colurm 9) 
Net revenues from USO customers (deduction only for USO provider) 
(colurm 12) 
Allowance of ECU 0.5 mo. (colurm 13) 
=  Operator's basis for contributions to the USF (colurm 14) 
Note that, besides operators A, 8, C and D, there are 10 other operators assumed to be 
liable to contribute to the fund which explains this group's total allowance of ECU 5 mo. 
(10 times ECU 0,5 mio. in colurm 13). 
Colurms (  15) and (  16) show the allocation of the net universal service costs arrong the 
operators as a percentage of the total and in ECU. The USO provider A accounts for the 
overwhelmng share of funding (84.38 %),  whereas operators  8 and  C pay a share of 
6.10  %  and  5.44  %.  Operator  D's  share  is  1.60  %  and  the  remaining  10 operators 
contribute a total of 2.49 %.  Assuning that the overall net cost of the USO arrounts to 
1  00 mio.  ECU,  the USO provider covers 84.4 mo.  ECU  itself.  Operators  8,  C and  D 
contribute to the fund 6.1, 5.4 and 1.6 mo. ECU,  respectively. Individual contributions by 
other operators are very small. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  131 132  Study for the European Cormission 
5.5.2  Supplerrentary charges to interconnection payrrents 
In  Table  5.5.2-1  we provide also a safll)le calculation for a system of supplerrentary 
charges.  The  underlying  scenario is  the  sarre as  above.  It  is  also  assurred that net 
revenues is the basis for calculating supplerrentary charges and the ifll)licit contribution 
of the USO provider. The resulting allocation of contributions shown in columns (15) and 
(  16)  is  slightly different cofll)ared to a US F.  Since a USO charge can only be irrposed 
on  interconnecting  operators,  pure  service providers  are  not included  in  the table  as 
organisations  liable  to  contribute  to  funding  of USOs.  The  group  of other  operators, 
therefore, only cofll)rises 4 regional network operators but no service providers. 
As Table  5.5.2-1  shows, the effect of excluding pure service providers from funding is 
small. The USO provider A now contributes a slightly higher share of 84.79 o/o  (instead of 
84.38 % under the US F). Operator B's share is 6.13 % (instead of 6.1 0 %) , operator Cs 
share arrounts to 5.47% (instead of 5.44 o/o),  and operator D contributes 1.61  %(rather 
than  1,60  °/o).  Hence,  it  can  be  concluded  that  a system of supplerrentary  charges 
results in a sinilar allocation of net USO costs once a net revenues base is  taken.  The 
reason  is  that with net  revenues-based  contributions,  service  providers  are  liable  to 
contribute  only  small  arrounts  to  the  USO  cost so that  leaving  them  out  under  a 
supplerrentary charges regirre only makes a small difference. The major difference to a 
USF then is that under a system of supplerrentary charges payrrents are made directly 
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Table 5.5.1-1:  Allocation of net universal service cost arrong operators under a Universal Service Fun 
Gross revenues (mio.  ECU)  Deductible payments (mo. ECU)  net  net  allowance 
revenues 
op  retail  retail  whole- inter- leased  whole- inter- leased  revenues  uso 
national  internat'l  sale  connect  lines  total  sale  connect  lines  total  (mio.ECU)  cust'rs  (mio.  ECU) 
(mio.  ECU) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
A  20,500  3,000  500  1,700  800  26,500  0  375  35  410  26,090  500  0.5 
B  2,000  250  300  170  50  2,770  0  620  300  920  1,850  0  0.5 
c  2,000  250  150  170  50  2,570  0  620  300  920  1,650  0  0.5 
D  600  50  100  30  10  790  0  205  100  305  485  0  0.5 
oth's  2,100  100  0  50  10  2,260  1,050  300  150  1,500  760  0  5 
total  27,200  3,650  1,050  2,120  870  34,890  1,050  2,120  885  4,055  30,835  500  7 
Note:  Arrounts to be contributed to the Universal Service Fund (column 16) are calculated on the assumption of a net US( 134  Study for the European Cormission 
Table 5.5.2-1:  Allocation of net universal service cost arrong operators under a system of supplerrent 
interconnection payrrents (salll>le calculation) 
Gross revenues (mio.  ECU)  Deductible payrrents (mio.  ECU)  net  net  allowance 
revenues 
op  retail  retail  whole- inter- leased  whole- inter- leased  revenues  uso 
national  internat'l  sale  connect  lines  total  sale  connect  lines  total  (mio.ECU)  cust'rs  (mo. ECU) 
(mio.  ECU) 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
A  20,500  3,000  500  1,700  800  26,500  0  375  35  410  26,090  500  0.5 
B  2,000  250  300  170  50  2,770  0  620  300  920  1,850  0  0.5 
c  2,000  250  150  170  50  2,570  0  620  300  920  1,650  0  0.5 
D  600  50  100  30  10  790  0  205  100  305  485  0  0.5 
oth's  900  100  0  50  10  1,060  0  300  150  450  610  0  2 
total  26,000  3,650  1,050  2,120  870  33,690  0  2,120  885  3,005  30,685  500  4 
Note:  Amounts to be contributed to the USF (column 16) are calculated on the assu!Tlltion of a net USO cost of ECU 1001 
Besides operators 8,  C and 0, there are 4 other operators which interconnect with the universal service provider A 
this group of operators of ECU 2 mio. in column 13. Costing and Financing Universal Service Obligations  135 
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